Protecting Catholic Colleges from External Threats to Their Religious Liberty

Federal and state laws are increasingly being used to coerce religious institutions into actions and commitments that violate deeply held religious convictions and moral principles.1  Some of these laws require employee and student health insurance that covers contraception, and mandate employee benefits for same sex couples.

Catholic colleges and universities and other Catholic organizations are not immune from emerging threats to their religious liberty and Catholic identity, but can take steps to minimize the danger.

This paper will briefly outline some of the major forms of these threats related to:

  • acceptance of federal student aid and grants, thus triggering federal Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibitions and federal research grant conditions;
  • Title VII’s prohibitions on employment discrimination;
  • the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act healthcare overhaul; and
  • various state-level laws and regulations.

After explaining the ways the application of these laws and regulations can threaten a Catholic college or university’s Catholic identity, the paper will propose steps each institution may take to mitigate the danger.

It must be noted, however, that any available exemptions for religious institutions will not apply if a college that was founded as a religious institution has become largely secular.  It is therefore vital that Catholic colleges and universities maintain their Catholic identity in all of their programs in order to best protect their religious character and mission.

Catholic colleges and universities have an advantage over other religious institutions in that the Catholic Church’s Canon Law and the Apostolic Constitution Ex corde Ecclesiae lay out the requirements for a college to be considered Catholic.  While Church law is beyond the purview of this paper, it should be noted that a college that does not faithfully adhere to and apply the Catholic Church’s own law might find it difficult if not impossible to convince a secular court that it is a Catholic institution deserving protection.

THREATS TO THE RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

Accepting Federal Funding

Federal funding generally takes the form of research grants or student financial aid.  The laws and regulations governing these funds prohibit discrimination based on sex, which may require insurance plans to cover prescription contraception.  But there is an exemption for religious organizations.

Research Grant Conditions

Religious discrimination is conspicuously absent from a list of prohibitions on discrimination that circumscribes the actions of grantees of direct grant programs from the Department of Education.  Religious institutions’ ability to receive such grants is conditioned on their compliance with the following:  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act.  Thus, grantees cannot discriminate on the basis of:  race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age.2  A direct grant is broadly conceived, and eligibility for each individual grant is governed by its particular authorizing statute and implementing regulations.3

Faith-based organizations are eligible to receive the direct grants, and the Code clearly establishes that the Department of Education awarding these grants will not discriminate against faith-based organizations.  These organizations are not forced to abandon their religious character, expression, or autonomy in order to receive these funds.4 To the extent that a religious educational institution seeks to provide a program or service for which a direct grant is available, the Department extends this opportunity to receive aid without compromising the school’s distinctively religious mission.  But religious educational institutions must carefully examine the procurement criteria for any particular research grant in order to determine whether accepting the federal funds will adversely affect their particular religious mission.

Federal Title IX’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination in Education

Although Title IX prohibits sex discrimination5 in schools that receive federal financial assistance, it has an exemption for religious organizations.6  If an educational institution is both “controlled by a religious organization” and if prohibiting sex discrimination would “not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization,” then the school may be able to discriminate.7  But it is clearly limited to differentiating on the basis of sex.8Title IX only applies to schools that receive federal financial assistance. Most Catholic colleges and universities receive federal financial assistance in the form of Federal Student Aid,9 which enables students10 to afford expensive post-secondary education.  Students apply for this aid by completing the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).  Formerly, student loans were offered under both the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program.  FFEL loans involved the federal government guaranteeing the loans of private lenders, but with Direct Loans, students borrow directly from the U.S. Department of Education.  In 2010, among other changes,11 the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (“Reconciliation Act”)12 eliminated the FFEL Program, and now these loans13 will all be funded by the Direct Loan Program.

The Code of Federal Regulations, which governs the interpretation of Title IX, defines federal financial assistance in the context of student loans broadly.14  The Supreme Court has likewise concluded that the definition of federal financial assistance includes both direct and indirect student loans.15

An institution’s receipt of federal funds actually subjects the entire institution to government regulation under Title IX.16  If federal financial assistance is actually received, subjecting the school to Title IX, there are virtually no methods of institutional structuring which will allow it to maneuver around these regulations.17

Two additional notes for educational institutions attempting to determine if they are receiving federal financial assistance:  (1) it appears that tax exempt status does not constitute receiving federal funds;18 and (2) use of small amounts of federal funds has been held to not be enough to classify the school as a recipient of federal financial assistance under Title IX.19

But if an institution does receive federal funds, Title IX has an exemption for religious organizations.20  The procedure for obtaining this exemption requires the highest ranking official of the educational institution seeking the exemption to submit a written statement to the Director of the Department of Education “identifying the provisions of this part [Title IX] which conflict with a specific tenet of the religious organization.”21

In order to qualify for this exemption, an educational institution must be “controlled by a religious organization.”  An educational institution that could be classified as a religious institution itself would also meet this requirement.22

On one end of the spectrum, a religious educational institution which is in fact a seminary will generally be considered controlled by a religious organization (or actually may be a religious organization) for the purposes of Title IX exemption.  Such a school would then need to establish that, according to its religious tenets, sex discrimination was necessary.  Many religious faiths believe in either differing vocational roles for men and women generally or at least, reserve ministerial ordination for men only.  These faiths can establish their beliefs based on their interpretation of their sacred texts and foundational documents.23  These clearly qualify for the exemption.24  To the extent that an educational institution which trains religious leaders can establish that its faith does differentiate in particular ways based on sex, it should be able to allow its students to receive federal financial assistance without coming under the sway of government regulations prohibiting the type of role differentiation it practices.

Catholic schools that do not train priests and other ministers should also be concerned about Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination.  For instance, schools that provide medical insurance for students may violate Title IX if they fail to provide coverage for prescription contraception coverage.  Failure to do so has been ruled sex discrimination.25  Schools could also face complaints about single-sex residence halls and related activities restricted to hall residents of the same gender.

So qualifying for the religious exemption to Title IX is important for all Catholic colleges and universities.  Although this exemption is narrow,26 Catholic schools stand the best chance of qualifying because they are institutionally connected to a particular religious denomination.27

Courts apply religious exemptions by weighing the facts carefully, not merely taking a school’s assertion that it is religious at face value.28  Importantly, a religious past does not speak for a religious present.  Straying from an historic religious character cuts decisively against being regarded as religious or controlled by a religious organization.

Prohibition on Discrimination in Employment Pursuant to Federal Title VII

Catholic colleges and universities, regardless of whether they receive federal funds, may be subject to federal laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace.  Despite the law’s broad exemption for religious organizations, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is increasingly inclined toward regulating Catholic employers without due consideration for religious liberty, especially with regard to health insurance mandates that conflict with Catholic morality.  For instance, Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina is currently being investigated by the EEOC because its health insurance does not cover prescription contraception for its female employees.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers of 15 or more employees from discriminating in hiring and firing employees on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.29  Unlike Title IX, the application of Title VII does not depend on whether or not an employer receives federal funds.  But Title VII includes a broader exemption for religious organizations.30

Title VII does not statutorily define what constitutes a religious educational institution or religious organization, but the exemption is broad: all of a religious organization’s activities are exempt, not just those activities that are specifically religious.  General principles of interpretation of the exemption caution that it is fact specific.31  Because of the sparse nature of the statute, courts have varied not only in their decisions about whether certain organizations are religious but also in the factors they apply.

In a case particularly relevant to the religious nature of educational institutions, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Samford, a Baptist university, was a religious educational institution which can consider religion when making employment decisions.  The court described the following as relevant to its conclusion:  (1) Samford was originally founded as a theological institution by the Alabama Baptist State Convention; (2) The vast majority of its trustees had been Baptist; (3) The Baptist convention contributed over four million dollars to Samford; (4) All Samford’s faculty who taught religion were required to subscribe to a particular Baptist statement of faith; and, (5) Samford’s charter described its purpose in explicitly religious terms.32

If a Catholic college or university qualifies for the religious exemption, it may require its employees to all be Catholic and live a life consistent with Catholic teaching.  If the school does not qualify for a religious exemption, it can still consider religion for certain positions that require someone of a particular faith, often referred to as a bona fide occupational qualification.  For instance, being Jesuit was considered a bona fide occupational qualification for a full-time faculty position at Loyola University of Chicago.33

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act

Title VII was amended in 1978 to prohibit discrimination against pregnant women  – often referred to as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.34  This was interpreted by the EEOC in 2000 as requiring employers to provide prescription contraception coverage in health insurance plans that include prescriptions.35 This mandate neglects the First Amendment rights of Catholic employers who must be faithful to Catholic teaching on the immorality of artificial contraception.

In 2009, the EEOC District Office in Charlotte, N.C., charged Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina with discrimination for not covering birth control pills in its employee health plan, which would compromise the college’s Catholic mission.  The college has filed an appeal with the EEOC national office in Washington, D.C., but has not received a reply.

The EEOC appears to be headed toward additional conflicts with religious employers.  Newly appointed EEOC commissioner Chai Feldblum, a former professor at Georgetown University Law Center and advocate for same-sex marriage, has argued that “sexual rights” should trump First Amendment religious rights when the two conflict.

The EEOC action against Belmont Abbey College indicates the extent to which Title VII can be used to impose personnel policies that may conflict with Catholic identity.  Contraception mandates could lead to abortion mandates in employee health insurance.  Antidiscrimination measures regarding sexual orientation could force benefits for same-sex couples and recognition of same-sex unions.  Catholic colleges and universities must be careful to require their employees to subscribe to the Catholic teaching on contraception if they do not want to be forced to provide similar coverage to their employees.

Employment Non-Discrimination Act

Another potential threat to Catholic colleges and universities is the continued effort in Congress to amend Title VII by passing some form of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).  By designating “sexual orientation” a protected class under Title VII, ENDA could pose problems for Catholic institutions when hiring or firing employees by limiting employers’ ability to consider homosexual activity or activism that is opposed to Catholic doctrine.  It may also limit employers’ ability to enforce dress codes, and could require employers to provide benefits to same-sex couples.  Some observers also note that ENDA may be a first step toward federal redefinition of marriage to include same-sex unions, which could further pose conflicts with personnel policies at Catholic colleges and universities.  As with sex discrimination, the best defense against this is to qualify for the religious organization exemption and require all employees to subscribe to Catholic teaching.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

The recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) may pose a serious threat to conscience rights of Catholic colleges and universities.  But the manner in which PPACA will be implemented is confusing and indeterminate.  PPACA generally mandates that employers provide one of several options of health insurance to their employees.  But PPACA also grants sweeping powers to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other administration agencies, making it distinctly possible that they may mandate coverage of contraception, in vitro fertilization, and even abortion in an employer’s coverage options.  Institutions opting to simply not provide health coverage for their employees will face stiff tax consequences.  This paper below discusses religious schools’ options for avoiding the requirements of the PPACA as well as potential grounds for protecting religious freedom through litigation.

General State-Level Threats

Some states such as Wisconsin have begun mandating contraception coverage in employee health insurance plans.  Not all of them have exceptions for religious organizations and when they do, it is sometimes unclear how to qualify as a religious organization.  A thorough analysis of the various and differing state laws is beyond the limited scope of this paper.  The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty has an excellent analysis of this issue with proposals for protecting Catholic institutions from this threat titled, Implications of Mandatory Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives for Catholic Colleges and Universities.  It is available at www.CatholicHigherEd.org.  A summary of state contraception mandates titled Contraceptive Mandates and Immoral Cooperation can also be found at the same site.

Some states also have constitutional provisions called “Blaine Amendments” that prohibit any state funds from being used by pervasively religious organizations.  At least four Supreme Court Justices have opined that Blaine Amendments – originally enacted as a result of anti-Catholic bigotry – are unconstitutional and the use of “pervasively sectarian” is outdated.36  Moreover, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver ruled that making distinctions between schools for purpose of state scholarship funding based on whether they are “pervasively sectarian” or merely “sectarian” actually violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause due to excessive entanglement of government with religion.37   This case may be the beginning of a successful effort to eliminate Blaine Amendments.  Nevertheless, Catholic schools should be aware that emphasizing their religious mission and theology may result in disqualification for some state funding programs until provisions that discriminate against pervasively sectarian organizations can be successfully challenged in court.

Potential Threats on the Horizon

The future may bring additional government threats to the religious liberty of Catholic colleges and universities.  While their scope and impact are yet uncertain, recent developments suggest the added importance of protecting against potential threats as well as current realities.

On October 29, 2010, the U.S. Department of Education issued new regulations on student aid that encourage tighter state controls over higher education.  The Higher Education Act requires state authorization of colleges and universities that participate in federal student aid programs, which until this year was often assumed absent an adverse ruling by a state agency.   The Education Department now expects state approval of institutions “by name” and a state process “to review and appropriately act on” complaints about any approved institution.

Associations concerned with religious higher education – including The Cardinal Newman Society, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, and the Council of Christian Colleges and Universities – have raised concerns about expanded state oversight which could be politicized and could erect barriers to religious colleges seeking state charters and access to federal student aid.  The Education Department acknowledged that it had received complaints from college leaders that “a State’s role may extend into defining, for example, curriculum, teaching methods, subject matter content, faculty qualifications, and learning outcomes.”  Others feared that states might “impose homogeneity upon institutions that would compromise their unique missions.”  In response, federal officials agreed that the new regulations do “not limit a State’s oversight of institutions.”

In a July 30, 2010, letter to the Education Department, William Armstrong, former U.S. Senator from Colorado and now President of Colorado Christian University, warned that the new rules would “almost guarantee that states will have to cope with noisy arguments over teaching methods, degree requirements and culture wars over textbooks, evolution versus Intelligent Design, phonics versus whole language, campus ROTC, climate change, family policy, abortion, race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.”

It should be noted that the law does not prevent the federal government from also imposing restrictions on Catholic colleges and universities that participate in federal student aid programs.  Regulations that could be tied to federal aid might affect employee benefits, hiring policies, accreditation practices, and other unforeseen areas that potentially conflict with religious identity.  Thus far the federal government has been notably restrained in interfering with higher education.

STEPS TO PROTECT CATHOLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Demonstrating a College is Religious

In short, many religious educational institutions, particularly colleges and universities which were founded on purposes tied to goals of educating in conformity to religious teaching –especially when the ties are denominationally specific or to an individual church – should be exempted from federal prohibitions on sex and religious discrimination.  But an educational institution that veers from a religious founding will probably not be able to demonstrate it is a religious organization.38  It will therefore not be able to require that its staff, faculty, and student body agree with, and abide by, its religious mission and theology.

Some Catholic schools have purposely minimized their religious ties for fear of being considered “pervasively sectarian,” and being disqualified for state funding by Blaine Amendments as indicated above.  Emphasizing their religious mission and theology is helpful for avoiding federal regulation, but it may adversely affect the school’s ability to participate in state scholarship programs – at least until those discriminatory provisions can be eliminated.

The cases indicate courts will consider 10 factors when determining whether a school is a religious organization.39  A college or university is much more likely to be able to qualify for an exemption to anti-discrimination laws if it satisfies all of them.  They are:

1. Whether the entity operates for a profit

This factor is not an issue for most secondary schools, but there are some for-profit colleges and universities.  “Nothing in the statute or case law says a for-profit corporation can not [sic] be a ‘religious corporation,’ but every reported claim for that status by a for-profit corporation has been denied.”  Dent, supra note 25, at 563.  Non-profit status definitely weighs in favor of being considered a religious organization.

2. Whether it produces a secular product

Many religious schools offer secular degrees in addition to religious.  This does not preclude them from being considered religious institutions.  For instance, Samford University offers a plethora of secular degrees,40 but was still considered a religious institution because, among other things, its chief purpose was “the promotion of the Christian Religion throughout the world by maintaining and operating … institutions dedicated to the development of Christian character in high scholastic standing.”41

3. Whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious purpose

All indications are that the governing documents of an organization are important to it being considered religious.  No cases were found where an organization was deemed religious even though no religious purpose was stated in its founding documents.42  On the other hand, Samford’s charter reflected its chief purpose of promoting the Christian Religion throughout the world, and that was a significant factor in the court’s determination that the university was religious.43

4. Whether it is owned, affiliated with or financially supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or synagogue

Though not determinative, this factor certainly figures strongly into the calculation when assessing whether a school is religious.  The Court found it significant that Samford University received seven percent of its annual budget from the Southern Baptist Convention.44

5. Whether a formally religious entity participates in the management, for instance by having representatives on the board of trustees

This factor is very helpful for determining a school is religious if it is not directly affiliated with a church or other religious body.  For instance, in LeBoon, a Jewish Community Center was considered a religious organization even though it was not directly affiliated with any synagogue, because several rabbis were advisory, non-voting members of its board.45

6. Whether the entity holds itself out to the public as secular or sectarian

This is one of the most important factors.  A school in Hawaii that required its teachers to be Protestant was not religious, due in part to the fact that the school’s introductory pamphlet and course catalogue did not list any religious purpose of the school.46  Conversely, another court found it significant that “Samford’s student handbook describes Samford’s purpose this way: ‘to foster Christianity through the development of Christian character, scholastic attainment, and a sense of personal responsibility, ….’”47

7. Whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its activities

Students at Samford University are required to attend chapel – which figured favorably in the court’s determination that it is a religious organization.48  But this factor did not help a school in Hawaii due in large part to the fact that most of the religious activities were optional for students.49

8. Whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the extent it is an educational institution

Sectarian schools must be careful to ensure that religious courses do something more than just teach about religion – which is allowed even in public schools.  For instance, this factor weighed against the Hawaii school that was found not to be religious because its curriculum “consist[s] of minimal, largely comparative religious studies….”50  Whereas, Samford University actually has a divinity school that trains clergy.

9. Whether its membership is made up by coreligionists

In the school context, this factor obviously has to do with the composition of the student body and faculty.  It is not necessary that students and teachers be limited to individuals of a particular religion.  Although Samford students are required to attend chapel, the court made no mention of a requirement that they be Southern Baptist, and determined the school was religious anyway.  And only instructors who taught religion courses were required to subscribe to a particular statement of faith.51  The court did favorably mention another case where the fact that 88% of the student body and 95% of the faculty were Baptist was significant in determining the school was religious.52

10. Consistent compliance with religious beliefs

Courts have held that a school or entity is no longer religious, even though it once was, because of lack of effort to comply with its original religious teachings.  For instance a court found that a home for troubled youth originally established with a religious purpose and governed by church-member trustees was presently secular because it no longer included religion in its programming and attendance at religious services was optional.53  Likewise, a school in Hawaii originally established as a Protestant institution was not religious because “the record reveals the purpose and emphasis of the School[] have shifted over the years from providing religious instruction to equipping students with ethical principles that will enable them to make their own moral judgments.”54

This factor may be particularly significant for universities and colleges that are affiliated with a particular denomination that specifically proscribes religious tenants that must be followed.  For instance, Catholic schools should adhere to the Canon Law requirements for their institutions, including the Church’s Apostolic Constitution Ex corde Ecclesiae, which applies directly to Catholic universities.55

Protection from PPACA

This section discusses religious schools’ options for avoiding the requirements of the Patient Protection and Affordable care Act (“PPACA”) as well as potential grounds for protecting religious freedom through litigation.  Schools should consult legal counsel to determine what their specific options will be under the PPACA regime.  Some potential options are as follows:

Lobby for amendments addressing conscience protection issues

Members of Congress are aware of the deficiencies in the PPACA, and several are proposing amendments to fix the shortcomings.  Representative Joseph Pitts (R-PA) introduced H.R. 5111, which would close the loopholes threatening to make abortion coverage mandatory.  Various proposed amendments would protect against requisite coverage of objectionable services in general.  Institutions concerned about the formidable new threats to their conscience rights must lobby for broad protection at both the federal and state levels.

Sue HHS under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

In a specific case where all of an institution’s options for fulfilling PPACA’s employee-coverage mandate substantially burden its religious beliefs by forcing it to cover objectionable practices, the institution may be able to file a lawsuit alleging that PPACA’s mandate as applied to them violates the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).   The act prohibits the government from “substantially burden[ing] religious exercise without compelling justification.”  Health coverage is an important employee recruiting and retention tool for employers.  Having to choose between not providing health coverage and compromising religious values is likely the type of burden RFRA was meant to protect against.  The success of any such claim will depend on the specific facts of an institution’s circumstances.  The institution should be able to assert that it actually has a sincere religious belief against providing coverage for certain objectionable practices, and that forcing it to do so will substantially burden its belief because it would select non-objectionable health coverage if it could.

Conclusion

Religious colleges and universities are prohibited from discriminating on sex and religion by Title IX and Title VII.56  There are exemptions for religious organizations in both of these statutes, but schools can only take advantage of these exemptions if they satisfy multi-factored tests that require them to consistently follow their religious convictions.  To the extent that a religious college departs from its historic religious ties, it may be in danger of losing its ability to claim that it is a religious employer exempted from civil rights legislation disallowing even religious discrimination.  To minimize regulation, such institutions should firmly maintain their religious identities and should exercise caution when accepting federal funds or allowing their students to accept federal financial assistance.

Religious schools are also subject to new requirements for providing health insurance to employees.  It is unclear how this new law will affect schools and other religious organizations that object to certain types of healthcare, such as abortion and in vitro fertilization.  But school officials should begin consulting with counsel as soon as possible to determine if there will be any conflict between this law and the school’s religious teachings.

Finally, direct funding from the federal government may contain some prohibitions on a school’s ability to hire faculty and recruit students that agree with its religious teachings.  The procurement criteria for each direct grant should be examined closely to be sure the school is not foregoing its ability to maintain its religious character.

 

 

 

Newman Society Files Amicus Brief on Obama Administration Mandate – District of Columbia Court of Appeals

The Cardinal Newman Society joined an amicus brief at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia urging the court to uphold that religious institutions should be exempt from the Obama administration’s “contraceptive mandate.”

Catholic Social Teaching at the Catholic University

An insistence on spreading the Church’s social doctrine among all Catholics, especially by educational programs for the laity, runs throughout the modern papal Magisterium, beginning with Leo XIII’s exhortations to the laity of the late 19th century.  At that time, it was indeed somewhat unusual for a pope to appeal directly to the people and to ask them to acquire the intellectual and moral training required to confront successfully the ever-growing challenges of the modern world. Yet by the time we reach Pius XI and Pius XII, it is taken for granted that the main audience for papal teachings on economics and politics must be Christ’s lay faithful, who are striving to impress the divine law upon and apply the natural law to the changing situations of their temporal life.

Thus, while even the forward-looking Leo XIII addressed his celebrated 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum on labor and capital (or the rights and duties of workers and employers) to the bishops of the world, Pius XI, commemorating the 40th anniversary of the same with his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno on the reconstruction of the social order, added to his addressees “likewise all the faithful of the Catholic world.”  This is only to be expected, for while the clergy have as their primary task the internal governance and strengthening of the Church, believers living in the world have the corresponding task of purifying and sanctifying secular realities with a view to leading souls to salvation in Christ.

If there is a definite Catholic doctrine on social, political, and economic life – and of course there is just such a thing: a rich and detailed corpus of teaching rooted in Scripture and Tradition, refined by centuries of experience – then it only stands to reason that educating the Catholic faithful in this body of doctrine is of paramount importance, a basic and necessary component of their ongoing catechetical and theological training.

Along these lines, Blessed John XXIII’s great encyclical Pacem in Terris of 1961 stated (and these words are representative of many other papal documents that might be cited):

We must reaffirm most strongly that this Catholic social doctrine is an integral part of the Christian conception of life.  It is therefore Our urgent desire that this doctrine be studied more and more.  First of all it should be taught as part of the daily curriculum in Catholic schools of every kind…Our beloved sons, the laity, can do much to help this diffusion of Catholic social doctrine by studying it themselves and putting it into practice, and by zealously striving to make others understand it…It is vitally important, therefore, that Our sons learn to understand this doctrine.  They must be educated to it.

The natural conclusion is that Catholic colleges and universities (or chaplaincies connected with non-Catholic ones) must make room in their curricula for mandatory instruction and optional specialized work in this crucial area of the Magisterium.

Many schools that once offered sound instruction in the area of social ethics abandoned it together with much else that was jettisoned in the wake of the Second Vatican Council.  This is particularly ironic, since the Council contained the strongest endorsement to date of the apostolate of the laity and emphasized the pervasive role Catholic social teaching must play in the modern world, if our world is to be saved from every-growing futility and violence.  Worse still, the academic milieu and campus lifestyle at many Catholic colleges and universities contradict the Church’s social teaching on nearly every head.  Courses in social ethics may inculcate distorted and refuted models such as Marxist-liberation theology or feminist theology.  It is not hard to imagine that students might end up worse off than they began, like the clean-swept room in which seven demons settle down (cf. Lk. 11-24-26).

Today Catholic educators have the opportunity to make needed changes with the support of interested students.  Young people today are encountering elements of Catholic social teaching, albeit often by chance and in an over-simplified form, and they find it exciting, because it offers a genuine alternative to the stale, predictable “solutions” of analysts and politicians.  This small but robust vanguard of what we will soon be calling the “Benedict XVI generation” surely affords educators a providential opportunity to follow up with programs offering solid, orthodox instruction and campus support systems for those who are called to dedicate themselves to applying the Church’s social doctrine to the enormous problems facing us in the Church, in the nation, and in the world.

We are already seeing this occur at some of the small, staunchly Catholic institutions of higher education.  Although on a worldly scale of values their influence would seem a whisper behind the roar of contradiction, graduates of these colleges will to one degree or another have engaged authentic Catholic social teaching, at very least by gaining an acquaintance with some of its major sources and themes.  Their minds will have been opened to the massive political and economic problems of modernity, problems to which the Catholic Church alone, in her divinely-guided wisdom, offers sane, reasonable answers that comport with human dignity and man’s ultimate end.

Students who attend a more traditional Catholic liberal arts college will learn firsthand, usually by discussing influential Great Books, the decayed roots and fatal consequences of self-destructive ideologies.  If the program is well designed, it will not fail to include something of the Church’s own Magisterium, whether it be a selection of social encyclicals of the modern popes from Leo XIII down to Benedict XVI, the excellent summary offered in the relevant portions of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (nn. 1961-2557), or the synthesis given in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church.

I am reminded of Fr. James Schall’s wonderful book from 20 years ago,  Another Sort of Learning, the subtitle of which begins with this phrase: “How finally to acquire an education while still in college or anywhere else.”  It is possible, even if not ideal, for a student to educate oneself in Catholic social doctrine. One can find good resources on the internet, sometimes one can find a good discussion group in one’s area; best of all, one might reach out to like-minded Catholics and start such a group.  The reading list is obvious: the aforementioned documents of the Magisterium, above all the papal encyclicals.  To commit some free time to working through this material is far better than remaining in the dark.But it would be even better, of course, if Catholic colleges and universities would seize upon the opportunity to provide coursework in authentic Catholic social teaching for students who are hungry to learn.  In this way Catholic schools can rediscover their birthright and offer it generously to their students.

 

*This Perspectives in Catholic Higher Education is available online at CatholicHigherEd.org. The views expressed by the author are not necessarily those of The Center for the Advancement of Catholic Higher Education.

How to Keep Your University Catholic

Dedication: To Father Michael Scanlan, T.O.R. President Emeritus, Franciscan University of Steubenville:
Who has shown that it can be done.

Table of Contents

Foreword
“Stewards of a Heritage, Bearers of Hope”
by Rev. Msgr. Stuart Swetland, S.T.D.
Preface to the Third Printing
Preface to the First Printing
Author’s Note
Chapter 1: A Case Study
Chapter 2: The Bishop
Chapter 3: The Trustees
Chapter 4: The Administration and Faculty
Chapter 5: The Students
Chapter 8: The Curriculum
Chapter 9: Academic Freedom
Chapter 10: “Indoctrination”
Chapter 11: Federal Aid
Chapter 12: Afterword
Authors

Foreword

Stewards of a Heritage, Bearers of Hope
Rev. Msgr. Stuart Swetland, S.T.D.
Vice President for Catholic Identity and Mission
Mount St. Mary’s University

Every person who is privileged to have the vocation as an administrator and/or educator at a Catholic college or university is both a steward of a heritage received from past generations and a bearer of hope to the current and future generations.47  Catholic universities are charged to “hand on what has been received.”48  We receive from above the supernatural gift of faith which we are called to preserve, explore, explain, live and faithfully hand on.  In bearing witness to the traditio of faith, Catholic universities are also privileged to be a source of light and hope for the world—a privileged place for an authentic encounter with God.  As His Holiness Benedict XVI said to Catholic educators at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., on April 17, 2008:

Education is integral to the mission of the Church to proclaim the Good News.  First and foremost every Catholic educational institution is a place to encounter the living God who in Jesus Christ reveals his transforming love and truth.

An encounter with Christ and His teaching leads to a genuine desire to deepen one’s knowledge and understanding of the One who reveals the merciful love of the Father.

When this pamphlet was first produced in 1992, and even when re-issued in 1997, much was “up for grabs” in the world of Catholic higher education.  There had been, for a variety of societal and ecclesial reasons, a widespread loss of confidence in the Catholic nature, identity and mission of Catholic higher education.  Much of the general upheaval in our society about fundamental truths or even the possibility of there being truth was reflected in the life of the university.  Many of our Catholic colleges and universities were caught up in the spirit of this age and gradually (or sometimes, sadly, rapidly) “drifted” towards a more secular vision of the university’s mission and identity.

Much has changed since the last quarter of the 20th century.  In many places, especially among the young, there is a new confidence in the Church’s teaching office.  With the publication of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the full implementation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, the general reception of the teaching office of John Paul II and Benedict XVI (including such seminal documents as Fides et RatioVeritatis SplendorEx corde EcclesiaeDeus Caritas Est and Spe Salvi) and the clarification of the role of the local ordinary vis-a-vis institutes of Catholic higher education, there has been a renewed focus and vigor brought to our campuses.  Thus, despite the scandals in the Church and the general loss of a religious sense in some sections of our society, there is no better time than now to focus on the nature and purpose of Catholic higher education.

The magnificent leadership of John Paul II and Benedict XVI has helped bring a renaissance to many Catholic colleges and universities.  Coupled with a growing demand for spiritual substance and depth emanating from the current generation of college-age students51 and the appropriate emphasis on mission required by many accreditation agencies, there is a growing sense that Catholic universities are extremely well situated to serve the holistic needs—spiritual, intellectual, moral, physical—of a demanding and discerning population of college-age students and their parents.

The times call for clarity.  Institutions and their leaders must know who they are and why they are.  At Mount St. Mary’s University, we are unapologetically committed to being a proud and robust Catholic university preparing young men and women for the challenges facing them in the contemporary world.  This is reflected in our governing documents where our Trustees committed the University to fidelity to its Catholic mission:

The Board of Trustees reasserts the critical importance of the Catholic identity in all operations of the University.  A strong Catholic identity is central to the mission of Mount St. Mary’s University.  Therefore, all faculty, staff, administrators, executive officers and Trustees are to work in concert with and support this Catholic mission.

The basic tenets of this Catholic mission at Mount St. Mary’s include:

  1.  The University is committed to the person and Gospel of Jesus Christ as the foundation of our values and attitudes which are reflected in our campus culture, policies and procedures.
  2.  The University fully understands, respects and follows the teachings of the Catholic Church.
  3.  The University is in full compliance with both the letter and spirit of Ex corde Ecclesiae.
  4.  The University recognizes the authority of the Holy See and the authority vested in the Archbishop of Baltimore regarding the Catholic nature and direction of Mount St. Mary’s University.54

This statement, like any governing document or mission statement, is only effective if it is rigorously put into action in the day-to-day running of the university.  This takes a commitment, a “mission centeredness,” as Father Kennedy observes, from the entirety of the university community.  Beginning with the Trustees and Administration but continuing through the faculty, staff and students, the institutional and personal commitment to the mission must be absolute.  More than likely, not everyone will share the fullness of the Catholic faith on campus; but everyone working on behalf of the university ought to be dedicated to its mission.

This means, among other things, that there is a critical need for well-formed Catholics who know and live their faith and who are willing to serve at every level at Catholic universities.  There is a need for accomplished men and women who will be willing to place their managerial and leadership skills at the service of Catholic higher education as trustees.  There is an acute need for well-formed Catholic academics who are committed to integrating their faith, their lives, their research and their teaching into a unity of life.  Especially needed are those who are willing to engage both their academic discipline and the Catholic intellectual heritage at the highest level to help in the great task of integrating faith and life.  There is a need for administrators who can place their faith and leadership experience at the service of the community of learners that is the university.  Staff members, with various skills and vocations, aid in the building of an authentic community centered in Christ.  Clergy and religious, especially the Chaplain and his staff, must provide the “daily bread” of Word and Sacrament necessary for personal and spiritual growth and renewal.  Other interested members of the greater community and Church can aid the university in its mission.

As college administrators, we cannot overlook the vital role that the President and his or her cabinet play in keeping a university robustly Catholic.  Presidents have the most central role.  They must never waiver from “blowing the certain trumpet” for Catholicism and keeping the campus focused on Christ.  Their cabinets, especially the recently developed idea of mission officers and/or Vice Presidents for Catholic Identity, aid them in the task of “setting the tone.”  Obviously, the role of mission officers or Vice Presidents for Catholic Identity and Mission will need further development.  There is a vital need for ongoing formation and development of faculty, staff, trustees and administration.  There is also a need for liaison with the local church and the local shepherd, the bishop.

Indeed, the bishop’s role is vital.  College presidents rightly expect that the relationship with their ordinary will be a fruitful one.  But the relationship must be a two-way street.  Catholic universities are called to be faithful to the Church and to serve Her mission.  But the Church, especially in the person of the Bishop, must serve the University as well.  Universities attempt to teach and model “servant leadership.”  We ask of our bishops to do likewise by providing a clear vision of how we can help serve one another.  Unlike what was stated at Land O’Lakes in 1967, we know that the Catholic university is only one of the places where the Church does its thinking; but we also know that it should be a privileged place of research, discovery and instruction.  As Pope John Paul II wrote in Ex corde Ecclesiae:

Every Catholic University, as a university, is an academic community which, in a rigorous and critical fashion, assists in the protection and advancement of human dignity and of a cultural heritage through research, teaching and various services offered to the local, national and international communities. It possesses that institutional autonomy necessary to perform its functions effectively and guarantees its members academic freedom, so long as the rights of the individual person and of the community are preserved within the confines of the truth and the common good.57

The university serves the common good by its rigorous pursuit of the truth.

An important point must be made here. Academic freedom is not an absolute right—it is a means to assure that the University can pursue the truth and serve the common good. No university, Catholic or not, will allow an absolute license to say or do everything or anything on campus. No one would tolerate overt racism, a “holocaust
denier” or an advocate for the violent overthrow of the government (or campus administration for that matter!). Academic freedom ought not to be confused with freedom of speech. The latter is a political right guaranteed in our constitutional system for citizens. The former is one necessary condition for the free and rigorous pursuit of truth in accordance with the appropriate academic standards of each discipline. The Church protects and promotes a “right” or “just” autonomy of earthly affairs. But a rightful autonomy is not an absolute autonomy. As the Second Vatican Council taught:

There seems to be some apprehension today that a close association between human activity and religion will endanger the autonomy of man, of organizations and of science. If by the autonomy of earthly affairs is meant the gradual discovery, exploitation, and ordering of the laws and values of matter and society, then the demand for autonomy is perfectly in order: it is at once the claim of modern man and the desire of the creator. By the very nature of creation, material being is endowed with its own stability, truth and excellence, its own order and laws. These man must respect as he recognizes the methods proper to every science and technique. Consequently, methodical research in all branches of knowledge, provided it is carried out in a truly scientific manner and does not override moral laws, can never conflict with the faith, because the things of the world and the things of the faith derive from the same God.  The humble and persevering investigator of the secrets of nature is being led, as it were, by the hand of God in spite of himself, for it is God, the conserver of all things, who made them what they are. We cannot but deplore certain attitudes (not unknown among Christians) deriving from a shortsighted view of the rightful autonomy of science; they have occasioned conflict and controversy and have misled many into opposing faith and science.

However, if by the term “the autonomy of earthy affairs” is meant that material being does not depend on God and that man can use it as if it had no relation to its creator, then the falsity of such a claim will be obvious to anyone who believes in God. Without a creator there can be no creature. In any case, believers, no matter what their religion, have always recognized the voice and the revelation of God in the language of creatures. Besides, once God is forgotten the creature is lost sight of as well.58

Autonomy and academic freedom must be placed at the service of truth.

This is particularly true in the discipline of theology. Catholic theology properly understood is “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum). For the theologian, the starting point is faith. Catholic faith is to the Catholic theologian what the periodic table is to the chemist. The chemist may be “free” to reject the periodic table as an “external constraint” to his or her free inquiry. But with this the chemist ceases, in any meaningful way, to be a chemist. He or she may be practicing some kind of discipline, but it will look a lot more like alchemy than chemistry. Similarly, the Catholic theologian who rejects the faith of the Church as interpreted and handed on by the Magisterium of the Church ceases in any meaningful way to be a Catholic theologian.

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stated this in its Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian:

Among the vocations awakened in this way by the Spirit in the church is that of the theologian.  His role is to pursue in a particular way an ever deeper understanding of the Word of God found in the inspired Scriptures and handed on by the living Tradition of the Church.  He does this in communion with the Magisterium which has been charged with the responsibility of preserving the deposit of faith.59

This wonderfully describes the vocation of the theologian.

Even secular sources recognize that academic freedom is not an absolute.  In a provocative editorial in The Chronicle of Higher Education entitled “Academic Freedom is Not a Divine Right,” scholar Stanley Fish states that academic freedom is a freedom limited to the task at hand—what he calls “freedom for academics—that is, for those engaged in a certain task.”  Fish writes:

It is the nature of that task and not any large abstraction like freedom or freedom of speech that determines the range of permissible and prescribed behavior.  You start with the idea of pursuing a line of inquiry to whatever conclusion it brings you, and then you ask for the freedom to engage in that pursuit without interference from external forces that would tie
you to the agenda of another enterprise.  The freedom you ask for is not added on to the project; it is constitutive of it, for you can’t follow where an inquiry takes you if obstacles are constantly put in your way.  When all is said and done, academic freedom is just a fancy name for being allowed to do your job, and it is only because that job has the peculiar feature of not having a pre-stipulated goal that those who do it must be granted a degree of latitude and flexibility not granted to the practitioners of other professions, who must be responsive to the customer or to the bottom line or to the electorate or to the global economy.  (That’s why there’s no such thing as “corporate-manager freedom” or “shoe-salesman freedom” or “dermatologist freedom.”)60

Indeed, academic freedom is ultimately about the freedom to do one’s job.

Ultimately, the idea of a Catholic University is about the mission to form students to become holy, saintly, well-educated, productive members of the Church and society. The essential characteristics necessary for this task are well laid out in Ex corde Ecclesiae:

  1. A Christian inspiration not only of individuals but of the university community as such;
  2. a continuing reflection in the light of the Catholic faith upon the growing treasury of human knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research;
  3. fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the Church;
  4. an institutional commitment to the service of the people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent goal which gives meaning to life. 61

These characteristics have not changed and will not change.  All are necessary if a college or university is to fulfill its mission as a Catholic institution of higher learning.

Father Kennedy’s essay contains many important points, some of which are absolutely essential for Catholic identity.  It also contains criticism of institutions and persons that, at the safe distance of time and space, may seem outdated.  We do not presume to be able to judge these persons and institutions.  Neither would we want to try.  We assume that the men and women of these earlier times were doing the best they could at the time with the lights they had.  Some documents, decisions and approaches obviously did not work to enhance the authentic Catholic witness of our colleges and universities.  Hopefully, we have learned much from these false starts and failed experiments.  Knowing most of the institutions described and most of the major players involved, we believe that, on the whole, these were good-willed and well-intentioned attempts to advance the Catholic intellectual apostolate.  With 20/20 hindsight it is easier now to recognize the failures and mistakes that others have made.

But dwelling on these past problems will not necessarily make the future brighter.  This will come only when we who are now entrusted with the stewardship of our Catholic universities hear the clarion call to fulfill our vocations in Christ.  We must hear and heed the call to what Pope Benedict XVI calls “intellectual charity”:

This aspect of charity calls the educator to recognize that the profound responsibility to lead the young to truth is noth ng less than an act of love. Indeed, the dignity of education lies in fostering the true perfection and happiness of those to be educated. In practice “intellectual charity” upholds the essential unity of knowledge against the fragmentation which ensues when reason is detached from the pursuit of truth. It guides the young towards the deep satisfaction of exercising freedom in relation to truth, and it strives to articulate the relationship between faith and all aspects of family and civic life. Once their passion for the fullness and unity of truth has been awakened, young people will surely relish the discovery that the question of what they can know opens up the vast adventure of what they ought to do. Here they will experience “in what” and “in whom” it is possible to hope, and be inspired to contribute to society in a way that engenders hope in others.62

It is this commitment to charity grounded in the Gospel of Jesus Christ that requires of us that we be faithful stewards of our great heritage and bearers of hope to those entrusted to our care.

Preface to the Third Printing

The Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities is the official document of the Catholic Church dealing with Catholic universities.  It is known from its opening words in Latin as Ex corde Ecclesiae.  Issued in 1990, it still has not been fully accepted by most of the Catholic universities of the United States. A complex and protracted document history eventually resulted in The Application of Ex corde Ecclesiae for the United States, which became particular law in 2001 through the action of the American bishops.

Years earlier, the American bishops had appointed a committee to recommend national directives for the application of Ex corde Ecclesiae to the United States.  This committee met with a committee appointed by the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, but substantial agreement was difficult to obtain. A pro-tem agreement was signed in June 1996, but many competent observers considered this to have been simply a papering over of substantial disagreement. Further re-workings were required to obtain final Vatican approval. The intransigence of American Catholic universities continues to have a great effect on the Canadian situation. It was not until 2006 that ordinances approved by the Canadian bishops for the implementation of Ex corde Ecclesiae took force.

Charles Rice, now an emeritus professor of the University of Notre Dame Law School, believes that several Catholic universities are past the point of no return, and has listed the three most contentious requirements of the Apostolic Constitution: (1) those teaching theology must have a mandate from the bishop of the diocese in which the university is located; (2) the university should adhere to the teaching of the Church’s Magisterium; and (3) the majority of the faculty must be Catholic.63

Concerning the first point, Kenneth Whitehead has traced the history of contemporary negotiations between Catholic universities and the Holy See back to their beginning in 1968 and the founding of the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU); in its 1972-74 document the IFCU said that bishops have both the right and the duty to intervene in university matters, even to the point of declaring teachings to be incompatible with Catholic doctrine.  And Whitehead points out that the 1983 Code of Canon Law requires teachers in the theological disciplines to have a teaching mandate from the competent ecclesiastical authority (canon 812).64 In 2001, the American bishops authorized publication of Guidelines Concerning the Mandatum in Catholic Universities, intended “to explain and serve as a resource for the conferral of the mandatum” according to the binding ordinances of The Application.

Concerning the second point, Gerald Bradley, another Notre Dame Law School faculty member, states that “our university theological establishment is neck deep in dissent from authoritative church teaching,” and Ralph McInerny, also of Notre Dame, claims that, for American universities, “The enemy is no longer a Vatican bureaucracy but the faith itself.” A quote from the late Archbishop Fulton Sheen is still instructive: “I tell my relatives to send their college-age children to secular institutions where they will have to fight for their faith, rather than to Catholic institutions, where it will be stolen from them.”65

The late Monsignor Terry Tekippe of Notre Dame Seminary in New Orleans studied the declaration of the Catholic Theological Society of America on this matter, and said that its “statement appears aggressively to separate the Catholic college or university from any connection or responsibility to the larger Church.”66

Concerning the third point, McInerny laments: “A laicized priest, a former religious, a fallen-away Catholic, or a Protestant may be at the front of the classroom. Recently a student told me that, in his biology course, the assigned content was tossed out in favor of prolonged bull sessions on women’s ordination. The student, having noted that several recent magisterial documents dealt with the matter, suggested that these be read and studied. The suggestion was laughed away. The instructor was Lutheran. This is far from being an isolated incidence.”67

Tekippe believed that “the question of the future of the Catholic university in the United States, then, becomes the question whether a critical mass of faculty and administrators, committed to the Catholic model of the university, is present, or can be hired in the foreseeable future.”  “In my sober estimate,” he wrote, “that is likely in a minority of universities…but not in a majority.”68 One example of the decline of Catholic faculty in Catholic universities is the University of Notre Dame. The Sycamore Project reports in 2008 only about 52 percent of the faculty are Catholics, down from 85 percent in the 1970s.69 Project President William Dempsey concludes, “Worse, with a reduction to account for dissident and nominal Catholics, there is no longer a faculty sufficiently Catholic to sustain the school’s historic claim to Catholic identity.”70

An organization dedicated exclusively to the re-Catholization of de-Catholicized universities in the United States, The Cardinal Newman Society, began in 1993.  It contacts administrators, faculty, students and alumni of American Catholic universities in an effort to improve the faith commitment of these universities in the short run and to save the universities for the Church in the long run.  I am pleased that this organization through its research division, The Center for the Study of Catholic Higher Education, is republishing this book.

How to Keep Your University Catholic has been written in the hope that at least some of the many Catholic colleges and universities of the United States and Canada may be saved for the Faith.

Preface to the First Printing

Two words in the title of this book should be explained at the outset. For the sake of simplicity, and with only a few obvious exceptions, “university” stands for
college or university. “Catholic” implies “loyal to the teachings of Christ as proposed by the Catholic Church’s Magisterium.” Today, many load this word with various unorthodox meanings, but I have no desire to preserve inauthentic Catholicism in our institutions.

It is my contention that Catholic universities in the United States are not healthy. This book is based on the premise that the condition of these universities can be improved. Perhaps other denominations will find it useful also. The basic problem in nearly all our Catholic universities is not financial, but whether or not to be truly Catholic. Many persons believe that, if the financial problem were solved, all would be well. This delusion is widespread, despite the fact that some of our universities are flourishing financially and close to bankruptcy religiously. The late writer Christopher Derrick states:

Within American higher education today, it is becoming increasingly unreal to apply the objective “Catholic” to institutions which once claimed it proudly and with good reason….In a number of cases, the college has frankly renounced its claim to have a distinctively Catholic character, usually in return for government money. This was at least honest. But that claim often continues to be made even where it has lost all plausibility.71

Ralph McInerny writes:

Unless we say our prayers and God is merciful there will be no colleges or universities worthy of the name Catholic before many years have passed. Except for the new ones, like Thomas Aquinas, Thomas More, Christendom.72

Alice von Hildebrand says:

The sight that confronts us is a pitiful one….Wherever we look, we see only ruins: many Catholic universities have been closed; others have betrayed their Catholicism and are vying with secular universities in their secularism….Catholic schools, colleges, and universities have been sold to the “spirit of the time”; they have caught the “ism” disease, succumbing to subjectivism, relativism, historicism, or idealism. For all practical purposes, in several of these schools, God is dead.73

And we have an equally dismal picture from a special committee struck by the American Philosophical Association to examine the teaching of philosophy in Catholic universities. Claiming that Catholic universities “are vague and confused about their objective and their nature,” the committee says:

In many “Catholic” colleges, a good number of professors are either not basically committed to passing on a Catholic tradition in any definable sense of the term or, if they are, they find their own work…not relevant to any properly Catholic objective….Some “Catholic” colleges…judged “the Catholic philosophical tradition to be either of small or of no relevance whatever to their teaching.” The chairman of philosophy in one large “Catholic” university replied that none of almost a dozen full-time philosophers found the Catholic philosophic tradition relevant to their teaching.74

My own study will not be exhaustive; it is not the result of surveys based on questionnaires sent to all Catholic universities. Such a study would have its value, but more needed is a modest program for immediate implementation. The program presented here, and its practicability, have to recommend them actual participation in, and reading about, the life and difficulties of Catholic universities over many years. I have been dean of philosophy in an American Catholic university and president of two Catholic colleges in Canada. Most of the problems of being Catholic are common to the universities in both these countries.

How to Keep Your University Catholic

Author’s Note

This publication is a straightforward guide to help those committed to promoting a true Catholic identity at Catholic colleges and universities. This prescription covers the role of bishops, trustees, administrators, faculty members and students, as well as the impact of the curriculum, academic freedom, “indoctrination” and federal aid.

A Case Study

One common reason for Catholic institutions diluting their Catholicity has been a real or imagined threat of going bankrupt, a fear intensified by the realization that the number of priests and religious on the faculty is steadily decreasing. This fear is the reason for all but one of the Catholic universities of New York State accepting state money on condition that they restrict their Catholicity.

Foreseeing that situation, Fordham University in New York commissioned two lawyers to determine what changes would have to be made if Fordham were to cease being Catholic and so become eligible for state funds as a private university.

Their report, published in 1970,75 is thorough, well-written, and includes an excellent summary of the state-church relations with regard to education. The report notes that New York State forbids aid to universities “in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.” In another state the report’s recommendations may have been in degree rather than in kind. According to the report, courts and judges would consider a university non-sectarian only after considering many aspects of the institution, such as:

  1. Its description of itself.
  2. The manner of selecting the governing board.
  3. The manner of selecting administrators, faculty, and students.
  4. The university’s ties with a religious community, or its financial arrangement with a church or body affiliated with a church.
  5. Associations in which the university holds membership.
  6. Religious symbols.
  7. Whether Catholic religious observances are required, facilitated, or suggested.
  8. Whether religious activities of non-Catholic groups are encouraged or allowed.
  9. The place of religion in the curriculum.
  10. Extracurricular religious activities.

The suggested changes for Fordham to achieve a nonsectarian status were sweeping. Some of them were:

  1. It should not call itself Catholic and should, in its self-description, sound as secular as possible.
  2. The Jesuit monopoly of legal power should be terminated.
  3. The president should not have to be a Jesuit; faculty should not have to be Catholic or even sympathetic toward Catholic principles or committed to the Christian way of life.
  4. The university should distance itself from parts of it that are too obviously Catholic: its preparatory school, the John XXIII Center for Eastern Christian Studies, the main chapel, the Jesuit residence, and the graduate theology section.
  5. Some non-Catholics, or at least “Catholics who have had a nonsectarian education experience,” should be hired to teach theology.
  6. The university should discontinue membership in organizations whose members must be distinctly Catholic.
  7. Most of the crucifixes should be removed.
  8. The Cardinal Bea Institute (which studies the relevance of religion to contemporary life) should become less distinctively Catholic.
  9. There should be “a greater infusion of…secular and non-denominational activities on the summer-time campus.”
  10. Non-Catholic religious groups should be allowed use of one or more of the university’s chapels.
  11. No Catholic “tenet or doctrine” should be taught.

We would hardly believe that Fordham could have contemplated taking any such steps until we discover, however, that some of the more unpalatable ones had already been taken and more were on the way. In its advertising, for example, Fordham was hiding its Catholicity. An official in the Admissions Office said: “We make a secular university pitch, never a religious one. We don’t sell Fordham as a place where you can save your soul. The kids to whom we are talking want to know whether they can get a good education at Fordham—and a good job afterward.” Already somewhat tolerant of non-Catholic teaching in the theology and philosophy departments, Fordham was slowly to become more indifferent: “Fordham, has done enough—and will no doubt in time do even more—to show persuasively that…faculty members who are theologians and philosophers…are not doctrinally shackled.” A newly proposed statement of academic freedom dropped this sentence: “The teacher in entitled to freedom…but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which…is contrary to the religious…aims of the institution.” If religious aims remained at the end of its transformation, Fordham professors would not have to respect them.

The authors found that the theology department had already dropped any concern about being “a place where you can save your soul.” Indeed, according to the authors, “the Department of Theology declares purposes in terms that might readily be adopted by any of the scientific or humanistic departments of the University.” And the students’ code, they note approvingly, was already “completely secular in tone.”

It is clear that Fordham had lost much of its Catholic nature before it commissioned a study of how it could cease to be Catholic to the extent necessary for receiving government funding. Did a desire for government aid come after the Catholicity had waned?

That secularization and government aid are two different issues is more easily seen in Canadian Catholic colleges. In Canada the state may help religious institutions provided it does not favor one denomination. The execution of this principle belongs to the ten provinces individually, each of which is in charge of its own educational policies. In some of these provinces at the present time, Catholic elementary and secondary schools are fully funded for both capital and operational expenses; in some, Catholic and other denominational colleges, as part of the provincial universities, are fully funded operationally, but are responsible for their own capital expenditures such as construction. Better funded by the government than their counterparts in the United States, these Catholic colleges are not all doing well with regard to their Catholicity, however.

Fordham University, one surmises, hoped to balance being Catholic against being non-sectarian in order to gain sufficient state aid and continue to exist. But how is it possible to be Catholic and non-Catholic? If New York State cannot give aid to a university which teaches Catholic doctrine, and a university which does not teach Catholic doctrine cannot be a Catholic university, how can aid be received without the university foregoing its Catholic identity? Even the authors of the Fordham study advert to this danger: “…public aid is not worth having if it can be gained only by ignoring the goal a college or university is striving to attain.”

At any rate, Fordham applied for nonsectarian status and state aid, and on February 19, 1970, the State of New York decreed “that Fordham was no longer a sectarian institution.” Now, if it is not sectarian, how can it be Catholic? And, if it is not Catholic, how can it be Jesuit?

The amount of money received from New York State is comparatively little. A colege in Rochester formerly conducted by my own religious community, which made itself non-sectarian, receives only four percent of its budget from New York State.

One might expect some of these universities to have realized their mistake, but a certain internal logic works against reversing such a step. First, people do not like to admit that they have been wrong. Second, the institutions become dependent on the money, however small the amount. Third, one step involves others, so that extrication becomes almost impossible. After all, once there is a secular definition of academic freedom, the institution is very soon practically a secular university.

Fordham provides a convenient example: In the 1980s it was charged by the State of New York with religious discrimination, being sued by Dr. Phyllis Zagano for not reappointing her to the faulty of the Department of Communication because she was “too Catholic”; the head of the department who opposed her reappointment wrote for a pornographic magazine; and Fordham’s Jesuit president defended the department head’s doing so.76 Decisions, after all, have consequences.

The Bishop

Who is the “your” in How to Keep Your University Catholic? A professor? A group of professors? The president? An alumni organization? A religious community? It may be any and all of these, but ultimately the bishop and the trustees (or directors, or regents, as they may be called) must be won over. It is to them, therefore, that this book is primarily addressed.

In some diocesan universities the bishop is chairman of the trustees, in others simply a member of the trustees, and in others not a trustee. But is should make no difference. And it should make little difference whether a university is conducted by a diocese, a group of Catholic laity, a religious congregation, or a board of trustees set up by a religious congregation; for, according to the 1983 Code of Canon Law, a bishop has the duty and right to see that the principles of Catholic doctrine are faithfully observed in all institutions of higher studies in his diocese which call themselves Catholic (canons 810, 814). He can declare a university to be Catholic or no longer Catholic (canon 808) and can withdraw from anyone teaching theological subjects the mandate to do so (canon 812). No doubt these powers should be exercised only after other means of dealing with difficulties are exhausted; these canons are first of all intended to ensure that a Catholic university will consult with the local bishop. Of course, if a bishop has a diocesan university, he could influence it more readily than otherwise.

The chief barrier to bishops exercising, or trying to exercise, effective influence over universities in their dioceses is one of attitude. Up to 1960 Catholic universities transmitted the faith, and bishops could follow a policy of benign neglect. But, although the faith has not been transmitted well since 1960, the bishops have continued their policy of neglect to the point that some are encouraging universities to become independent of bishops and the Pope. Both an archbishop and an auxiliary bishop signed the Land O’Lakes (Wisconsin) document of 1967, advocating that Catholic universities be free of church authority.77 And, in the bishops’ only pastoral letter on Catholic higher education,78 there was no mention of episcopal rights vis-à-vis theologians, but simply a wish that there be “a fruitful cooperation with theologians” and that a “delicate balance” be maintained. An archbishop gave an imprimatur to the American commentary on the new Code of Canon Law79which states that the Code does not apply to North American universities.80 And a president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops has stated that “there is no reason in principle that the accepted standards of academic freedom should not be accepted in the study of Catholic theology,” thus accepting a definition of academic freedom which is opposed to canon law.81 Then, too, the bishops’ own university, The Catholic University of America, was a hotbed of dissent in the 1980s, its then-president pushing for a secular definition of academic freedom in the university’s own publication.82 And action against its dissent came, finally, from the Vatican rather than from the American bishops.

If the identity of Catholic universities is to be preserved, bishops will have to exercise their authority, a task best done through the trustees. For since any institution calling itself Catholic must follow Canon Law, those who legally control it, the trustees, are likewise bound by Canon Law. Nevertheless there remain those like Father Hesburgh, C.S.C., a former president of Notre Dame, who once said that the university’s trustees would not obey the local bishop because they are bound by the articles of the board of trustees.83 This is to deny the right of the Church to tell a Catholic university what the Board’s articles should say. As long as Notre Dame calls itself Catholic, its trustees are bound by Canon Law and therefore required to see that the principles of Catholic doctrine are faithfully observed at Notre Dame. If the present articles of the Board do not provide for such observance, they should be revised to accord with the sacred canons and to facilitate the bishop’s supervision of the university.

Ex corde Ecclesiae, issued by Pope John Paul II,84 has made this matter clear: “Every Catholic university…has a relationship to the Church that is essential to its institutional identity. As such, it participates most directly in the life of the local Church in which it is situated. At the same time…each institution participates in and contributes to the life and the mission of the universal church…One consequence of its essential relationship to the Church is that the institutional fidelity of the university to Christian message includes a recognition of and adherence to the teaching authority of the Church in matters of faith and morals” (27).

Ex corde says that bishops “should be seen not as external agents but as participants in the life of the Catholic university”(28), and that “a Catholic university is linked with the Church either by a formal, constitutive, and statutory bond or by reason of an institutional commitment made by those responsible for it” (Norm 2, 2). It also states that “a university…is to incorporate these general Norms…into its governing documents and conform its existing statutes both to the general Norms and to their applications and submit them for approval to the competent ecclesiastical authority” (Norm 1, 3). A university is also required “to make known its Catholic identity” and, “particularly through its structure and its regulations, is to provide means which will guarantee the expression and the preservation of this identity…” (Norm 2, 3). If a problem arises concerning a university’s Catholic character, “the local bishop is to take the initiatives necessary to resolve the matter…, if necessary with the help of the Holy See” (Norm 5, 2).

We can see from these provisions of Ex corde that bishops are empowered to recognize as Catholic only those universities which require of the Board of Trustees, the administrators, and the faculty, a formal institutional commitment to the truth of the Catholic faith and to the authority of the Church’s Magisterium, and whose curriculum and organization of student life reflect this commitment.

In the present crisis in Catholic universities, many bishops will have to act. Prudence dictates strong action in critical situations. Why, then, cannot each bishop ask universities within his jurisdiction to have the articles of the board of trustees explicitly accept the teaching of the Church and the canonical authority of the bishop? Such a request could uncover unresolved problems in the relations between a bishop’s universities and the Church.

Unfortunately, ambivalence over dissent has kept many bishops from acting against their universities.  We must ask,“If the trumpet give forth an uncertain sound, who will prepare for battle?”  The disorder in our universities is a continuing cause of disorder in the Church, but it is also, at a deeper level, a result of it.  For this reason, a diocese which has not decided to reform dissent in general cannot hope to reform dissent in its universities.

The Trustees

According to civil law, the board of trustees has ultimate authority over a Catholic university. We have examined the board’s duty to have the statutes of the university recognize Church law. Now let us look at the composition of the board. In the euphoric atmosphere of the last twenty-five or more years, many religious communities felt guilty about owning universities. There was a vague feeling that it was more appropriate to surrender control of them, with the result that many religious orders, acting rather imprudently, gave their control away. They did not consider setting up a purely advisory board, whose advice would always be followed except in decisions detrimental to the religious nature of the institution; or a board with full power but whose members were chosen by, and held office at the pleasure of, the religious community or episcopal corporation. Nor did they limit membership on the board to Catholics. In many cases, then, Catholics were chosen initially, but later appointments included non-Catholics or nominal Catholics. Often, too, members of the religious community or episcopal corporation on the board were in the minority.

Most boards, in religious matters as in academic ones, follow the wishes of the president and faculty. In other words, except in financial matters, boards do not formulate policy. Consequently many boards do not concern themselves with the preservation and improvement of the university’s religious goals. Once this situation develops, the Catholicity of such institutions is in jeopardy. And, indeed, once the trustees accept, explicitly or implicitly, that first step towards de-Catholization, the slope downward is slippery indeed.

In a Catholic institution, the board’s chief responsibility is to safeguard its religious nature. Ex corde says that “the responsibility for maintaining and strengthening the Catholic identity of the university…is entrusted principally to…the chancellor and/or a board of trustees or equivalent body…” (Norm 4, 1). And, unless the board is composed mainly of committed Catholics, it is simply unrealistic to think that it can carry out its task. How can a board preserve an institution as Catholic if the board itself is not thoroughly Catholic? The Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities has been lyrical in its praise of appointing non-Catholics as members of boards.85 My own experience has been that the scholastic adage operatio sequitur esse (“a thing acts in accordance with its nature”) is as valid here as anywhere and admits of no exceptions.

Assuming, however, that we have a board that wishes to maintain a Catholic university loyal to the Magisterium, we must next explore the wording of its statutes and by-laws. Legal assistance should of course be sought, but the lawyers themselves will need guidance in their task.  The final arbiter as to what is, or is not, the teaching of the Magisterium should be the local bishop. An alternative would be to make the arbiter a small committee composed of, say, the bishop, the chairman of the board of trustees, and the archbishop of the ecclesiastical province concerned (or a neighboring archbishop if the university is in an archepiscopal see). No doubt the law will require some concrete arbitration procedure and a concrete arbitrator or arbitration panel, and such can be arranged.

This matter of statutes and by-laws is extremely important: everything should be set down in writing and approved by the board. At the time of their founding most Catholic institutions had so clear a purpose and nature that the principles and details of operation were seldom committed to writing or explicitly approved. The situation is different today. The university’s policies on all matters must be put in writing and be approved by the highest governing body. In this way the policies can shape the institution, and be less threatened when disputes arise.

I repeat: the Catholicity of a university rests with the board of trustees. If the board does its work well, receiving direction from canon law and working in harmony with the bishop, the institution will retain its authentic religious nature. Perhaps the most significant passage in Ex corde is this: “The identity of a Catholic university is essentially linked to the quality of its teachers and to respect for Catholic doctrine. It is the responsibility of the competent authority to watch over these two fundamental needs in accordance with what is indicated in Canon Law” (Norm 4, 1).

The Administration and Faculty

Since we are dealing in this book with only one point—the Catholicity of our universities—we must take for granted that, in appointing administrators and faculty, the board will assure itself that candidates have sufficient training, competence and experience to fill job requirements other than those required by the religious nature of the institution. The point here is that the religious character of the university determines the most important requirements for administrators and faculty. The religious dimension of the university has as its goal the religious formation of the students, a goal which will be achieved primarily through the influence of administrators and faculty for, although the functions of the university chaplaincy are important, they can only supplement the influence of administrators and faculty; they cannot equal it. For example, on a secular campus, as much as a chaplain might try to counteract this influence, his success will be limited. At worst, unsuitable administrators or faculty members may thoroughly undo the work of the chaplaincy; at best they will lessen it.

Administrators are no less important in Catholic universities than elsewhere: they set the tone for faculty and students, and they have great influence in appointments of faculty. Great care is required therefore in the appointment of the president and other administrators. They should be committed Catholics, with a thorough knowledge of Catholic theology and Church history, convinced of the importance of Catholic universities and what is required to keep them Catholic. The president, in particular, will be the instrument through whom the trustees will implement many of their decisions. The Ex corde says that “the responsibility for maintaining and strengthening the Catholic identity of the university…calls for the recruitment of…administrators who are both willing and able to promote that identity” (Norm 4, 1).

I never cease to be surprised at the lack of concern in some administrators about appointing committed Catholics. They may admit that a certain number of the faculty should be such Catholics, but no more. Rarely is such a qualification a sine qua non of appointment. Yet the Code of Canon Law reads: “It is the duty of the competent statutory authority to ensure that there be appointed teachers who are not only qualified in scientific and pedagogical expertise but also outstanding in their integrity of doctrine and uprightness of life (canon 810). It is thought fanatical to suggest that all faculty members should be good Catholics. What was taken for granted some decades ago is now denied without an argument. And, should administrators deign to argue the matter, they always raise the same eleven points:

  1. It would not be possible for us to discontinue the contracts of a large number of people, many of whom have tenure.

To this I reply that there is a difference between hiring and firing. We are not recommending an undoing of the past but a fresh start for the future. There are obvious obligations to present faculty, who will understandably be afraid of being let go. If job security is not assured at the outset, nothing will be accomplished.

2. There are many Catholics whom I would not want on the faculty.

Strange to say, this argument is frequently encountered. Of course, no one is suggesting that faculty be hired solely on the basis of their being Catholic. The principle is that, in addition to being competent teachers, in addition to being congenial and hardworking, faculty members should be good Catholics.

3. No one can say whether a person is a good Catholic.

This statement can be interpreted in two ways. It may imply that the Catholic faith is so amorphous that practically anyone calling himself a Catholic must qualify as a good one. What an institution needs, then, is an objective criterion, and an effective one is at hand: does the person wish to be loyal to the Church’s Magisterium? If so, the understanding of the faith is clear enough, since it can be found in the 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church. If not, the very notion of a test of Catholicity has been abandoned, and the institution can only end up being of disservice to the Church. The second meaning of the statement is that a person’s faith and religious practice cannot be determined. But this is simply erroneous; determining it is as easy or as difficult as learning what the person’s teaching competence is. A diligent inquiry may be required in either case, but it is equally possible in both.

4. Seeking information of this type is illegal.

Legal matters can be settled by consulting a competent lawyer. And consultation shows that such information may be asked for. Federal and state (or, in Canada, provincial) laws allow religious educational institutions to use religious faith and practice as a criterion in appointments as long as the criterion is publicly stated. It is therefore as alarming as it is revelatory to see Catholic colleges advertising without reference to their religious commitment, or even stating that they hire without discrimination as to creed.

5. At our particular institution we have accepted state aid and have given up the right to prefer Catholics.

To this I say that it would be better to refuse state aid and save the nature of your institution.

6. There are some wonderful people on our faculty who are not Catholics. They are good teachers, congenial, and dedicated to the purpose of the institution.

Of course, we all know such persons and are thankful for them; but we should not argue by exceptions. We want the ideal professors. If one is not available in a given case, we have to approximate to the ideal. Most of the time this will still result in appointing someone who is a good Catholic, though it may be that a devout Protestant Christian would be hired.

7. We shouldn’t live in a ghetto.

This slogan is often used. There are two replies. The first is that no ghetto could survive in the modern world, even if it wanted to. Students view television and films, read newspapers and magazines, and meet every kind of person. This leads to the second and the real reply to this slogan; that is, that in one sense we do want a “ghetto” as an oasis where Catholics can be Catholics, where the faith can be expressed, discussed, and developed. Only with this kind of help will they be able to remain committed Christians in a secular world.

8. The Church wants its institutions to be ecumenical.

Correct. But true ecumenism is an attitude of understanding joined to charity, not of indifferentism. In Catholics it requires a thorough knowledge of their faith. To turn out graduates who do not know their own religious tradition is to be anti-ecumenical at the most fundamental level. The ecumenical orientation of our colleges would be better expressed by dialogue with other religious institutions, not by confusion at home. Furthermore, faculty hired today will often be on staff for thirty or forty years. An institution could easily become more “ecumenical” than Catholic.

9. Hiring good Catholics is important in the theology department, but it is not necessary for other departments.

If only our colleges would hire, for their theology departments, Catholics loyal to the Magisterium! We would then see more clearly that all the departments of the university should contribute to the Catholicity of the students’ education. If these latter departments were to present their subject in a framework of faith, they would deepen the students’ ability to integrate their knowledge and their religious belief. Why should a Catholic college not use all its resources? And what type of person can best help in this work of integrating knowledge and the Catholic faith? An agnostic? Certainly not; this is work for a committed Catholic. Ex corde  states: “Aided by the specific contributions of philosophy and theology, university scholars will be engaged in a constant effort to determine the relative place and meaning of each of the various disciplines within the context of a vision of the human person and the world that is enlightened by the Gospel and therefore by a faith in Christ…” (16).

10. To follow this principle in hiring would be insular and intolerant.

A Catholic university has a definite aim. Achieving it requires appropriate means. The Catholic university cannot achieve its aim without hiring good Catholics, any more than a French-speaking university can attain its goal without hiring French-speaking professors. A Catholic university need not apologize for preferring Catholics any more than does a French-speaking university for preferring faculty who speak French. One could not imagine an American Jewish community allowing a professor to teach anti-Semitism, nor could one imagine the American public faulting the university for not hiring the professor. Similarly Catholic universities should not hire professors whose religious orientation is at variance with Catholicism.

11. Many of our students are not Catholic.

The primary purpose of a Catholic university is to produce Catholic leaders. To form them requires using all the university’s resources. And the primary resource of the university is the faculty. The faculty therefore should be thoroughly Catholic. If non-Catholic students come to a Catholic university, they should do so because it is Catholic. If this is not their motivation they should not be admitted. The presence of non-Catholic students is therefore no reason for making the university less Catholic by hiring non-Catholics.86

If possible, then, all the administrators and faculty in a Catholic university should be practicing Catholics. Why settle for less? Perhaps, in a given case, it may not be possible to find the right person, but one can wait for the right person by making temporary arrangements with the best approximation to the ideal. After all, a Catholic university has the right to be Catholic and therefore the right to use the means necessary to guarantee, and enhance, its Catholicity.

Taking religious commitment as the basic criterion for appointment, the same holds for promotion and for the granting of tenure. A university lax in hiring will be forced to continue in the same lax mode. On the other hand, it could be made clear to professors applying for tenure or promotion that a basic criterion by which they will be judged is their incorporation of religion into their work. It is unfair to bring in new criteria after they are hired. They should know, therefore, from the start, that a deficiency in this matter papered over at the time of their hiring can be grounds for denying promotion or tenure. Ex corde Ecclesiae says that “all teachers…, at the time of their appointment, are to be informed about the Catholic identity of the institution and its implications, and about their responsibility to promote, or at least respect, that identity” (Norm 4, 2), and that “all Catholic teachers are to be faithful to, and all other teachers are to respect, Catholic doctrine and morals in their research and teaching” (Norm 4, 3). Also, “in particular, Catholic theologians, aware that they fulfill a mandate received from the Church, are to be faithful to the Magisterium of the Church as the authentic interpreter of Sacred Scripture and sacred tradition” (Norm 4, 3).

Something similar holds even for tenured professors. Even after receiving tenure they too will know that the religious dimension of their teaching is of prime concern. It is unfair to dismiss them for what was present and known at the time they were given tenure, but not for changes after they are tenured. A Catholic university should not allow teaching opposed to the Magisterium of the Church at any time, whether before or after tenure. The university should be serious and adamant in this matter. Of course,
especially in the case of a tenured professor, the matter must be important and there must be a refusal to correct it, a refusal given in words or deeds. The university’s statutes should state this plainly, and list the steps to be taken in a case of dismissal.

Everyone knows how upsetting and unpleasant a dismissal is. All the more need for care to be taken at the time of appointment, promotion, and the granting of tenure! The words of The Imitation of Christ come to mind: “Resist beginnings; all too late the cure when habit has gained strength by long delay.”

A committee of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, the committee mentioned earlier, warns us of the dangers of appointing faculty who are unsuitable from a religious point of view:

It is foolish not to take into consideration the moral character of a candidate for faculty membership. When a scholar becomes a member of a university faculty, he becomes part of a collegium, a collegium that he will in due course come to influence, whose tone he will help to establish.87

Yet we find universities which do not mention specifically Catholic or even Christian qualities as being normative for faculty. Take, for instance, this statement from St. Norbert College:

Within the academic program the college considers it the responsibility of all members of the faculty to embrace such personal values as integrity, honesty, and concern for others as well as such societal values as a commitment to thoughtful citizenship, social justice, and peace….Some faculty, while neither sharing the Catholic tradition nor the Christian faith, remain at St. Norbert’s because they lead lives of inquiry that support a commitment to the realm of moral value.88

One wonders what “moral value” is envisioned here. Is it: Love of God? Or the Catholic teaching related to the family? Or is it the condemnation of contraception, abortion, homosexual activity and remarriage after divorce? Under so vague a clause Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud would have qualified for appointment. One suspects that this institution’s commitment to Catholicism has already been so diluted by the presence of non-Catholic faculty that the institution is no longer able to state what a Catholic university stands for.

At the heart of Catholic education are good, learned, Catholics, who love God and their faith, and share this love and this faith with the younger members of the university community. Pope John Paul II is certainly convinced of this:

The purpose of a Catholic university lies in the pursuit of research and instruction but such a university must likewise allow the students to carry on their studies in an atmosphere consistent with the faith, to find the means to deepen this faith, to learn the rudiments of the spiritual life and Christian activity….Such a demand concerns first of all the professors on the staff, who must not be afraid of bearing witness to the faith which motivates them, to their ethical reflection in the light of the Church’s teaching.89

I remember few incidents in my undergraduate days that impressed me as much as one of my chemistry teachers marveling in front of the class at the divine wisdom after he had taught us the laws of thermodynamics. I have forgotten the laws of thermodynamics, but not his love of God.

The Students

The primary purpose of a Catholic university is to produce well-trained Catholics who will occupy influential places in society as clerics, lawyers, doctors, nurses, judges, businessmen, educators, and so on, as well as influence others through their roles as spouses, parents, and parishioners. According to Ex corde, students “should realize the responsibility of their professional life, the enthusiasm of being the trained ‘leaders’ of tomorrow, or being witnesses to Christ in whatever place they may exercise their profession” (23).

Most of our universities have enrolled non-Catholics, many in large numbers. Non-Catholics may be enrolled if their purpose is to obtain the special benefits Catholic universities offer, and if suitable Catholics are not thereby prevented from attending. Ex corde states that “the education of students is to combine academic and professional development with formation in moral and religious principles,” and that “courses in Catholic doctrine are to be made available to all students” (Norm 4, 5). In many Catholic universities, however, there are no requirements for the moral or religious education of all students, even of all Catholic students.

Many non-Catholics register in Catholic universities for other reasons: The universities are closer, they are less expensive, a friend is going, the entrance standards are lower, the entrance standards are higher and so on. One might hope that the Catholic environment will have a beneficial effect on such persons, and no doubt it sometimes does. But, to the extent that they really do not want what is distinctive in a Catholic university, they are dead weight at best; at worst they are influences counter to the university’s primary work. It is unfortunate that so many of our universities accept these extra students to balance the books. The temptation to solve a financial problem in this way is strong, and, once given in to, tends to become habitual. Our universities would do better to become smaller, and establish a lower quota, so that they might admit only Catholics and a few special non-Catholics.

Ex corde Ecclesiae declares that, “in a Catholic university,…Catholic ideals, attitudes, and principles penetrate and inform university activities” (14). But how can this be done unless Catholic dogma and morality are omnipresent? And how can they be omnipresent unless the students either are Catholic or are sincerely interested in learning about Catholicism? Ex corde also states that “everyone in the [university] community…contributes…toward maintaining and strengthening the distinctive Catholic character of the institution” (21). To admit students who are not really interested in Catholicism is to make a mockery of such statements.

A fair number of non-Catholics will change the climate of a Catholic university. Crucifixes and other religious symbols will disappear, prayers before class will be eliminated, specifically Catholic topics and teachings will be avoided. A good test of whether non-Catholic students are being admitted for the right reasons and in the right numbers is the continuing Catholicity of the university. And a good indication of admissions policies is the promotional literature of the university. Is the institution called Catholic? Is its Catholicity highlighted? Is the religious purpose of all instruction mentioned?

The Curriculum

We are not concerned here with all aspects of the curriculum but only those involved in the Catholicity of an institution. To simplify our presentation we will also leave graduate programs out of consideration.

A university is not truly Catholic unless it both teaches theology and requires theology classes of all its undergraduate students, no matter what their program. Many Catholic young people emerging from high school are badly informed about their faith; and all need a more mature treatment of their religion during the undergraduate years since, when the dichotomy between what they believe and what they see in the secular world around them strikes home, students often question their beliefs in an adult fashion.

There is much to learn because, while the Catholic faith is simple enough for a child to believe, it is also complex enough to allow a lifetime of study. Undergraduate students therefore need a thorough presentation of the articles of their faith, of the history of Catholicism, of the Old and New Testaments, of the sacraments and the liturgy, of moral theology and spirituality. This is not religious studies, but the study of our faith based on an acceptance of fundamental revealed doctrines. Religious studies examine from the outside the content, history, and present status of various religious traditions. In Catholic theology, the content of faith is accepted as true; in religious studies it is viewed as an historical phenomenon. Catholic universities should teach Catholicism as theology and other religions as religious studies.

The minimum amount of theology required of all students should not be set at less than twelve semester hours. A good selection of courses would be: Dogma; Scripture; Moral Theology and Spirituality; the Sacraments and Liturgy. Of course, there is room for variety here, and perhaps some choice might be allowed, particularly in the later years. But the minimum number of semester-hours should never be reduced.

Should theology courses be required for non-Catholics? It would be unwise to require such courses for Catholics only, for several reasons. First of all, Catholics might see this as “laying a burden” on them from which others are exempt. Second, non-Catholics need theology as much as Catholics do. Third, we have already established the principle that non-Catholics should not be accepted unless they apply because the university is a religious university.

Non-Catholics should therefore be required to take the same number of semester-hours in theology as Catholics. Some universities will also require that they study Catholic theology as well as Scripture and Apologetics, not to require them to accept it as true but to instruct them in this important area of thought and history. If the curriculum is thoroughly influenced by the Catholic faith, as it should be, students should know about this faith in some depth. Other universities will leave the study of the Catholic faith as an option for non-Catholics, and will devise special courses for the ones who do not exercise this option. No doubt most of the non-Catholics will be Protestants; most will probably be poorly informed even about their own religious tradition. Courses in Scripture, in the history and forms of Protestantism, or in issues of morality, would be suitable. No doubt more choice should be allowed in these matters than for Catholics if the number and variety of non-Catholics is great.

However, even courses in the core curriculum designed specifically for non-Catholics should be taught by Catholics. There are three reasons for this. First, it will happen, for one reason or another, that some Catholics will take these courses, if perhaps only for extra theology credits. Second, the variety of students in them does not justify the choice of any one denomination rather than any other. There will probably be atheists, agnostics, Jews, Moslems, Baptists, Lutherans, Episcopalians and so on. There is then no need for any particular non-Catholic professor rather than a Catholic one. Third, professors once hired tend to be on the staff for thirty or forty years. It is no small matter to hire a non-Catholic these days. It would be preferable to hire someone on a temporary or part-time basis if need be. Such a temporary arrangement should, of course, in justice, be made clear, and the person should be properly paid so that a good job will be done.

Philosophy is as important as theology in a Catholic university because it provides an underpinning of faith. It is true that philosophy can be required in universities because it trains students to think clearly and because it studies the history of highly influential ideas. Certainly these reasons are good ones for insisting on philosophy in a humanities program or a liberal arts program but, when we are speaking of a philosophy requirement for all undergraduate students in the university, whether they are in business, nursing, pre-medicine, education, or any program whatever, the only argument is its necessity for developing an educated believer. Philosophy deals in great part with the same matters as theology—the origin of the universe, its purpose of human life, and how that purpose is attained. It can therefore contribute immeasurably to the believer’s appreciation of divine revelation.

Theology never replaces philosophy. It is true that a Catholic, by his faith, knows the truth about these matters, by revelation, but a mature person will always ask for rational, philosophical answers as well, and will not be satisfied until they are given.

The objection is bound to rise that there are many philosophies, frequently contradicting one another in important areas. To simply require courses in philosophy, then, will not achieve the intended purpose. This objection leads however, not to the conclusion that philosophy should not be required, but that the right philosophy should be required.

What is the right philosophy? Obviously it must be a Christian philosophy. A minimum requirement of a Christian philosophy is that it not be in conflict with Christian faith. A non-Christian philosophy cannot be true on the points on which it disagrees with the faith. The choice then narrows down to a decision for one Christian philosophy or for an eclectic selection from several Christian philosophies. Do we have a way of deciding? We cannot simply assume that all Christian philosophies are correct and simply because they do not contradict the Catholic faith.

This is a problem Christians have dealt with since the second century, though most attempts ended ultimately in failure. But there is one philosophy the Church explicitly approves and asks scholars to cultivate—that of St. Thomas Aquinas. To require philosophy of students in Catholic universities while denying them the study of Thomism is to commit an injustice. We must remember that we are speaking here of the courses required of all students and therefore relatively few. It would be a wasted opportunity if all the required courses did not present the philosophy of Aquinas. The time is so short, the object so important, that such a course of action is called for. Of course Thomism
cannot be well taught without other major philosophical systems being studied.  What Thomism would provide would be the core of the program.90

How much philosophy should be required? The minimum should be the same as for theology, twelve semester-hours. Again, there is so much to cover: the existence of God, the nature of God, freedom of the will, the immortality of the human soul, the purpose of human life, and the means by which this purpose is obtained. A good choice of courses might be: The Philosophy of the Human Person; Ethics; Metaphysics; and Epistemology. And these courses might well be taken in that order. Ethics should follow the philosophy of the human person. Ideally it should also follow metaphysics but, being less abstract, it is better taken before metaphysics. Epistemology, theoretically, could well precede ethics and metaphysics but, since it is a second-order science, dealing with knowledge and not directly with reality, it requires knowledge of reality. Consequently it is better taken last. But it certainly should be studied, because our world is rampant with relativism, subjectivism, and skepticism, which must be dealt with head-on at some stage in a student’s career.

With the amount of knowledge students must acquire constantly increasing, and especially with growing demands on major requirements, there will always be agitation among some faculty to decrease the requirements in theology and philosophy, but theology and philosophy must hold pride of place in a Catholic university.

We find a strong statement concerning the importance of philosophy in an address by Alice von Hildebrand, wife of the late Dietrich von Hildebrand and herself a noted philosophy professor:

…[I]t should now be clear that philosophy must play a crucial role in Catholic education….I grant that it is better to study no philosophy than bad philosophy, and that, today, people who have no philosophy at all are usually better off than those whose training is based on the thought of a Russell, a Heidegger, a Sartre (to name but a few). But the fact remains that true philosophy is indispensable for a true Catholic education and, in particular, has crucial importance for theology. My husband used to say that the catastrophic theological systems which are proliferating today are to be traced back to the wrong philosophy on which they are based. Philosophy is so crucial in man’s intellectual life that everyone necessarily has a philosophy of life—and, if this philosophy is not sound, it has a devastating effect on man’s intellectual life. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that a Catholic university embrace and form its students in true philosophy, i.e., in an objectivistic philosophy exclusively based on rational arguments and at the same time in perfect harmony with faith.91

This matter of the amount of theology and philosophy required of all students is one that should be committed to writing by the board of trustees, and any change should require its approval.

We now leave the consideration of theology and philosophy and turn to the other subjects, all of which should be taught from a Catholic point of view. Ex corde teaches that “a Catholic university, as Catholic, informs and carries out its…teaching…with Catholic ideals, principles, and attitudes” (Norm 2, 2). Would that Catholic universities were as serious about this as the evangelical colleges are about coordinating with their curriculum. The president of the evangelical Christian College Coalition (now the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities), wrote:

The stand of our schools is: if you’re earnest about your faith, you can’t compartmentalize it. It weaves through everything you do.92

Obviously some subjects are less connected with the faith than others. But none of them should be taught in such a way as to contradict the faith. And many courses, such as history, psychology, sociology, and literature, touch on religion at every turn. But this is a question of who teaches these subjects rather than of their place in the curriculum, and we have dealt with this already.

A word might be added here concerning residence arrangements. A university which allows students to visit bedrooms of persons of the opposite sex fails in its duty to assist its students to live chastely. Such a disorder parallels in extracurricular matters the curricular disorders with which we are here primarily concerned.

Academic Freedom

The most important issue in Catholic universities at the present time is academic freedom. There are two possible definitions of it. A secular definition would be “the freedom of academic faculty to search for truth in accordance with the canons of their particular scholarly disciplines and to expound the results of this search for truth without undue restrictions being placed on them by university or outside authorities, or, more especially, without jeopardizing their academic positions and their tenure in these positions.”93 A definition suitable for a Catholic university would be the same except for this restrictive addition: “It is understood that faculty are not allowed to teach or write in such a manner as to oppose the religious purposes of their university.” Such a definition is vehemently opposed by the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities (ACCU)94 of the United States and by several presidents of institutions in the Association, but is required by the Code of Canon Law. Though the ACCU fears more than anything else an effective episcopal presence in our universities, it also opposes any boards of trustees that would safeguard Catholic doctrine.

The freedom of one person or group cannot be absolute but must be exercised in such a way as to respect the freedom of other persons or groups. For example, my freedom to smoke in a public place may legitimately be restricted by the rights of non-smokers who would suffer harm or discomfort from smoke. Now, there is more than one freedom involved in academic freedom. Besides the freedom of the professor there is that of the institution and that of the students. An institution should be free to pursue its goal—in this case to provide Catholic education—and students should be free to receive a Catholic education in a Catholic university. When a professor attacks the religious purpose of his university, he offends against both its freedom and that of its students. What is needed, then, is a means of balancing these freedoms.

A professor who publicly and unrepentantly promotes doctrines opposed to Catholic beliefs is, in the name of his freedom opposing the university’s freedom. Yet, since he is a member of a Catholic university and was aware of its beliefs when he was hired, it is clear whose freedom must give way. This becomes even more cogent given that the freedom of the university exists for the sake of the students’ freedom to obtain a Catholic education. The freedom of both the faculty and the university is ordered to the students’ freedom.

We must remember also that the professor was hired by the institution to help it in its aims, not to oppose these aims. It is consequently an implicit condition of his appointment that he not do so. It would be better, of course, to make such a condition explicit, as well as the procedure to be taken against offenses in this matter.

Most Catholic universities in the United States were founded by bishops, directly or through religious orders, to provide a Catholic education. Benefactors supported these universities because of their religious purpose. The universities, then, have a publicly known purpose that is recognized by canon and secular law. There is no need for these universities to be defensive about their position. Why is it, then, that they are defensive, or even willing to forego their rights?

The National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA) in 1976 provided three answers to these questions. The first is a fear that enemies of the Church:

will contend derisively that truth cannot be upheld and defended without resort to penalties and outside sanctions, confirming for some the suspicion that Catholic institutions cannot be true universities.

The second and third are:

Catholic colleges and universities in the United States cannot deprive faculty members of their civil right as defined by American law, nor limit their academic rights which are supported by accrediting and otherprofessional associations, without severe penalty to the institution, not least of which would be the loss of prestige and influence in American society and particularly in the American intellectual community.95

Apparently the NCEA agrees that Catholic universities are not true universities if they have a religious definition of academic freedom. The fact is, however, that Catholic universities that have adopted a secular definition of academic freedom have not remained substantially Catholic. And the reasons are not hard to find: they cannot defend their nature; they cannot keep their enemies outside; they must fight for their existence with their gates wide open to attack. It is not too much to say that a Catholic university with a secular definition of academic freedom cannot remain Catholic.

My own opinion is that the administrators in these institutions fear that secular colleagues will think less well of them or their institutions if they do not act as secular administrators or universities do. In effect, they share the secular assumption that the Catholic faith is a hindrance to the search for truth. The reason given for accepting a secular definition of academic freedom is that it enables professors to search for truth wherever it may be found, and this includes a search among doctrines opposed to Catholic teaching. But, if Catholic teaching is true, the search for truth among doctrines opposed to it is bound to be fruitless and, usually, harmful. A Catholic university is therefore justified in forbidding the teaching of doctrines opposed to the Catholic faith; indeed, it is required to forbid it. The Catholic faith is to Catholic theology what empirical data are to the natural sciences. Certainly no university would allow its natural scientists to reject or falsify the raw data of science.

The Ex corde says that an “essential characteristic” of a Catholic university is “fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the Church” (13), and that the “institutional fidelity of the university to the Christian message includes a recognition of and adherence to the teaching authority of the Church in matters of faith and morals. Catholic members of the university community are also called to a personal fidelity to the Church with all that this implies. Non-Catholic members are required to respect the Catholic character of the university…” (27). And this applies especially to theologians: “Since theology seeks an understanding of revealed truth whose authentic interpretation is entrusted to the bishops of the Church, it is intrinsic to the principles and methods of their research and teaching in their academic disciplines that theologians respect the authority of the bishops and assent to Catholic doctrine…” (29).

No doubt some of the Catholics who want to have a secular definition of academic freedom in a Catholic university do accept the teaching of the Church’s Magisterium. Yet the logic of their position is faulty. They do not wish to deny their own faith, but the do not mind if their university denies its faith, as it must when its faculty teach what is contrary to the Church’s Magisterium.

The history of the very recent demand for a secular definition of academic freedom in Catholic universities is instructive. It began with the Land O’Lakes document of August 1, 1967, signed by representatives from a number of Catholic universities, including Georgetown, Boston College, Catholic University of America, St. Louis, Fordham, Laval, and Notre Dame. The document claimed “the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself.”96 This was a demand for freedom from episcopal and papal authority. On the other hand, at his meeting with Catholic university leaders in New Orleans in September, 1987, Pope John Paul II stressed that the influence of bishops and the pope is not external to Catholic institutions, but intrinsic to them. The position of the Land O’Lakes signers was adopted by the NCEA in 1976.97 Speaking for 223 Catholic universities of the United States, the NCEA stated that “a juridical relationship between the Church and Catholic institutions in the exercise of their proper autonomy” is not “desirable or even possible….” It patronizingly granted that “bishops and other church leaders can provide significant insights into the particular needs of service to the local Church,” but added: “We believe the word ‘cooperation’ or the phrase ‘mutual respect and support’ best characterizes the kind of relationship that should exist between institutions and Church.”

Furthermore, no American has a civil right to teach what is contrary to Catholic teaching in a Catholic university. Nor do accrediting and other professional associations limit the rights of Catholic universities to be Catholic. So what the Association really fears is “the loss of prestige and influence…in the American intellectual community.”98

Opposed to the Land O’Lakes statement and the NCEA paper is the Code of Canon Law. The Code teaches that bishops have the duty and right to see that principles of Catholic doctrine are faithfully observed in their universities (canon 812); the right to bestow or withdraw the designation “Catholic” (canon 808); and the authority to see that teachers lacking integrity of doctrine are removed from office (canon 810).

Episcopal powers in a Catholic university would be completely stymied by a secular definition of academic freedom, and the university could not long continue as Catholic. That is why the Code implicitly demands a religious definition of academic freedom in Catholic universities.

Much of what has been said so far is justified by the Charles Curran case. Father Curran sued The Catholic University of America because it had refused to let him continue to teach theology.99 The judge recognized that Catholic University “shares with the Roman Catholic Church a common bond of faith and mission to preserve and protect the church’s doctrine,” and that the University aims, at the same time, at “the goal of unfettered and robust academic inquiry.” He saw that this was bound to raise problems but that is was for the University to decide how to resolve them: “On some issues—and this case certainly presents one of them—the conflict between the University’s commitment to academic freedom and its unwavering fealty to the Holy See is direct and unavoidable. On such issues, the University may choose for itself on which side of that conflict it wants to come down…”

What decided the issue was the civil law of contracts: “It is the law of contracts which must govern the decision.” In other words, since the University’s statutes stated that theology professors must have canonical mission, the University can dismiss a professor who loses his: “The court prefers…to rest its decision on the canonical mission requirement incorporated into the contract by the…statutes….” The judge declared that the professors of the University were aware of the relationship between the University and the Church: “no one…could have contracted with the Catholic University of America without understanding the university’s special relationship with the Roman Catholic Church, with all of the implications and obligations flowing from that relationship.”

We thus see that, as far as civil law goes, what a university’s statutes state concerning academic freedom will be upheld in a civil court. The Curran case will be a landmark case. Those administrators in Catholic universities who have been defending a secular definition of academic freedom in Catholic institutions by threatening legal difficulties will now have to rethink their position.

“Indoctrination”

There are those, even among Catholics, who claim that Catholic universities that follow canon law do not teach but rather indoctrinate. This claim is made chiefly with regard to the teaching of theology, but the argument here applies to every subject in the curriculum. Father Hesburgh worries about indoctrination wherever a bishop can require a Catholic university to forbid a professor to teach theology judged to be contrary to Catholic faith.  A generation ago, he wrote:

Obviously, if [the] church…can dictate who can teach…, the university is not free and, in fact is not a true university where the truth is sought and taught. It is rather, a place of…religious indoctrination.100

Father Hesburgh would be right if we did not know that the Catholic faith is true. But a university which does not accept it as true is not Catholic. Why, then, should a Catholic university allow teachers to claim that it is false? We might worry about a bishop making a mistake in judgment, but this worry cannot invalidate the bishop’s right or the university’s duty in general. Of course, provisions have to be made for a proper procedure which will reduce the number of mistakes, but this is a different matter from Father Hesburgh’s denying the general principle altogether.

Is it indoctrination when a Catholic university appoints a committed Catholic to teach theology, or any other subject? “Indoctrination” usually has the pejorative meaning of “induction of convictions by improper means.” Now, any subject taught improperly can become indoctrination. Teaching history is indoctrination if evidence is suppressed; teaching mathematics is indoctrination if students are led to memorize rather than understand; and teaching psychology and sociology is indoctrination if the principles underlying them are passed on by repetition, rather than made explicit and examined. But, just as any subject can become indoctrination, so any subject can avoid this pitfall. Theology can be taught objectively, making clear why it accepts divine revelation and only then interpreting and building on it. Once this principle is publicly stated, to act in accord with it is no longer indoctrination. The professor of theology need not disbelieve what he is teaching or disguise his faith, any more than a mathematics professor need deny the laws of logic. Why should a Catholic university
be allowed to teach mathematics or physics or history as true, and not be allowed to teach Catholicism as true? Not to present Catholic theology as true would be contrary to a Catholic university’s nature.

We find Catholic universities bending over backwards to avoid “indoctrination” in Catholicism. Some teach not morality but “values clarification.” A midwestern Catholic college, for example, wants to avoid a “prescriptive model” of teaching the faith, which would have the teachers “dictating” this faith to their pupils. Instead there is a pursuit of truth: “the pursuit of wisdom and truth, the very reason for the existence of St. Norbert, is manifested…in the curriculum.” This pursuit of truth, we are told, demands that some non-Catholic, even some non-Christian, faculty be appointed:

Some faculty, while sharing neither the Catholic tradition nor the Christian faith, remain at St. Norbert because they led lives of inquiry that support a commitment to the realm of moral values. This pluralism is demanded by the conscientious pursuit of truth in personal freedom by a diverse group of people.101

There are no theology courses, only religious studies courses, none of which are required. Furthermore, the “Values Program” does not mention anything Catholic or even Christian in its objectives.

…The program proposed as its objective several things: [to] help students become explicitly aware of their own value systems and give them the opportunity to compare these to the value systems of others; [to] help students identify their own objectives and their value systems…

From the experience gained thus far, it is evident that the students who have participated in the program have indeed become more conscious of
their own values and more aware of the value component in every decision.

And what has replaced required classes in Scripture, Catholic dogma, and Catholic moral theology? A “religiosity” is fostered by “people processes,” “process-oriented counselor functions,” and “the advisement system.”

We find another example of the avoidance of indoctrination at Loyola University of Chicago. Loyola, to judge by the papers in its symposium on ethics,102 avoids indoctrination in Catholic morality by teaching non-Catholic morality. One speaker says that students should be made “more aware of the moral questions that there are, waiting to be addressed,” but warns against “final answers to moral questions,” as if there were no clear Catholic positions on such topics as abortion, contraception, homosexuality, or marriage after divorce. Indeed, although the editor says that “the panelists presented views that showed that we are not always certain what the norms are,” it would be truer to say that their views claim that we are never certain what the norms are.

Many pages of talks given at this symposium are given over to a presentation and discussion of the “values clarification” teachings of Kohlberg, who, as one of the questioners pointed out, has little to offer Catholic ethicists.103 And, though advertising for the book claims that it contains “a discussion of all aspects of ethics in higher education” (emphasis added), many important aspects are omitted:

  1. What is the relationship between the ethics advocated at the symposium and Catholic teaching? Is Catholic ethics being discussed when the keynote speaker defines ethics as “our relationship to other persons in this world and to ourselves as persons in this world,” with no mention of our relationship to God?
  2. There is no discussion of whether ethics is to be required of some or all students. Actually one hopes that the type of ethics presented here is not required at all. On the other hand, why should a proper ethics not be required, and of all students?
  3. What are the prerequisites for the study of ethics? Can it be studied properly without a knowledge of God and His attributes, without a knowledge of the immortality of the human soul? And where should this prior knowledge come from? From required courses in theology or philosophy, or in both?
  4. Who are to teach these ethics courses? We have shown earlier that they must be taught by committed Catholics, but there is no discussion here of this aspect of the topic.

There is certainly no danger of indoctrination in Catholic thought envisioned by the speakers at this symposium; one would think they were discussing ethics in a secular university. It seems that Catholicism is so carefully handled in this Catholic university that it is less in evidence than other religious traditions:

…in some areas we don’t do as much as other, non-Catholic institutions do, and we are more shy about expressing our religious ethos than our co-religionists, even those here at Loyola, are.

That a Catholic university should publish the papers of such a symposium is an indication of how far down the road to non-Catholicism some “Catholic” universities are.

Federal Aid

The Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities (ACCU), in opposing the Vatican schema, has said that a Catholic university that is too Catholic will be denied federal funds. The claim, worded a little differently, is that Catholic universities not accepting a secular definition of academic freedom, or teaching the Catholic religion as true (“proselytizing”), or following Canon Law, will lose their accreditation and their federal aid. Sister Alice Gallin, O.S.U., then the ACCU’s executive director, said:

Catholic institutions…must meet the standards for accreditation by regional accrediting agencies recognized by civil authorities…Such accreditation, as well as the federal and state funding that accompanies it, requires that institutions respect academic freedom and that the curriculum not be used for proselytizing on behalf of any religion.104 It is virtually certain that such aid would be withdrawn if it could ever be shown that Catholic colleges and universities were “controlled” by the Catholic Church.105 It is clear that the favorable decisions regarding public aid to Catholic colleges or universities are founded on a perception by the court that the church does not control them.106

And Father Theodore Hesburgh, then president of the University of Notre Dame, agreed: “We would stand to lose a lot if we conformed to the dictates of the church.”107
But his view has been denied by Kenneth Whitehead, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education at the U.S. Department of Education.108

Sister Gallin and Father Hesburgh were simply wrong in their contention that accreditation requires a secular definition of academic freedom, and avoidance of the teaching of the Catholic faith, and an avoidance of the effective presence of bishops.

As regards academic freedom, “a religiously affiliated institution requiring a certain standard of doctrinal ‘orthodoxy’ on the part of its faculty…would not jeopardize its accreditation, provided it plainly announces beforehand its requirements in this regard. In practice, the same thing would be true of requirements regarding the moral behavior expected of faculty members of students at the institution.”109 The Northwest Association, for example, an accrediting agency, “specifically affirms that ‘intellectual freedom does not rule out commitment…Institutions may hold to a particular…religious philosophy.’”110

The same applies, of course, to a university’s teaching a specific body of religious doctrines as true: “…if the stated purpose of a religiously affiliated college or university is to provide a higher education within the specific context of the teachings of a given religion or denomination, carrying out this stated purpose would in no way constitute a bar to accreditation….”111

The same is true of a particular church having a great deal of influence over a university:

…neither the accrediting agencies nor the Supreme Court…seem to object to sponsoring church representation on college governing boards. Yet such representation is normally all that a church might require to ensure that a school it sponsors remains authentic from the point of view, for example, of the theology taught there.112

Whitehead also points out that, even if existing accrediting agencies refused to accredit Catholic universities loyal to their Catholicism, these universities could form their own accrediting agency which would be acceptable to the Federal Government provided it met the criteria required of such agencies.113

Some Catholic university authorities have stated that, unless their institutions conform to the secular definition of the Association of American University Professors (AAUP), their institutions will lose their federal grants. But Whitehead has shown that the AAUP does not have a secular definition of academic freedom and, further, that institutions censured by it “go right on being accredited and go right on receiving federal aid.”114

How ironic that it is not the Federal Government but Catholic universities themselves which envisage a withdrawal of federal aid because these universities are religious.

The conclusion is inescapable: “institutional autonomy” and “academic freedom” are defined to permit wider variations in practice. They clearly allow for institutional freedom of religion. Narrowly defined as the freedom of professors to teach what they want or as the freedom of an institution to be free of any constraints from its sponsoring church or other body they are clearly not requirements for accreditation (and hence for federal aid).115

The real danger to Catholic universities, Whitehead points out, is that they might lose their privileges as religious institutions if they become only half-Catholic by divesting themselves of the legitimate control of the church. A university hospital, for example, might be forced to either allow abortions or close up.116

Whitehead asks an embarrassing question of the Catholic universities which claim that federal aid would be lost if the universities accepted Canon law:

What is the real motive and origin of the claim that Catholic colleges and universities must have “institutional autonomy” and “academic freedom”? This inquiry has demonstrated that these things are not strict requirements of the federal or state governments, of the accrediting agencies, or even of the AAUP.117

The answer seems to be that these universities were deceitful: they wanted a secular definition of academic freedom, they wanted freedom from church “control,” and so they proceeded to bully the bishops into accepting half-Catholic universities:

As far as Catholic colleges and universities are concerned, the evidence examined in this enquiry suggests that these colleges first decided they wanted to have “institutional autonomy” and “academic freedom”—and only then decided to adduce supposed government requirements for giving out aid as a principal reason they needed to have these two things.118

If it were actually the case that federal funds would be available only if a Catholic university ceased to be truly Catholic, the fitting reaction of Catholic universities would be to change the system or to forego federal funds. The universities of which we have been speaking, then, which allege that federal funds would be unavailable except to watered-down Catholic institutions, have been wrong not only on a matter of fact but on a matter of principle. It would be crippling to American Catholicism if her
universities were to cease being truly Catholic; and they certainly will cease being so if they accept a secular definition of academic freedom, if they cease to proclaim Catholic truth “with unmistakable clarity,”119 and if they reject that part of canon law which applies to Catholic universities.

Whitehead is convinced that, even if federal funding were denied openly religious universities, it would be possible for Catholics to have the policy changed.

It is fair to say that no public policy opposed with cogent and persuasive reasons by a united Catholic community both knowledgeable and determined about its rights and responsibilities could long survive in the United States. Once again, one has to wonder where American blacks, far fewer in number than Catholics, would be today if they had simply continued to acquiesce in the various kinds of disabilities that a number of courts and state governments had tried to impose of them.120

Certainly the first instinct of any Catholic university should be to oppose unjust laws rather than give in to them. It is, however, an unfortunate characteristic of so many Catholics today to give in to secular pressures rather than to fight them.

Of course, it is quite possible that problems will arise concerning government funding or concerning other sources of financial assistance. But the answer to such problems will be to solve them in such a way that the Catholic university keeps its Catholicism intact.

Afterword

Many persons, on reading this little book, will think it too idealistic, perhaps fanatical, in making its case. They will respond immediately that life is too full of compromises to expect perfection. Now, life is full of compromises, and we are well advised not to expect perfection, but it would be a serious mistake not to know what perfection is, and not to strive for it. To become so accustomed to second-best that one takes it for granted is to make an ideal of the status quo. And to do this is to court disaster.

What has been recommended is, in most cases, a return to the practice of a few decades ago, when many principles questioned today were taken for granted. Some will think this is a step backward, but others will see it as a return, after a failed experiment, to what was good, just as the present liberalism in the Church will finally burn itself out and leave the old orthodoxy intact.

A final point: Perhaps most important for keeping a university Catholic is courage. Of course, knowledge of the importance of a university’s fidelity to the Magisterium, and of the means to bring this about and preserve it, is imperative, but, without firm commitment despite all the difficulties that arise, efforts are useless and the best intentions cave in under pressure.

There should be no compromise on essentials. I know that those who insist on this will be crucified, but the line has to be held. No university administrator or member of a board of trustees can afford to be thin-skinned in our day. The former Rule of my religious community said that no one should accept the post of Superior unless he could steel himself to discipline others when it was needed. And I say that no one should accept the post of Catholic university trustee or administrator unless he can steel himself against all the attempts to dilute his institution’s religious character. To settle for less might give the university the whole world, but only at the loss of its very self.

 

 

 

Enhancing a Catholic Intellectual Culture

Executive Summary

Rejecting secular and Protestant norms and ideals, Catholic universities today must assert a distinctive Catholic intellectual culture featuring the unity of faith and reason, the acceptance of magisterial teaching and an active critique of culture. Such a Catholic intellectual culture will foster Catholic intellectuals and dispose students to the truth, and has the potential to preserve and restore elements of reason and humanity that are being lost in Western civilization.

Specific institutional strategies for promoting a Catholic intellectual culture are suggested.  These include promoting the disciplines of theology and philosophy and integrating them across the curriculum; developing a holistic approach to Catholic identity; integrating faculty into the Catholic and overall academic environment of the university; recruiting Catholic scholars who live out their faith; guarding against outside research and professional pressure; and promoting Catholic identity through a senior official for Catholic mission.

Enhancing a Catholic Intellectual Culture

This paper encourages Catholic universities in the development of a genuine Catholic intellectual culture by identifying the main features of such a culture and suggesting specific institutional strategies to promote them. First, however, it is necessary to address a certain set of cultural obstacles which impede the realization of a Catholic intellectual culture.

I. Understanding the Catholic Difference

Almost two decades after the publication of Ex corde Ecclesiae (hereafter ECE), very few Catholic universities can be said to have fully implemented the norms and goals envisioned there. This is not, for the most part, for lack of trying. Indeed, despite some initial opposition to ECE, the large majority of Catholic university faculty and administrators has recognized the need, and has sincerely sought, to recover a genuine Catholic identity in the intellectual life of their institutions. Much effort and creativity has been invested in this task, with some success overall and notable success in some places.

Yet the reform has not, in most places, been as successful as it might have been, nor made as much progress as it could reasonably have been expected to have made. Recently (2006) Melanie Morey and Father John Piderit, S.J., reported, based on representative interviews with 124 administrators of Catholic universities, that despite the fact that “[a]lmost all Catholic institutions are currently seeking ways to be more ‘Catholic’ . . . most administrators in the end admitted that their colleges and universities [sic] had rather weak Catholic cultures.” The leadership of Catholic universities, it appears, despite widespread attempts to express an institutional culture that is vibrantly Catholic, has generally been impeded from fully realizing this goal by persistent obstacles or roadblocks.

From the perspective of an administrator, these obstacles are visible in the organizational or interpersonal dynamics that often resist change, collegiality or coherence in an institution. Such forces are particularly strong in any university and present real challenges to reform. If this were not the case, after all, it would not be worth considering, as we do at length below, what Catholic institutions can do to reform and improve their Catholic identity. Yet the failure of reform, particularly as it pertains to Catholic intellectual culture, is also made possible, and the institutional forces of opposition are strengthened, by the particular susceptibility of Catholic universities in America to corrosive cultural forces that operate upon them from outside by means of institutional ecology or cultural context.

Morey and Piderit observe, “The dominant culture, despite obeisance paid to cultural diversity, wants religious institutions to provide the same services as secular ones, and they expect to judge them according to the same standards.” These standards then become internalized: “Senior administrators at Catholic universities. . . .gave witness to the strong pressures they experience to conform to the practices of their nonsectarian counterparts. The legitimacy of these institutions as colleges and universities is claimed on the basis of how similar they are to all other colleges and universities.” This pressure to conform to a secular model of being a university constitutes, I suggest, a broad roadblock that tacitly undercuts institutional programs or efforts for reform in American Catholic universities. This expectation is particularly effective in impeding the reform of the university’s intellectual culture, because the blockage here is at root intellectual and cultural, not institutional. In order to have any hope of establishing a vibrant Catholic intellectual culture, then, administrators at Catholic universities must first critically re-evaluate the prevailing secular understanding and standard of what constitutes a university, and thus of what constitutes the distinction between a Catholic university and a secular one.
Because it is the dominant cultural form, it is natural and common to think of the university as typified by the absence of a dominant intellectual commitment, a “marketplace of ideas” in which free inquiry leads to a variety of fundamental conclusions about the universe. On this view there are, on the one hand, generic, mere or normal universities, which work to preserve the absence of a dominant intellectual commitment, and on the other hand religious, including Catholic, universities, which embody a prior commitment to particular truths about the universe. The designation “Catholic,” then, is a qualification of the idea of a “university” generically.

However, whether acknowledged or not, every university, just as every culture, embodies particular intellectual commitments and perspectives in its common life. A secular university pursues a particular way of being a university, just as a Catholic university pursues a particular way of being a university. A secular university is just as committed, in its own way, to a particular view of the universe as is any religious institution.

The idea that the intellectual culture of a secular university is open-minded and tolerant while that of a religious university is, by comparison, narrow and intolerant is almost axiomatic for the leaders of secular institutions, who studiously marginalize religion. It is also reflected in the leaders of Catholic universities, however, when they strive to assure observers that their institution is just as tolerant and open as a secular school. Yet the premise is demonstrably false, not (only or necessarily) on theoretical grounds but on empirical ones. As the experience of numerous religiously-minded faculty members and students attest, the range of acceptable opinions in a secular university is quite narrow, while that in a religious institution is quite wide, to the point that the notion that a secular institution is open while a religious one is closed has no basis except, ironically, in the intellectual prejudice of secularists.

Many have noted this irony of the modern academy, but perhaps none better than the French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu observes that while the formal structures of a modern secular university, centered in the ideal and operative mechanisms of academic freedom, provide powerful protection against imposing views on scholars, the informal structures of a secular university operate just as (and perhaps more) powerfully to dispose scholars to affirm a relatively narrow range of acceptable opinions, hypotheses, judgments, lifestyle choices and political views. The prescriptive power of political correctness in professional settings, well-known to American academics, provides a good example of this dynamic; and any religiously-committed scholar who has tried to integrate her faith and scholarship in a secular institution can testify to the powerful, if informal, institutional controls that are placed on violations of such tacit secular orthodoxy.

How does a secular university impose such conformity? Not by explicit rules or faculty selection, but by its intellectual culture. As Bourdieu points out, the ideas which can be discussed and taught in a secular university’s academic culture are circumscribed by understandings, ideas and values which everybody knows, which are “taken for granted,” and are all the more powerful because they are uncontroversial and unstated. Such axiomatic assumptions are compelling for persons in a culture, not because they are rigidly enforced or defended, but because they need no enforcement or defense whatever. They are not merely unquestioned, but unquestionable. They are the things that go without saying. Such undiscussed assumptions, which Bourdieu collectively terms “doxa” set the limits for both formal orthodoxy and heterodoxy regarding what can be discussed, researched or taught in the secular university.

For those concerned about a university’s intellectual culture, whether secular or religious, this is a crucial point, to which I will return below. At the root of any university’s intellectual culture lies a tacit consensus about fundamental matters that limits and directs its intellectual life far more powerfully than any overt administrative or formal faculty actions or programs. The implications of this for the reform of university intellectual culture are clear and stark: Just as the open formal structures of the secular university, as necessary as these are, cannot prevent the development of a narrow and restrictive doxa, so the imposition of formal mechanisms to promote Catholic identity and culture in a Catholic university, as necessary as these may be, cannot by itself or necessarily bring about a doxa that supports truly Catholic teaching and research.

In practice, just as the secular university sincerely proclaims an ideal of open inquiry while unconsciously fostering a restricted intellectual culture, so many Catholic universities, while sincerely professing to seek a distinctive Catholic intellectual culture, have unconsciously adopted the informal norms, the doxa, of secularity. They have done this, not because they wish to be secular, but because they wish to be a university, and have uncritically accepted the false assumptions noted above, i.e., that the secular university is more open-minded than a religious one, and that this is the pure or normal form of the university. In order to be a genuine university, respected and successful among its peer institutions (and among a secularized Catholic laity from which come its prospective students and parents), many Catholic universities have tried to combine a Catholic faith commitment with the implicitly secular academic structures of a “normal” American university.

The result was, and continues in many cases to be, a tense and uneasy mix of incompatible norms. The tension between the norms is reflected in institutional and interpersonal tension that accompanies such a strategy to instill a genuine Catholic culture. The efforts to resolve or manage this tension have resulted in various often-noted partial and ineffective results for these institutions, such as the balkanization of Catholic intellectual life, with some departments determinedly secular and others just as persistently Catholic; relegating Catholic identity to campus ministry and occasional liturgies which have minimal effect on the intellectual culture or formation of the university; and confining student formation in the Catholic intellectual tradition to one or two required courses in theology or philosophy, which may or may not actually address the Catholic faith.

Compared to other religious universities, Catholic universities in the United States experience added definitional tension because, where the institutional norms of higher education in the 20th century have not been secular, they have been largely Protestant. As Kathleen Mahoney chronicles clearly, in the late 19th century “liberal Protestant leaders of the university movement linked the newly created modern university with the cause of a Protestant America.” On the other hand, “Catholics’ status as members of a religious minority complicated the ways in which they could respond to the reforms that remade much of higher education.” Subsequently, the effect of the Second Vatican Council, for better or for worse, was to lessen or remove many of the features of Catholic life and thought that distinguished Catholics from Protestants. Catholic universities today therefore face the double forces of conformity not only to a dominant secular civic culture but also to a dominant Protestant religious culture, which have together shaped the intellectual culture of the modern academy.

The worst result of living in tension with secular and Protestant universities is the tendency for Catholic universities to minimize the true distinctiveness and difference that Catholic faith and commitment makes to the business of being a university. The basic problem with many current attempts to restore a university’s Catholic intellectual identity is that the attempt itself expresses only a secularized, eviscerated notion of what it is to be Catholic. Morey and Piderit observe that Catholic universities “are willing to put a dash of religion in their collegiate stew, but, wary of having it overpower, they put just enough to make it interesting, not enough to make it truly distinctive.”

Such attempts at accommodation do not preserve Catholic identity, but, on the contrary, result in the eventual loss of anything distinctly Catholic. Pope Benedict XVI, in his address to Catholic educators on the occasion of his recent (2008) visit to the United States, suggested that such nominal Catholic institutions may not be worth continuing. As R. E. Houser succinctly summarizes his argument: “American Catholic colleges and universities are needed, but only if they exhibit a strong and vigorous sense of Catholic identity.” It is important, therefore, that Catholic administrators consider carefully what constitutes the distinct features of a Catholic intellectual culture.

II. Features of a Catholic Intellectual Culture

The previous section raised a crucial point about intellectual culture with respect to Catholic reform: a genuine Catholic intellectual culture cannot be something “added on” to fundamentally secular norms of university life. Such norms carry with them a doxa that is inimical to Catholic life. Rather, implementing or seeking a genuine Catholic intellectual culture changes everything about the nature of a university. The goal of such reform, then, must be to introduce, not just new norms and structures, but a new doxa in the university. This section attempts to define some of the common features of a Catholic intellectual culture so conceived. While each of these features, I suggest, are sine qua non for the intellectual culture of a genuine Catholic university, some institutions may emphasize some of them more than others.

Unity of Faith and Reason

The central affirmation of a genuine Catholic intellectual culture is that faith and reason, doctrine and discovery, piety and learning are mutually enlightening and reinforcing modes of life and knowledge. In a direct rejection of secularism, a Catholic university begins with the assumption that the convictions of faith and the conclusions of rational observation and reflection are never incompatible. This fundamental assumption underlies (and integrates) the activity of a Catholic university. Like most fundamental assumptions, it has the strongest influence on scholarly activity when the teachings of faith and the findings of reason seem most irreconcilable. By way of analogy, the fundamental assumption of order and regularity in nature that underlies physical science operates most powerfully when such order is not apparent, thus stimulating research to seek to discover the underlying order involved or transcendent order implied.

For Catholics, faith and reason are not only compatible, they are not severable. Faith enlightens reason, as Augustine affirmed; and reason completes faith, as Aquinas affirmed. To paraphrase Kant, reason without faith is empty, and faith without reason is blind. For this reason theology, which attempts to express faith in a reasonable way, and Christian philosophy, which explores reason in a faithful way, are essential disciplines of a Catholic university.

The affirmation of the unity of faith and reason in this way is distinctively Catholic. For Protestant thought, since salvation is by faith alone (sola fide), human reason can add nothing essential to faith, which is fundamentally nonrational. Modern Protestant thought, therefore, has tended to assert that faith is subjective, a matter of feelings (Schleiermacher), a “leap across the abyss” (Kierkegaard) or an affirmation of the will (Barth). Liberal Protestants, therefore, welcomed the secularization of the university so long as the nonrational activity of faith was not excluded. Evangelical Protestants, by contrast, have strived to uphold the reasonableness of faith, arguing that, while faith is nonrational, it is not irrational. On this basis some evangelical universities have managed in impressive ways to inhibit secularization and foster a generic “Christian world view”. Evangelicals have been less successful, however, in exploring the faithfulness of reason, since they lack consensus on many points regarding the intellectual content of the faith. In sum, Protestants are hampered in achieving the goal of a university by a deficient view of faith and reason (and, correlatively, Scripture and Tradition) as being separate modes of knowledge that can operate critically upon each other. The full integration of faith and reason that a university requires is today only possible among Catholic universities.

This should not be overstated, however. A Catholic university does not exist “over against” non-Catholic Christian colleges and universities in the same sense that they may stand over against schools of other denominations. Protestants protest Catholicism, by definition, but Catholics do not protest Protestantism. Indeed, Vatican II teaches that the church, in its most basic sense of communio fidelium, includes those “separated brothers” of Protestant faith. Thus, a university that comes “from the heart of the church” will seek to explore and express, not only those truths that are particular to Catholics, but also, and perhaps especially, those that are common to faithful Catholics and Protestants alike.

Fostering Catholic Intellectuals

In practical terms, the first and foremost task for the development of a Catholic intellectual culture in a university is fostering an environment that supports the formation and sustenance of Catholic intellectuals. Ex corde Ecclesiae calls for a majority of the faculty to be Catholic, a point upon which much effort and energy have been expended in the past two decades. The achievement of a statistical majority of Catholics, however, will be ineffective in producing a genuine Catholic culture of the intellect, if the “Catholic” faculty are merely nominal Catholics, who think essentially like secular persons, rather than persons informed with a Catholic world view, who actively seek to discover truth within the context of revealed truth.
The tensions which can easily undermine the university’s mission—between faith and reason, autonomy and authority, dogma and academic freedom—cannot be resolved by the institution until they have first been resolved in the minds and wills of the faithful scholars who comprise the faculty. It is in the hearts of the faculty that the integration of knowledge, the unity of faith and reason, is first and fundamentally achieved. As John Henry Newman puts it:

Some persons will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting, and stunting the growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such thought. Nor have I any thought of a compromise, as if religion must give up something, and science something. I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is, that they should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I want to destroy that diversity of centres, which puts everything into confusion by creating a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion.

Clearly, on this ideal, to be such a scholar/worshipper, or what I have called throughout this essay a faithful Catholic scholar, does not mean (necessarily) that a scholar favors religious topics or questions in her research, or selects a research agenda that supports the teachings of Christianity in some instrumental way. Rather, it means that, in whatever questions are pursued, the scholar’s orientation is toward seeking wholeness and understanding of her path of inquiry within the larger understanding, and mystery, of God’s creation, incarnation and engagement with the world as revealed by the Church. Stanley Jaki, writing on “The Catholic Intellectual”, applies Newman’s ideal more directly to the modern research setting. It is not the case, he says,

. . . that only those Catholic intellectuals qualify for being considered Catholic who work on specifically “Catholic” topics. [But when research raises ultimate questions] … [a] Catholic intellectual must be ready to face up to such questions and in a genuinely Catholic sense. And if he has not acquired the ability to cope with such questions, he at least must have a vivid conviction that Catholic answers can be given to such questions, and indeed have been given time and again. And, most importantly, the Catholic intellectual must not turn the truth of those answers into a function of the measure of their acceptance in secular academia, which is well nigh zero in most cases.

Such scholar/worshippers cannot be sprinkled among the faculty in an isolated way, where they may be tolerated or marginalized by the prevailing culture of the university. Rather, for a genuine Catholic intellectual culture to exist, such scholar/worshippers must comprise the prevailing culture of the university. They must form a genuine community of scholars devoted to the common service of faith and truth, who encourage, challenge, exhort and dispute one another in collective pursuit of their common commitment to the truth about God and the world. As noted above, all scholars pursue their vocation within an intellectual and institutional context, which shapes their scholarship in ways that are no less powerful for being often unrecognized. In a truly Catholic university, faithful Catholic scholars must become for each other what sociologists call a “plausibility structure”, in which the Catholic world view of each scholar is confirmed, sharpened, refined and extended by ongoing interaction with others who operate from a shared faith commitment, a doxa that presumes Catholic faith.

Submission to the Magisterium

The advantage a Catholic university has in being able to integrate faith and reason is lost entirely if the intellectual culture of the university is not predicated upon a full and free submission to the truths proposed by the Catholic Magisterium. The acceptance of magisterial teaching cannot be only a collective policy of the institution; it must be instantiated in the thinking, research and teaching of each scholar in the university. After all, an institution cannot believe; only persons can freely offer the voluntary assent which magisterial teaching calls for. Such assent must be part of the doxa of the university, that is, those elements of common life that are unquestionable and given.

Jaki explains clearly why this is essential for Catholic scholarship:

“Catholicism means above all the surrender to the greatest fact of history, Jesus Christ, or the flesh and blood, and therefore very provincial (Catholic) reality of the incarnation of the Son of God. But an integral part of that reality was His intention to teach with universal authority and, in all evidence, to have that authority of his concretely (that is very provincially) perpetuated. Therefore the Catholic intellectual’s submission to Christ must be preceded by a submission to those who today are the concrete factual voice of Christ’s authority, which renders their teaching strictly authoritative. Only then can the Catholic intellectual begin the task of unfolding the conceptual implications of the fact of the Incarnation for an understanding of Catholicism in its full range. . . . A Catholic intellectual must have for his foremost standard of reasoning an unconditional, total commitment to the voice of Rome as the only factor that puts him in proper contact with the greatest fact which is Christ.

The particularity of such a faith commitment has always been scandalous to secular reason, and it is understandably difficult for scholars, accustomed to relying on their own reason and expertise, to humbly come to the Church to be taught. Yet in order to find what it can know, the Catholic university must be able to know what it does not know. In order to teach the world, its scholars must humbly come to the Church to be taught. Without this, the university—notwithstanding fine chapel services, social service efforts, or other elements of Catholic life—remains at best essentially Protestant in its intellectual life, suffering the same deficiencies of that form of Christianity for achieving the goals of a university noted above.

Due to the special mission of the Catholic university within the Church, however, its relation to the magisterium is not simply one of being given the faith, on analogy with being catechized. On this point, both those who support and those who oppose the submission of the university to magisterial oversight have tended at times to misread Ex corde Ecclesiae’s “from the heart of the church” as “from the heart of the Magisterium.” The university does not merely take delivery of the deposit of faith, but also participates in certain ways in appropriating, expressing, framing and developing the truths of faith. This function is explicit in canon law, which states that the the Church establishes universities, in part, “to complement the Church’s own teaching office.” There is, in a real sense, a give and take. The work of Catholic theologians and philosophers often finds its way, sub rosa, into the formal declarations of the Magisterium; but the same dynamic is true for scholars in all fields of inquiry. Popes and bishops often consult scholars in Catholic universities, speak at their forums, and request them to undertake particular initiatives to help develop and apply Catholic truth. Church councils and commissions seek out the best scholarship of the Church’s universities in order to better address the truths of faith to the issues of the day.

This mutual exchange is a vital part of the reception of the faith theologically understood, or its articulation in a cultural sense. In this situation Catholic scholars do not serve the Church well by being merely passive to its teaching. They are called (more or less, depending on their field of inquiry) not merely to receive the faith with the receptivity proper to the Church’s teaching authority, but also to join with the Magisterium in a common assent to the truth of Christ and the Gospel.

Disposing to the Truth

The secular mind objects on principle to the idea of a university pursuing its mission in light of religious truth. On this view, to privilege religious truth is to distort the very freedom of inquiry for which the university exists, and to impose adherence to religious tenets on the mind of its faculty undermines academic freedom altogether. A university, it is said, cannot be a church. Its object cannot be to indoctrinate, but to encourage the exploration of truth in many realms, unencumbered by dogma and tradition.

This objection misunderstands the purpose of a university, but begins by misunderstanding the purpose of the Church. It is true that the purpose of a Catholic university cannot be to indoctrinate, but not because the university is not part of the Church, but because it is, and the purpose of the Church is not to indoctrinate—at least, not in the manner intended by the objection. The Catholic Church insists that all men and women be free from every constraint in the area of religion, so that religious truth can be freely and genuinely chosen by the believer consistent with the dignity of conscience. As Pope John Paul II stressed, “The church proposes. She imposes nothing.”

If it is the work of the Church to propose the truth, then I suggest that it is the work of the university within the Church to dispose to the truth. A successful Catholic intellectual culture will create an environment in which the truth proposed by Catholic faith “rings true”. It builds a cultural disposition to the truth by seeking the comprehension and integration of knowledge, not merely its pursuit and acquisition. It thus aims at truth, not merely truths; that is, an intellectual structure by means of which all knowledge, wherever derived, can be understood. As the name implies, a university is premised on the conviction that knowledge forms a universe, and thus some knowledge is universal.

The university fosters a personal disposition to the truth in its faculty and students by the formation of what has been called the liberal mind. This is not a mind that necessarily knows and understands the truth, but it is one that is disposed to be open to the truth wherever it is encountered. In classical language, the university seeks the formation of minds that are ordered to the truth. The fruit of such formation is the ability to recognize and dismiss shallow reasoning, the intellectual fads of the day, the peril of easy answers, the sophistry of self-deception, and a thousand other intellectual and moral impediments to knowledge; and to consider what presents itself as truth sincerely, deliberately, judiciously and without prejudice, cant or cavil. The possessor of such a mind, being still alive and growing, will not have apprehended all of the knowledge that, in the destiny of her life, it will be her task to discover. She may not comprehend all of the Catholic faith (does anyone ever?). But she will be disposed to hear, understand, and integrate into her life that which validly presents itself as true, in whatever context it may come.

The goal of such formation is not, as I have said, the acquisition of all truths, even all of the truths of faith. As St. James reminds us, it is quite possible to know and believe the specific truths of the faith, yet not have a mind or life that is ordered to truth itself. The goal of a Catholic intellectual formation is not to know many things, but to be able to know how to know. This goal militates against the practice—nearly universal among Catholic universities, copying their secular counterparts—of exposing undergraduates to a smattering of many different areas of knowledge, as if such an education produced a comprehensive understanding of the world. From the standpoint of a Catholic education, it would be better if students studied less broadly and more deeply. In coming closer to mastering one discipline, or at most a few, they would be more likely to acquire the skills and liberal outlook by means of which they could more readily apprehend other areas of knowledge.

Exposing the False

Any culture, but especially a minority subculture, thrives not only by preserving its core identity and by cultural reproduction but also by vigorous boundary maintenance. As noted above, too often religious universities have tried to minimize or elide their differences from nonreligious ones. The predictable result of this failure of nerve is a weakened and inconsistent intellectual culture in the religious university. On the contrary, a vigorous religious intellectual culture needs to clearly articulate—inoffensively yet unapologetically—what distinguishes it from secular models, the depth and profundity of that distinction, and the advantages the difference conveys.

Catholic universities need to engage in a double critique; a wide-ranging critique of secular academic culture, and a more narrowly focused debate with Protestant (and other) religious alternatives. An exploration of the elements of these critiques is beyond the scope of this essay, although some have already been noted, and the main points can be briefly stated. Secular thought is increasingly showing itself to be empty and incomplete for addressing the human condition; and cannot correct itself, since among the consequences of positivism, i.e., the rejection of metaphysics and mind, is the loss of the ability to expose the hidden presuppositions of positivism. The Protestant mind can go a long way toward an integrated universe of knowledge, but is impaired, from a Catholic point of view, by a defective notion of the relation of faith and reason and by an abstract, partial notion of the Church.

Catholic universities need to articulate, with humility and respect, such a boundary critique, or “apology” in the classical sense of that word, for the good of their own self-definition, irrespective of the real prospects of convincing or changing those who hold alternate views.

Such a stance does not preclude, and is in fact enhanced by, an active critique of Catholic life and culture at the same time. The difference between these areas of criticism, we must confidently hope, will be that secularism and Protestantism will be shown to be deficient due to their principles, while Catholic culture fails when it opposes or neglects its principles. In this way Catholic culture can show its integrity and fearlessness in the face of criticism, and its willingness to be held to account for its convictions and to change when necessary.

By the same token, with appropriate prudence, and while faithfully affirming the truths taught by the Church, a genuine Catholic intellectual culture must be willing, even eager, to dialogue with those hostile to the faith. To do this itself expresses faithfulness to the Magisterium. As the fathers of Vatican II said:

the desire for such dialogue, undertaken solely out of love for the truth and with all due prudence, excludes no one, neither those who cultivate the values of the human spirit while not yet acknowledging their Source, nor those who are hostile to the Church and persecute her in various ways.

By engaging in boundary debates and critiques, Catholic universities simultaneously build up their own identity and tear down the false misconceptions of non-Catholics. Confident that truth is whole, and that all truth is God’s, the intellectual culture of the Catholic faith is unafraid to face challenges to its convictions from any quarter.

Whatever else comes of such engagement, it demonstrates that, despite secular prejudice otherwise, Catholic thought is truly the most democratic, open-minded system on offer today. While appealing to the highest authority and warrant for its claims, it submits itself for free ratification to the conscience of each person. In affirming tradition both Christian and classical, it does not discount or ignore any reasoned contribution to knowledge on the merely adventitious grounds that the author happens to be dead. In valorizing revelation, the Catholic mind prefers concrete historical experience—the witness of shepherds and fishermen—to the abstract theories of elites.

Restoring Civilization

As noted above, only a Catholic intellectual culture can fully unify faith and reason in the kind of coherent understanding of reality in which the work of a university can be grounded. In separating faith and reason, Protestantism and secularity respectively devolve into a faith which does not fully understand itself or a reason which is blind to the things that matter most: mind, meaning and the nature of human life. Empirically, both secularity and Protestantism have tended, in their intellectual cultures, to fragmentation in a kind of truce among ultimate commitments, out of which has not come any unified notion of reality. Today only the Catholic tradition possesses fully the intellectual and faith-related resources to form a true university of discourse.

The implications of this for the mission of a Catholic university, in recovering and sustaining a genuine Catholic intellectual culture, are profound. Surely in expressing and exploring this unique unity of knowledge that it possesses, the university will be both serving the Church and recovering its own raison d’etre, the meaning of its own life. Just as the application or transmission of faith takes place through knowledge, so the integration of knowledge takes place through faith. But it will also be doing much more than this. In taking on the task of forming a genuine Catholic intellectual culture, the university will be advancing, as no one else can, the true interests of Western civilization.

The historian Christopher Dawson is probably the best known proponent of the view that a persistent Christian culture has been expressed alongside the increasingly secular political culture of the West. Whether or not this is the case, it is an expression of the larger and more general view that, as religion is at the heart of culture, so culture is the carrier of religion. If this is true, then the Catholic university must recover a genuine Christian culture not only for the sake of Catholicism but also for the sake of Western civilization itself. This was Dawson’s view. It is also the view of Pope Benedict XVI, who sees the intellectual task of the Church to be nothing less than the restoration of reason to the culture of the West.

Although Protestants will (naturally) protest and secularized academic culture will not appreciate the point, today it is only in Catholic institutions that the intellectual heritage of the West has any chance of developing, and therefore surviving. As Catholic monks famously kept the light of civilization burning in earlier ages of barbarism, so today Catholic scholars have the opportunity and challenge to preserve the intellectual heritage of the West, the coherence of knowledge and indeed reason itself, in an age which has lost the ability to recognize the truth.

III. Specific Suggestions

The following are some specific practical and programmatic suggestions for supporting a Catholic intellectual culture. They are derived from the ideas outlined above, pertinent magisterial teaching and suggestions and thoughts from other Catholic scholars. This list is not intended to be comprehensive.

1) Favor theology and philosophy.

These two disciplines should receive special emphasis in a genuine Catholic intellectual culture, as those that deal most directly with the integration of faith and reason. A Catholic university without strong offerings and leadership in these two fields will be less likely to succeed in instituting a vibrant Catholic intellectual culture.
As already noted, philosophy that presupposes revealed truth has a special function in a Catholic intellectual culture, which suggest an essential role for a department of philosophy that engages the rich tradition of Christian philosophy proper. More than this, however, it implies a special role for philosophical thinking about the relation of each department of knowledge in the university to the larger truths that fulfill and integrate each specialty into a coherent view of the life and the world. Such intentional application of philosophical norms to today’s specialized branches of knowledge may or may not be done by those in the philosophy department. As Fides et Ratio (paragraph 30) states, “The truths of philosophy, it should be said, are not restricted only to the sometimes ephemeral teachings of professional philosophers.” This point leads to the next suggestion:

2) Don’t confine theology and philosophy to departments of theology and philosophy.

Academic departments or schools of theology and philosophy cannot provide the comprehensive integration of knowledge which a Catholic university seeks. As academic disciplines, neither theology nor philosophy is integrated in themselves; there are many different and competing theologies and philosophies, even among faithful Christian scholars. Moreover, theologians and philosophers are limited in making applications to other academic specialties, both because theologians and philosophers are generally as limited in their understanding of other specialties as those in other specialties are in their understanding of theology and philosophy, and because, no matter how knowledgeable, theologians and philosophers function according to the autonomy, norms and interests of their own disciplines rather than those of some other discipline.

Indeed, the best contribution of philosophy departments may not be to “solve” the problems of the humanities or social sciences, but to stimulate a culture of philosophical reflection by practitioners of the other fields. What is needed is not philosophers crossing disciplinary lines (though this has its own value), but philosophical thinking on the part of political scientists, psychologists, linguists, historians and all the other specialized scholars of the university.

The critical analyses and unifying connections that are the special province of theology and philosophy need to be disseminated broadly among all the disciplines of the university in order for a genuine, coherent intellectual culture to be expressed.Each member of the faculty should carry some theology and philosophy, and some devotion, into her/his classes and research. Indeed, they already do so by default, whether they know it or not.

This model of integration, rather than leaving it up to theology/philosophy departments, is clearly envisioned by Ex corde Ecclesiae. For example, regarding dialogue between faith and science, ECE (46) notes: “This task requires persons particularly well versed in the individual disciplines and who are at the same time adequately prepared theologically . . . .” Likewise, canon law calls for “lectures which principally treat of those theological questions connected with the studies of each faculty.” All the academic specialists—scientists, engineers, mathematicians, economists, etc.—of the university should also be theologians and philosophers, to the extent needed to perceive and articulate the horizon of ultimate truths to which their particular research and teaching leads. Achieving this may involve special interdisciplinary efforts and conversations involving philosophy and theology.

3) Involve the whole institution in Catholic identity.

The notion that a university’s Catholic mission can be carried by a campus ministry or a few departments, or a well-crafted mission statement that is generally ignored, is probably the greatest single source of failure to fully reform Catholic universities today. In order to foster a genuine Catholic intellectual culture, Catholic principles, aims and ideals—a Catholic doxa, in Bourdieu’s sense—must permeate every aspect of educational and institutional life. The impress of Catholic life and thought should be evident, not just in the mission statement, but in the administrative procedures, student and faculty handbooks, honor code, institutional review board, personnel policies and so on; not just in the campus ministry, but in every lecture, classroom, dining hall and dormitory; not just in the Board of Trustees, but in every administrator, board, committee, academic council, school, department and student organization.

4) Fill the faculty with scholar/worshippers.

The commitment of the faculty to a life of faith is sine qua non for a genuine Catholic intellectual culture. Not that every faculty member has to be Catholic—in fact a minority of other faiths can enhance the development of a Catholic intellectual culture—but every member should be a person of active faith, and concerned about the faith formation as well as the intellectual development of each student. The large majority of faculty should be Catholic; the bare majority envisioned in ECE should be considered a minimum standard. And, consistent with the previous suggestion, the majority principle should be applied at the level of the department (or smallest academic unit), lest there develop some “secular” departments and some “Catholic” ones, thus impeding the full integration of knowledge and providing mixed experiences for students.

5) Promote departmental integration, faculty sharing and cross-registration.

Strong walls between academic departments reflect and further the secular fragmentation of knowledge. Today widely disparate fields often cover the same intellectual ground, with slightly different emphases, with little awareness of the duplication. Replacing departmental competition with cooperation in a common task helps scholars to work together to seek unifying themes in their specialties. Being able more easily to cross departmental boundaries helps both faculty and students to integrate and find unity in the various areas of knowledge. The resulting interdisciplinary discussion and reflection serves both the development of a liberal mind and the discovery of common truths by which knowledge can lead to genuine understanding.

6) Define faculty identity and success with reference to the university rather than to the academic field.

Modern scholars envision the possibility of changing institutions, but rarely of changing fields, in the course of their careers. As a result, institutional goals and distinctives become secondary to those of the academic professions, their journals and professional associations, which are almost uniformly secular. Sadly, the standards for faculty productivity and career advancement in Catholic universities routinely collude with this dynamic, explicitly encouraging faculty achievement and reputation in secular academic fields, to the detriment of their own mission. The most
committed faithful Catholic scholar will be hobbled in the pursuit of a genuine Catholic intellectual culture as long as s/he defines career success in terms of recognition in an (secular) academic field.

A Catholic university which promotes such a definition of success among its faculty, therefore, contradicts its own mission. In the long run, identifying with the goals of the institution will often provide scholars an intellectual advantage in their academic fields, where the questions and synthesis possible in a Catholic intellectual culture are not generally addressed. It will also encourage more productive scholars to remain with the Catholic institution rather than trading up to a more commodious appointment in a secular university.

7) Be very selective about extramural research and grant funding generally.

External research grants are awarded in order to promote research in particular areas and topics; for a Catholic institution it can easily turn into a case of the tail wagging the dog. Of course, research that serves agendas hostile to Catholic teaching (abortion or alternative forms of marriage come to mind) should not be considered. But even benign, defensible research can distract the university from its central mission and become an attractive nuisance with regard to fostering a Catholic intellectual culture. In some fields, of course, there are agencies that promote Catholic oriented research; but in most there are not. In the hard sciences, for example, it is doubtful that any agency can even articulate what questions arise from a Catholic view of the universe as opposed to a secular one. It would not be a bad idea, though perhaps not feasible or prudent, to simply reject all extramural funding, or perhaps funding from certain agencies, on principle.

8) Resist the encroachment of technical, occupational and professional level skills on the liberal arts.

This suggestion should be considered more or less, as some Catholic universities have a greater mission to the professions than others; what I am concerned with here is the tendency for instrumental education and pragmatic concerns to displace the ideal and practice of intrinsically valid learning. In a Catholic intellectual culture, knowledge must always be an end, and not merely a means. The most important knowledge may be “useless” in terms of career success. A faithful Catholic university, therefore, must subsume the acquisition of skill to the inculcation of truth. Regardless of whether they learn how to make a living, it is paramount that students are formed in how to live.

9) Institute a senior administrative position devoted to strengthening and assuring the Catholic ature of the institution.

The important goals of a university today are expressed in vice-presidential appointments. A Vice President—or other senior administrator—for Catholic Mission who has genuine administrative authority powerfully communicates the resolve of institutional leaders to develop and sustain a genuine Catholic intellectual culture. This office can oversee and provide resources for the integration of Catholic thought in all the activities of the institution, as outlined in the suggestions and themes discussed above.

IV. Toward a Truly Human Culture

A culture is an expression of human aspirations, ideas and relationships. The best policies and programs imaginable will still be ineffective to recover a vigorous Catholic intellectual culture if those who administer and enact them do not aspire, in their deepest selves, to the great vision of good that such a reform entails. In the busy round of demands and pressures of university administration and management, it is easy to lose sight of the larger purpose of our actions. The urgent particular needs in front of us can crowd out our awareness of ultimate purpose of our work. But the unfinished task of Catholic university reform requires more than technocrats, or those merely skilled in the processes of education. It calls for those who can also imagine or envision a fully formed Catholic intellectual culture, be personally committed to it as a great good, and nurture it into reality with devotion and passion. I invite you, therefore, for just a moment, to imagine.
Imagine with me a world in which hundreds of universities maintain a vibrant intellectual culture that stands athwart the shallow, sterile secularism of our day; in which the classic culture of the West is probed, inculcated and extended, not as a historical curiosity, but as a living conversation; in which wonder and wisdom, the integration and the synthesis of knowledge, complete the accumulation of facts; in which the full range of human life, being and value is explicated in every particular discipline of knowledge.

Imagine degrees in which the acquisition of technical skill is made to serve the attainment of a good life, focusing on how to live, not just how to make a living; in which a college education does not corrode, but strengthens and deepens the apprehension of revealed truth; and where intellectual development is matched with moral formation.

Imagine an active community of such schools, which earn the respect (perhaps grudgingly) of their secular counterparts by the insight of their scholarship and the integrity of their students; and which engage in endless discussion, debate, rebuttal and exploration of all the facets of knowledge, life and belief that offer themselves for research and examination.

Today this vision is being fulfilled in some places and in some respects. Imagine the power for good it can be when it is brought to pass in all places in all respects. It is nothing less than the power to renew the world.

References

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Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Code of Canon Law. 1983. Accessed August 26, 2008 at
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Houser, R. E.. “A Rekindling of the Light: The Past, Present and Future of a Catholic Core
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Mahoney, Kathleen. Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America. Baltimore, MD: Johns
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Marsden, George. The Soul of the American University. New York: Oxford, 1996.

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Morey, Melanie and John Piderit, S.J. Catholic Higher Education: A Culture in Crisis. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

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Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1968.

Pope John Paul II. Fides et Ratio [Faith and Reason]. Encyclical letter. 1998.

____________Redemptoris Missio [Mission of the Redeemer]. Encyclical Letter, 1990.

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The Effects of Pornography on Individuals, Marriage, Family and Community

Editor’s Note

This paper is co-published by the Marriage and Religion Research Institute (MARRI) at the Family Research Council in cooperation with the Love and Responsibility Project of The Center for the Study of Catholic Higher Education. 

Catholic colleges and universities have important reasons to discourage and restrict student access to pornography, which “perverts the conjugal act” and is a “grave offense” according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church.  Given the massive, deleterious individual, marital, family and social effects of pornography, college leaders should consider ways of increasing the effectiveness and impact of institutional approaches to students’ sexual behavior.

This paper reports ample evidence that pornography distorts a young person’s concept of the nature of conjugal relations and alters both sexual attitudes and behavior.  Pornography engenders greater sexual permissiveness, which in turn leads to a greater risk of out-of-wedlock births and STDs.  Men who view pornography regularly have a higher tolerance for abnormal sexuality—including rape, sexual aggression and sexual promiscuity.  If continued beyond college, the viewing of pornography is a major threat to marriage, to family, to children and to individual happiness.  In undermining marriage it is one of the factors in undermining social stability.

Pornography, as a visual (mis)representation of sexuality, distorts an individual’s concept of sexual relations by objectifying them, which, in turn, alters both sexual attitudes and behavior.  It is a major threat to marriage, to family, to children, and to individual happiness.

Social scientists, clinical psychologists, and biologists have begun to clarify some of the social and psychological effects of pornography, and neurologists are beginning to delineate the biological mechanisms through which pornography produces its powerful effects on people.

Pornography’s power to undermine individual and social functioning is powerful and deep.

  • Effect on the Mind: Pornography significantly distorts attitudes and perceptions about the nature of sexual intercourse.  Men who habitually look at pornography have a higher tolerance for abnormal sexual behaviors, sexual aggression, promiscuity, and even rape.  In addition, men begin to view women and even children as “sex objects,” commodities or instruments for their pleasure, not as persons with their own inherent dignity.
  • Effect on the Body: Pornography is very addictive.  The addictive aspect of pornography has a biological substrate, with dopamine hormone release acting as one of the mechanisms for forming the transmission pathway to pleasure centers of the brain.  Also, the increased sexual permissiveness engendered by pornography increases the risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease or of being an unwitting parent in an out-of-wedlock pregnancy.
  • Effect on the Heart: Pornography affects people’s emotional lives. Married men who are involved in pornography feel less satisfied with their marital sexual relations and less emotionally attached to their wives. Women married to men with a pornography addiction report feelings of betrayal, mistrust, and anger. Pornographic use may lead to infidelity and even divorce. Adolescents who view pornography feel shame, diminished self-confidence, and sexual uncertainty.

Introduction

The conjugal act—the act of sexual intercourse—brings humanity into existence and sets in motion the next generations of society.  Sexual intercourse, like atomic energy, is a powerful agent for good if channeled well, but for ill if not.  Healthy societies maintain their stability by channeling the sexual energies of young adults into marriage, an institution that legitimizes sexual intercourse, protects the children that are the fruit of intercourse, and channels the giving and receiving of sexual pleasure in a way that builds up rather than tears down society.  Sexual taboos are one set of the normal mechanisms of social control of the sexual appetite.  They are analogous to the control rods of a nuclear reactor plant: they block the sexual from straying off course and into destructive pathways.

One of the biggest tasks of adolescent members of all society is to come to grips with their burgeoning sexuality.  Some have always tested the limits of sexual expression even when strong social controls were in place.  In well-ordered societies, such testing triggers immediate social sanctions from parents, mentors, and community.

In today’s media-saturated society, these sanctions operate in fewer and fewer quarters.  A substantial factor in this shift has been the growth of digital media and the Internet.  This “digital revolution” has led to great strides in productivity, communication, and other desirable ends, but pornographers also have harnessed its power for their profit.  The cost has been a further weakening of the nation’s citizens and families, a development that should be of grave concern to all.  The social sciences demonstrate the appropriateness of this concern.

Two recent reports, one by the American Psychological Association on hyper-sexualized girls, and the other by the National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy on the pornographic content of phone texting among teenagers, make clear that the digital revolution is being used by younger and younger children to dismantle the barriers that channel sexuality into family life.66

Pornography hurts adults, children, couples, families, and society.  Among adolescents, pornography hinders the development of a healthy sexuality, and among adults, it distorts sexual attitudes and social realities.  In families, pornography use leads to marital dissatisfaction, infidelity, separation, and divorce.  Society at large is not immune to the effect of pornography.  Child sex-offenders, for example, are often involved not only in the viewing, but also in the distribution, of pornography.

Pornography is powerful enough even to overwhelm individuals, couples, and families despite earlier affectionate relationships—whether between the mother and father or between the parents and the child.  But loving family relationships can help mute many of the factors that encourage the use of pornography long before its addictive power takes root in a user’s life.

The effect of regular viewing of pornography on marriage and family is dealt with first, for there its greatest damage to the innocent can be seen.  Then the source of this damage is reviewed: the effects on the individual user, his psyche, and his behavior.  Adolescent usage, patterns, and effects are then delineated, for during this period the habit of viewing pornography is often developed in stages.  Finally the effects of sexually-oriented-businesses on their local environs are reviewed.

The Consequences of Viewing Pornography

Family Consequences

Pornography has significant effects during all stages of family life.  For a child exposed to pornography within a family setting, pornography causes stress and increases the risk for developing negative attitudes about the nature and purpose of human sexuality.  For adolescents who view pornography, their attitudes toward their own and others’ sexuality change, and their sexual expectations and behavior are shaped accordingly.  For adults, pornography has harmful and even destructive effects on marriage.

Impact on Children

The impact of a parent’s use of pornography on young children is varied and disturbing.  Pornography eliminates the warmth of affectionate family life, which is the natural social nutrient for a growing child.  Other losses and traumas related to the use of pornography when a child is young include:

  • encountering pornographic material a parent has acquired;
  • encountering a parent masturbating;
  • overhearing a parent engaged in “phone sex”;
  • witnessing and experiencing stress in the home caused by online sexual activities;
  • increased risk of the children becoming consumers of pornography themselves;
  • witnessing and being involved in parental conflict;
  • exposure to the commodification of human beings, especially women, as “sex objects”;
  • increased risk of parental job loss and financial strain;
  • increased risk of parental separation and divorce;
  • decreased parental time and attention—both from the pornography-addicted parent and from the parent preoccupied with the addicted spouse.67

Also, parents may disclose their struggle with the addiction to pornography to their children, intentionally or unintentionally, thereby distorting their children’s sexual development.70

Impact on Adolescents

Pornography viewing among teenagers disorients them during that developmental phase when they have to learn how to handle their sexuality and when they are most vulnerable to uncertainty about their sexual beliefs and moral values.91  A study of 2,343 adolescents found that sexually explicit Internet material significantly increased their uncertainties about sexuality.121  The study also showed that increased exposure to sexually explicit Internet material increased favorable attitudes toward sexual exploration with others outside of marriage and decreased marital commitment to the other spouse.122  Another study by Todd G. Morrison, professor of psychology at the University of Saskatchewan, and colleagues found that adolescents exposed to high levels of pornography had lower levels of sexual self-esteem.123

A significant relationship also exists between frequent pornography use and feelings of loneliness, including major depression.124 125

Finally, viewing pornography can engender feelings of shame: In a study of high school students, the majority of those who had viewed pornography felt some degree of shame for viewing it.  However, 36 percent of males and 26 percent of females said they were never ashamed of viewing pornography,126 giving some idea of the level of desensitization already reached in society.

High adolescent consumption of pornography also affects behavior.  Male pornography use is linked to significantly increased sexual intercourse with non-romantic friends,127 and is likely a correlate of the so-called “hook-up” culture.

Exposure to pornographic sexual content can be a significant factor in teenage pregnancy.  A three year longitudinal study of teenagers found that frequent exposure to televised sexual content was related to a substantially greater likelihood of teenage pregnancy within the succeeding three years.  This same study also found that the likelihood of teenage pregnancy was two times greater when the quantity of that sexual content exposure, within the viewing episodes, was high rather than low.128

Impact on Marriage

Marital Dissatisfaction

Pornography use undermines marital relations and distresses wives.129  Husbands report loving their spouses less after long periods of looking at (and desiring) women depicted in pornography.130

In many cases, the wives of pornography users also develop deep psychological wounds, commonly reporting feelings of betrayal, loss, mistrust, devastation, and anger in responses to the discovery or disclosure of a partner’s pornographic online sexual activity.131

Wives can begin to feel unattractive or sexually inadequate and may become severely depressed when they realize their husbands view pornography.132  The distress level in wives may be so high as to require clinical treatment for trauma, not mere discomfort.133

Viewers of pornography assign increased importance to sexual relations without emotional involvement,134 and consequently, wives experience decreased intimacy from their husbands.135

The emotional distance fostered by pornography and “cybersex” (interactive computer contact with another regarding pornographic sexual issues) can often be just as damaging to the relationship as real-life infidelity,136 and both men and women tend to put online sexual activity in the same category as having an affair.137  The estrangement between spouses wrought by pornography can have tangible consequences as well: when the viewing of pornography rises to the level of addiction, 40 percent of “sex addicts” lose their spouses, 58 percent suffer considerable financial losses, and about a third lose their jobs.138

In a study on the effects of “cybersex”—a form of sexually explicit interaction between two people on the Internet—researchers found that more than half of those engaged in “cybersex” had lost interest in sexual intercourse, while one-third of their partners had lost interest as well, while in one-fifth of the couples both husband and wife or both partners had a significantly decreased interest in sexual intercourse.  Stated differently, this study showed that only one-third of couples maintained an interest in sexual relations with one another when one partner was engaged in “cybersex.” 139

Prolonged exposure to pornography also fosters dissatisfaction with, and even distate for, a spouse’s affection.140  Cynical attitudes regarding love begin to emerge, and “superior sexual pleasures are thought attainable without affection toward partners.”141  These consequences hold for both men and women who have had prolonged exposure to pornography, with the decline in sexual happiness being primarily due to the growing dissatisfaction with the spouse’s normal sexual behavior.142

Finally, pornography users increasingly see the institution of marriage as sexually confining,143 have diminished belief in the importance of marital faithfulness,144 and have increasing doubts about the value of marriage as an essential social institution and further doubts about its future viability.145  All this naturally diminishes the importance for them of having good family relations in their own families.146

Increased Infidelity

Dolf Zillman of the University of Alabama, in one study of adolescents, shows that the steady use of pornography frequently leads to abandonment of fidelity to their girlfriends.147  Steven Stack of Wayne State University and colleagues later showed that pornography use increased the marital infidelity rate by more than 300 percent.148  Another study found a strong correlation between viewing Internet pornography and sexually permissive behavior.149  Stack’s study found that Internet pornography use is 3.7 times greater among those who procure sexual relations with a prostitute than among those who do not.150

“Cybersex” pornography also leads to much higher levels of infidelity among women.  Women who engaged in “cybersex” had about 40 percent more offline sexual partners than women who did not engage in cybersex.151

Separation and Divorce

Given the research already cited, it is not surprising that addiction to pornography is a contributor to separation and divorce.  In the best study to date (a very rudimentary opportunity study of reports by divorce lawyers on the most salient factors present in the divorce cases they handled), 68 percent of divorce cases involved one party meeting a new paramour over the Internet, 56 percent involved “one party having an obsessive interest in pornographic websites,” 47 percent involved “spending excessive time on the computer,” and 33 percent involved spending excessive time in chat rooms (a commonly sexualized forum).152  Cybersex, which often takes place in these chat rooms, was a major factor in separation and divorce:  In over 22 percent of the couples observed the spouse was no longer living with the “cybersex” addict, and in many of the other cases spouses were seriously considering leaving the marriage or relationship.153

Differences Between Men and Women

Pornography affects both men and women.  However there are significant differences between men and women on the likelihood of using pornography, the types of pornography used, and their feelings about pornography.

Different Rates of Use and Different Types of Use

Men and women use pornography differently.  Men are more than six times as likely to view pornography as females,154 and more likely to spend more time viewing it.

In a study of self-identified female ”cybersex” addicts, women reported that they preferred engaging in “cybersex” within the context of a relationship (via email or chat room) rather than accessing pornographic images.  This preference may contribute to the significant difference one study found in the proportion of women who have real-life sexual encounters with their online companions compared to men.  It found that 80 percent of women who engaged in these online sexual activities also had real-life sexual encounters with their online partners, compared to the much lower proportion of 33 percent for men.155  Also, as stated above, such women are much more likely to have had very high numbers of such sexual encounters and partners.156  However in another study, this time of men who flirted in Internet chat rooms, 78 percent reported they had at least one face-to-face sexual experience with someone they had met through a chat room in the past year.157  Thus, it seems that a very high proportion of both men and women who engage in “cybersex” may go on to have physical sexual encounters with their online partners.

A study of sex-addicted men also found that 43 percent used online sexual activity to engage in sexual activities they would never otherwise perform.158  Similarly, self reports also reveal that the tendency to explore new behaviors in “offline” relationships increases with increased online sexual activity.159

Different Reactions to Different Infidelities

The way men and women view infidelity is very different.  One study, using undergraduates from a large university in Northern Ireland, investigated how men and women perceive online and offline sexual and emotional infidelity.  When forced to decide, men were more upset by sexual infidelity and women by emotional infidelity.  Only 23 percent of women claimed they would be more bothered by sexual infidelity, compared to the 77 percent of women who would be more bothered by emotional infidelity.  Males felt the opposite way.  Eighty-four percent of the men reported they would be more bothered by sexual infidelity, whereas only 16 percent say they would be more bothered by emotional infidelity.160

In a study which examined different types of degrading pornography, featuring themes such as “objectification” and “dominance,” both men and women rated the same three major themes as the most degrading of all, but with different intensities: women rated them as even more degrading than men did.161

Individual Consequences

Pornography changes the habits of the mind, the inner private self.  Its use can easily become habitual, which in turn leads to desensitization, boredom, distorted views of reality, and an objectification of women.  A greater amount of sexual stimuli becomes necessary to arouse habitual users, leading them to pursue more deviant forms of pornography to fulfill their sexual desires.

Desensitization, Habituation, and Boredom

Prolonged use of pornography produces habituation,162 boredom, and sexual dissatisfaction among female and male viewers,163 and is associated with more lenient views of extramarital sexual relations and recreational attitudes toward sex.164  A 2000 study of college freshmen found that the habitual use of pornography led to greater tolerance of sexually explicit material, thus requiring more novel and bizarre material to achieve the same level of arousal or interest.165  For example, habituation may lead to watching “depictions of group sex, sadomasochistic practices, and sexual contact with animals,”166 engaging in anal intercourse,167 and trivializing “nonviolent forms of the sexual abuse of children.”168

The pornography industry adapted to this desire for more bizarre and uncommon images.  An analysis of the content of PlayboyPenthouse, and Hustler from the years 1953 to 1984 revealed 6,004 child images and an additional 14,854 images depicting crime or violence.  Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of the child images were sexual and violent, with most of the images displaying girls between the ages of three and eleven years of age.  Each of these magazines portrayed the scenes involving children as though the child had been unharmed by the sexual scene or even benefited from it.169

Heavy exposure to pornography leads men to judge their mates as sexually less attractive,170 resulting in less satisfaction with their affection, physical appearance, and sexual behavior.171  The need for more intense sexual stimulation brought on by pornography can lead to boredom in normal relationships and a greater likelihood of seeking sexual pleasure outside of marriage.  Repeated exposure to pornography leads the viewer to consider “recreational sexual engagements” as increasingly important,172 and changes the viewer to being very accepting of sexual permissiveness.173

Distorted Perception of Reality

Pornography presents sexual access as relentless, “a sporting event that amounts to innocent fun” with inconsequential effects on emotions, perceptions, and health.174  This is not the case, however.  Pornography leads to distorted perceptions of social reality: an exaggerated perception of the level of sexual activity in the general population,175 an inflated estimate “of the incidence of premarital and extramarital sexual activity, as well as increased assessment of male and female promiscuity,” “an overestimation of almost all sexual activities performed by sexually active adults,”176 and an overestimation of the general prevalence of perversions such as group sex, bestiality, and sadomasochistic activity.177  Thus the beliefs being formed in the mind of the viewer of pornography are far removed from reality.  A case could be made that repeated viewing of pornography induces a mental illness in matters sexual.

These distortions result in an acceptance of three beliefs: (1) sexual relationships are recreational in nature, (2) men are generally sexually driven, and (3) women are sex objects or commodities.178  These are called “permission-giving beliefs” because they result in assumptions that one’s behavior is normal, acceptable, and commonplace, and thus not hurtful to anyone else.179  These beliefs are deepened and reinforced by masturbation while viewing pornography,180 a frequent practice among those who use pornography to deal with stress.181

When male and female viewers do not believe that exposure to pornography has any effect upon their personal views or lives,182 they more readily internalize abnormal sexual attitudes and increase the likelihood that they will engage in perverse sexual behaviors.183

All of these distortions amount to a serious misunderstanding about sexuality and relationships and are a dangerous distortion of the nature of social life.184  Those who perceive pornographic sexual scenes as depicting reality tend to be more accepting of sexual permissiveness than others.185  Prolonged exposure to pornography fosters the belief that sexual inactivity constitutes a health risk.186

Objectification and Degradation of Women

Pornography fosters the idea that the degradation of women is acceptable.  Since males use pornography much more frequently than females,187 exposure to sexual and even semi-sexual material from the Internet, magazines, and television is associated with stronger notions that women are sex objects or sexual commodities.188  Men thus exposed are more likely to describe women in overtly sexual terms, rather than by other personal attributes.189

A study of widely distributed x-rated films by Gloria Cowan and colleagues, professors of psychology at California State University, San Bernardino, determined the range and extent of domination and sexual inequality depicted of women in a random selection of movies in family video rental stores in California.  Physical aggression was present in 73 percent of the films, and rape scenes were present in 51 percent, with the woman as the victim every time.  The films depicted gender-role inequalities as well, typically portraying the men as professionals and the women as school girls, secretaries, or housewives.190  During the sexual scenes, the man usually remained at least partially clothed, whereas the woman was usually naked.191

Pornographic films also degrade women through “rape myth acceptance” scenes, which depict women being raped and ultimately enjoying the experience.  These scenes foster the belief that women really “want” to be raped.  Jeannette Norris of the University of Washington conducted a study in which a group of students read two versions of the same story depicting a woman being raped.  The story, however, had two different endings: one version ended with the woman deeply distressed, the other ended with the woman seeming to enjoy herself.  Even though the two stories were identical in every way except for the woman’s reaction at the end, the students viewed the scenario more positively when the story depicted the woman as enjoying the rape.  They perceived the raped woman as having a greater “desire” to have sex and were thus more accepting of what the man had done.192

Similar results emerge in assessments of college men.  Sarah Murnen of Kenyon College, Ohio found that fraternity members, who displayed many more pornographic pictures of women in their rooms than those from the non-fraternity group, had more positive attitudes toward rape.193

Women tend to view pornography as more degrading of women than men do.  When a sample of students was asked about their feelings toward pornography, 72 percent of the young women but only 23 percent of the young men stated their feelings were negative.  Moreover, when asked if pornography is degrading, almost 90 percent of young women but only 65 percent of young men agreed that pornography is degrading.194

After prolonged exposure to pornography, men especially, but also some women, trivialize rape as a criminal offense.195

Whether they think pornography is degrading or not, women who view pornography regularly unwittingly engage in a form of self degradation: they develop a negative body image about themselves because they do not measure up to the depictions in the pornographic materials.196

Clinical Consequences

Pornography consumption has more than just psychological and familial ramifications.  There are numerous clinical consequences to pornography use, including increased risk for significant physical and mental health problems and a greater likelihood of committing a sex-based crime.

Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies

Since pornography encourages sexually permissive attitudes and behavior, users of pornography have a higher likelihood of contracting a sexually transmitted disease or fathering an out-of-wedlock pregnancy.  Pornography’s frequent depiction of intercourse without condoms (87 percent of the time) is an invitation for the promiscuous to contract a sexually transmitted disease,197 to have a child out of wedlock and to have multiple sex partners.198  Pornography also promotes sexual compulsiveness, which doubles the likelihood of being infected with a sexually transmitted disease.199

Sexual Addiction

Pornography and “cybersex” are highly addictive and can lead to sexually compulsive behaviors (that decrease a person’s capacity to perform other major tasks in life).  Over 90 percent of therapists surveyed in one study believed that a person could become addicted to “cybersex.”200  In an American survey, 57 percent of frequent viewers used online sexual activity to deal with stress.201  A 2006 Swedish study of regular Internet pornography users found that about six percent were compulsive users and that these compulsives also used much more non-Internet pornography as well.202

Addictive pornography use leads to lower self-esteem and a weakened ability to carry out a meaningful social and work life.  A survey of pornography addicts found that they disliked the “out of control” feeling and the time consumption that their pornography use engendered.  All of the sexual compulsives reported they had felt distressed and experienced impairment in an important aspect of their lives as a result of their addiction.  Almost half of the sexual compulsives said their behavior had significant negative results in their social lives, and a quarter reported negative effects on their job.203  In another survey, sexual compulsives and sexual addicts were 23 times more likely than those without a problem to state that discovering online sexual material was the worst thing that had ever happened in their life.204  No wonder then that severe clinical depression was reported twice as frequently among Internet pornography users compared to non-users.205

Aggression and Abuse

Intense use of pornography is strongly related to sexual aggression,206 and among frequent viewers of pornography, there is a marked increase in sexual callousness, including the “rape myth acceptance” noted above.207

A significant portion of pornography is violent in content.  A study of different pornographic media found violence in almost a quarter of magazine scenes, in more than a quarter of video scenes, and in almost half (over 42 percent) of online pornography.  A second study found that almost half the violent Internet scenes included nonconsensual sex.208

The data suggest “a modest connection between exposure to pornography and subsequent behavioral aggression,”209 though when men consume violent pornography (i.e. depicting rape or torture), they are more likely to commit acts of sexual aggression.210  Dangerously, pornography strongly affects psychotic men, who are more likely to act out their impulses.211

Consumption of nonviolent pornography also increases men’s self-acknowledged willingness to force compliance with their particular sexual desires on reluctant partners.212  And though there are conflicting data on the relative effects of violent versus non-violent pornography,213 there is little doubt that the consumption of pornography leads to a significant increase in “rape myth acceptance,”214 which involves a reduction of sympathy with rape victims and a trivialization of rape as a criminal offense,215 a diminished concern about child sexual abuse, short of the rape of children,216 and an increased preparedness to resort to rape.217

One study at a rape crisis center interviewed 100 sexually abused women to determine if pornography played a role in any past incidences of sexual abuse.  While 58 percent could not say, 28 percent stated that their abuser had in fact used pornography.  Of this 28 percent (women who were aware that their abuser used pornography), 40 percent (or 11 percent of the total group) reported that pornography actually played a role in the abusive incident they experienced.  In some cases the abuser had watched pornography before abusing the woman, in one case he used pornography while committing the abuse, and in yet some other cases he forced his victim to participate in the making of a pornographic film.218

Sex Offenders and Pornography

Pornography viewing and sexual offense are inextricably linked.

One study of convicted Internet sexual offenders reported that they spent more than eleven hours per week viewing pornographic images of children on the Internet.219  Another study compared two groups of offenders: those convicted of Internet collection and distribution of child pornography images, and those who commit real life child sex abuse.  The results showed that a majority of those who were convicted of only Internet-based offenses also had committed real life sexual abuse of children.  Moreover the study also found that real life offenders had committed an average of over thirteen different child sex abuse offenses, irrespective of whether they had formally been convicted of any real life incident.220

A study of sex offenders and non-offenders revealed significant differences in adolescent pornography use as well as current use.  Significant proportions of different types of rapists and molesters had used hard-core pornography (depictions of non-consensual acts) during their adolescence: 33 percent of heterosexual child molesters, 39 percent of homosexual child molesters, and 33 percent of rapists.  The current use of hard core pornography was even greater for these groups: 67 percent of heterosexual child molesters, 67 percent of homosexual child molesters, and 83 percent of rapists, contrasted with 29 percent of non-offending pornography viewers.  About a third of the sex offenders reported using pornography as a deliberate stimulus to commit their sexual offenses.221

Another study examined the beliefs of three groups: real life, “contact-only”child sex offenders, Internet-only child sex offenders, and mixed offenders (contact and Internet).  While all groups were more likely to minimize the gravity of their offense, the Internet-only group was more likely than the contact-only group to think that children could make their own decisions on sexual involvement and to believe that some children wanted, even eagerly wanted, sexual activity with an adult.222

Pornography and New Findings in Neurology

The neurological study of pornography is still in its infancy, but neurophysiology provides insight into pornography’s power to form the cognitive and emotional habits of the user.  As is becoming clear from many different areas of neurological study, repetition of an act establishes new neural pathways, thus facilitating the retention of these behaviors.223

Other research is uncovering the link between dopamine, a hormone that produces feelings of pleasure, and the effect that a pornographic image has.  PET scans (a nuclear medicine three-dimensional imaging technique) of both pornography-addicted adults and non-addicted adults viewing pornography show brain reactions for both groups similar to cocaine addicts looking at images of people taking cocaine.224  Findings such as these have led scholars to posit that “emotionally arousing images imprint and alter the brain, triggering an instant, involuntary, but lasting, biochemical memory trail.”225  A small experimental indication of this type of imprinting occurred in one study where participants saw a board of words that were either sexual or neutral.  All participants retained more sexual words than neutral words, but pornography consumers retained even higher amounts of sexual words.226

Treatment programs for sex offenders and pornography addicts, designed to break patterns of deriving pleasure from viewing pornography, use a technique called “safeguarding.”  “Safeguards” are negative thoughts used to interrupt sexual fantasies.  Whenever patients have sexual fantasies, they are taught to think of a safeguard; for example, they may produce a mental image of bugs crawling on them, a public address system broadcasting their thoughts, or an image of a police officer watching their sexual behavior.  Through this method, participants learn to interrupt their fantasies227 and, it is thought, gradually displace the old neurological pathway with a different and safer one.

Adolescent Exposure to Pornography in the Media

The phenomenal growth of mass media during the late 20th century, and particularly the establishment of the Internet, has vastly increased accessibility to pornography and other sexually-related information.  This creates a major obstacle to the healthy development of sexuality, especially among youth.

Adolescents and Pornography

Though most U.S. parents (78 percent) are worried about their adolescents accessing Internet pornography, not all teenagers readily take to this sexualized culture.  Most start out being ill at ease with any display of pornography: they tend to be upset or embarrassed,228 with reactions ranging from fear to shame to anger to fascination.229 In one survey, about a quarter were “very” upset by this exposure,230 but they tend not to report it.231

Adolescents often come across pornography accidentally on the Internet.  One study found that 70 percent of youth aged 15 to 17 accidentally came across pornography online.232  A study of 1,501 youth aged ten to seventeen examined unwanted exposure incidents more thoroughly: in 26 percent of the cases, respondents reported that when they tried to exit an unwanted site, they were actually brought to an additional sex site.233  The same study showed that out of the total number of unwanted exposure incidents, 44 percent of the time the youth did not disclose the episode to anyone else.234

These initial reactions of disgust, however, rapidly dissipate so that older adolescents tend to use sexually explicit Internet material more often than younger adolescents235 and are twice as likely to report intentional pornography use as are younger adolescents.236  Repeated exposure to pornography eventually wipes out any feelings of shame and disgust and gives way, instead, to unadulterated enjoyment.237

A 2005 survey showed that respondents who reported unintentional exposure to pornography were over 2.5 times as likely to then report intentional exposure as those who did not report any unintentional exposure.238  It seems the unintentional exposure has its effect of bringing them back for more, which of course is one of the fears of parents.

Several factors predict an adolescent’s use of pornography.  Teenagers who watch pornography more frequently tend to be high sensation seekers, less satisfied with their lives, have a fast Internet connection, and have friends who are younger.239  Adolescents are at greater risk for intentionally seeking out sexual material when they have high levels of computer use.  The more time spent on the computer, the more likely these adolescents will search for sexually explicit content.240  Not surprisingly, given all that has already been reported, viewers who masturbate while viewing sexually explicit material assess the material more favorably than those who do not masturbate.241

There is a difference between boys’ and girls’ reasons for seeking pornographic sites, differences that parallel the different patterns of adult male and female use of pornography.  Boys tend to seek pornography initially because they are curious or want sexual arousal, while girls tend first to go to non-pornographic but sexually oriented sites for sexual health or relationship-related information.242  Also, the impacts are different for boys and girls: males report more positive memories of sexually explicit material than females,243 and report “more positive attitudes toward uncommitted sexual exploration” as their use of pornography increases.244  In one study, adolescents who watched the highest level of sexual content on television doubled the likelihood they would initiate intercourse.245

The Protective Role of Parental Involvement

Although U.S. adolescents indicate their preferred source of sexual information is their parents, more than half of them report they have learned about intercourse, pregnancy, and birth control from television, and half of teenage women report they first learned about intercourse from magazines.246

A study of 1,300 eight- to thirteen-year-old girls found that, among those who engaged in “cybersex,” 95 percent of the parents were completely unaware of their children’s involvement.247  Compared to adolescents who do not search for pornography online, adolescents who search for pornography online are about three times as likely to have parents who do not monitor their behavior at all (or very little).  Compared to those who do not seek out pornography, those who seek Internet pornography are three times as likely to give a poor rating of their attachment to their parent.248

Clearly there is a lot that parents can do, but it takes a good family life, lots of communication with the adolescent, and a relationship that permits such communication about such an anxiety-provoking topic.

We move now to matters far outside the family.

The Effect of Sexually Oriented Businesses on Their Surroundings

Sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) – pornography stores and strip clubs – deleteriously affect their surrounding communities.  For instance, SOBs along Garden Grove Boulevard in California contributed to 36 percent of all crime in that area.249  A similar study in Centralia, Washington found that, after an SOB opened, the serious crime rate rose significantly in the vicinity of the SOB’s address.250  Findings such as these generally come from studies commissioned by cities to measure the incidence of the eight serious crimes of the Uniform Crime Reports: homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, theft, auto theft, and arson.251

SOBs have been found to cause more crime than non-sexually oriented nightclubs and bars.  A report from Daytona Beach, Florida found that SOB neighborhoods have 270 percent more total crime than non-SOB control neighborhoods and 180 percent more than non-SOB neighborhoods with “taverns.”252  A study in Adams County, Colorado found that 83 percent of crimes in a neighborhood featuring two adult businesses were connected to those adult businesses.253

SOBs can also act as centers for crime.  In Houston, Texas, more than 517 arrests took place within 12 months at SOBs, 50 at one SOB alone.254

A study of SOBs in Phoenix, Arizona found that the number of sex offenses was 506 percent greater in a neighborhood containing a SOB.255  Sexual deviants are attracted to these areas, intending to pay for sexual pleasures.  The forbidden partners they desire include children, the invalid, and the elderly.256

The transmission of STDs is also commonplace at many SOBs.  Pennsylvania’s attorney general closed several Philadelphia SOBs because patrons created a serious public health risk by regularly engaging in unprotected sexual activity inside the video booths, promoting the spread of HIV, hepatitis B, and other STDs.257  The numbers of incidences may be higher than reported to police (and thus used in these studies) because many victims are reluctant to report crimes committed against them while at SOBs.  This reluctance makes many patrons easy prey for criminals.

SOBs affect property values as well.  The closer a property is to an SOB, the more its value depreciates.  A study of owners of commercial property or their owners from Dallas, Texas found that all concluded that SOBs drastically decrease property value.  Property sales were significantly lower at $1.50 to $7 per square foot in areas in close proximity to SOBs, compared to $10 to $12 per square foot a mile away from SOBs.258

The close proximity of SOBs to neighborhoods leads to a greater exposure of children to pornographic material.259  In Denver, Colorado, an investigation into the adverse secondary effects of SOBs on surrounding neighborhoods found large amounts of litter in these neighborhoods that included pornographic images, sex paraphernalia, used condoms, and used syringes.260

The devaluation of people and property by SOBs has not gone unnoticed by the courts, which have consistently afforded substantial deference to government entities seeking to regulate adverse secondary effects associated with SOBs.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a jurisdiction need not conduct its own study, but may rely on relevant studies and evidence produced by other jurisdictions.261  The Court has also recognized that common experience and case law can be relevant factors in support of SOB regulation.262

Conclusion: Pornography in the Context of Modernity’s Social and Sexual Problems

Contemporary society is alarmingly sexualized, and the traditional sexual taboos of a well-functioning society have broken down.  Nearly two-thirds of United States high-school students have had sexual intercourse by grade twelve.263  Of these sexually active high-schoolers, 70 percent of females and 55 percent of males report that they wish they had waited instead.264  These numbers have massive implications for the future of the American family, for of women who have had three sexual partners other than their eventual husband, only 39 percent will be in a stable marriage by their mid-thirties.265  In 2007, 20 percent of U.S. girls in grade 12 already have had sexual intercourse with four or more partners.266  The vast majority of their children will grow up without their fathers present.

As the empirical data make clear, pornography further misshapes this already dysfunctional sexuality, and the consumption of pornography can become a destructive addiction as well.  This sexual malformation not only affects the consumer of pornography, but also weakens those close to him or her.  Habitual consumption of pornography can break down the relational substrates of human life and interaction—family, friends and society.

As such, reinforcing these relationships is the surest guard against such destructive sexual tendencies.

The closer adult men were to their fathers growing up, the fewer non-marital sexual behaviors they engage in and the greater their levels of marital happiness and family satisfaction.267  The proportion of adolescents who rate their fathers as very close to them is highest among those from intact married families (40 percent) and lowest among those from single-parent families (three percent).268

Society benefits when it fosters a healthy sexuality.  Human beings are healthiest and happiest when they are monogamous (only one sexual partner in a lifetime), and that happiness is directly related to monogamy’s long-term stability and exclusivity.269

Healthy relationships yield additional positive sexual outcomes.  Some research indicates that married couples have the most frequent, and Conservative Protestant women have the most enjoyable, sexual relations.270  The supreme and tragic irony is that, while the desire for the highest levels of sexual fulfillment are likely the motive for many adolescents’ first peek into pornography, the attainment of that universal longing is most likely to be had through monogamy and regular participation in religious worship.

These insights, until recently, were common social assumptions and institutionalized patterns.  Until the dawn of the sexual revolution and, later, the digital age, they were reflected in a public opprobrium of pornography.  One 1994 study found that 71 percent favored a total ban on sexually violent movies and 77 percent a total ban on sexually violent magazines.  Only eight percent thought that there should be no restrictions on the former, and only three percent thought there should be no restrictions on the latter.  Concerning merely sexually explicit magazines, less than 10 percent thought there should be no restrictions on the material.271

The cultural censure of disordered sexuality that enables stable family life has faded with the proliferation of Internet pornography.  As a result, the effects of hyper-sexualization permeate society.272  Today’s youth are reaching puberty earlier, engaging in sexual intercourse sooner, while “Emerging Adults” are cohabiting more, having children out of wedlock,and getting married significantly later or not at all.

The key to militating against these damaging patterns and to protecting against the effects of pornography is to foster relationships of affection and attachment in family.  The first and most important relationship is between the father and the mother.  The second is engaged parents who love their children.  In today’s technological society, this means limiting, monitoring, and directing their children’s Internet use.  This, in turn, provides an invaluable shield against Internet pornography, and allows room for a healthy sexuality to unfold in a natural and socially supported way.  In our over-sexualized culture, with a longer pre-marriage period, children need the capacity for abstinence if their sexuality is to be channeled into stable marriage, procreation, and healthy family life for their children.  Strong families remain the best defense against the negative effects of pornography, especially when aided by regular religious worship with all the benefits it brings.273

Finally, the fundamental role of government (including the courts) is to protect innocent citizens, most especially children and adolescents, and to protect the sound functioning of the basic institutions of family, church, school, marketplace, and government.  They are all interdependent.  Pornography, clearly, undermines both marriage and the family, and has a host of ill effects.  It is time for government to reassess its laissez-faire attitude towards the proliferation of pornography, especially on the Internet.

Our present and future families need protection from this insidious enemy of love, affection, and of family and social stability.

 

——

The author acknowledges his debt to Drs. Jill Manning, Stephanie Sargeant-Weaver and James B. Weaver III without whose reviews of the literature, Senate Testimonies and pointers towards the underlying studies he could not have prepared this paper.  Their work suffuses the whole project. These reviews include Jill C. Manning, “The Impact of Internet Pornography on Marriage and the Family: A Review of the Research,” Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity 13 (2006): 131-65; Stephanie Sargent-Weaver,  “The Effects of Teens’ Exposure to Sexually Explicit Materials on the Internet: Synthesis of the Research and Implications for Future Research;” and James B. Weaver III, “The Effects of Pornography Addiction on Families and Communities,” presented before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington, DC (November 18, 2004). Jill Manning’s Senate Testimony, from which more of this paper has been drawn than from any other source, is highly recommended for its comprehensiveness and can be found at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/upload/85273_1.pdf (Retrieved Jan 19 2009).

 

 

Crafting Employee Health Plans for Catholic Institutions

In the last few years, the Catholic Church and its Catholic institutions have faced attacks through legislation and judicial activism, which are increasingly coming in the form of mandates for health insurance “benefits” that support immoral behavior but not medical necessities. The most recent instances in the news include the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission’s (EEOC) ruling against Belmont Abbey College and Wisconsin’s mandate forcing even Catholic employers to provide contraception coverage. Both are extremely troubling though not unexpected in to- day’s increasingly secular environment.

This paper is written from my experience building employee health plans for more than 50 Catholic employers, including several dioceses and religious orders. I do not write from a legal perspective. My concern is finding insurance solutions that avoid the problems of religious discrimination and violations of conscience—“real world” solutions that can be implemented today. Legal advice is also important, but it often only answers one question without examining the non-legal consequences of recommended actions. Health insurance experts like me who work every day with the Church must be concerned with reality and practicality, and not only what is permissible under the law.

The State of Affairs

Let us first consider the moral issues on which Catholic institutions are being at- tacked and which have a current or potential impact on medical insurance. These are many and growing: contraception, abortion, domestic partners, same-sex marriages, “gender reassignments,” sex-change operations, sterilization, stem cell research, in vitro fertilization and several other issues.

The attacks come primarily from two fronts, legislation and judicial activism. The activism is often coordinated and well-funded by Planned Parenthood, the American Civil Liberties Union and others who view the Church and its moral principles as dangerous obstacles that must be eliminated from public policy decisions.

In response to these attacks, the Church’s lawyers typically argue that the constitutional right of religious freedom should protect “religious” institutions from new laws and lawsuits. However, the reality is that it is very expensive to defend an institution in court, and there is significant risk of losing a court battle. The Supreme Courts of California and New York have issued rulings that are very troubling for Catholic institutions, and thus far the U.S. Supreme Court has not enforced First Amendment rights in these situations.

How “Catholic” must a college, hospital or other entity be to qualify for religious exemptions from health insurance mandates? Unfortunately several laws and rulings have denied a religious exclusion because of things like:

  1.  Too many employees are not Catholic.
  2.  Too many people served are not Catholic.
  3.  The institution takes federal funds.

This may be oversimplified, but it makes the point. Catholic charities, hospitals and colleges are going to be in great difficulty with these rulings, even in states that have religious exemptions written into the laws. The courts are defining religious institutions so narrowly, it sometimes seems only a cloistered convent might qualify.

A particularly dangerous line of attack is employee complaints and “discrimination” lawsuits, alleging that by not providing morally offensive “benefits,” employers are discriminatory to women. This is the heart of the Belmont Abbey case. The argument is that by not covering contraception, an employer discriminates against women since they bear a higher burden and cost for birth control. There have been several rulings by the EEOC along these lines, and it is likely that in the current political climate there will be more of this, not less.

Additionally, Catholic institutions can anticipate great difficulties with regard to insuring legally married same-sex couples. While many have argued that the Defense of Marriage Act provides some protection, this law is being challenged on many levels, and Catholic employers should plan for the worst and expect lawsuits in this area.

Designing Catholic Health Plans

The Catholic Church and its institutions will inevitably and increasingly face legal battles, but must act now to make changes that help protect health plans. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex task that requires professional advice, what follows are a few recommendations for Catholic employers.

Plan ahead and stop being reactionary with regard to health insurance. Assume that your institution’s Catholic principles will be challenged eventually; it is not a matter of “if ” but “when” in today’s increasingly secular society. To be safe your institution must have a specifically Catholic health plan in place, not an off-the-shelf product.

Commit today to take a few hours up front dealing correctly with health insurance, first by reading and understanding what your existing policy actually covers. Many Catholic institutions will be surprised by what they find. It helps to have professional assistance, because often the offensive benefits are hidden in vague language and technical insurance terms.

Consider the Belmont Abbey situation. Their health insurer reportedly added contraception coverage without their knowledge, which was readily apparent when officials read the plan documents. However, to be honest, officials and even human resources staff often fail to read such documents in their entirety. The documents are dry and boring and have paragraph after paragraph of highly technical insurance contract language. Unfortunately the consequence of a mistake could be spending hundreds of hours playing defense in a legal system that is not always friendly to Catholic concerns.

When designing or revising your employee health plan, ensure that it is regulated by federal law and not state law, by “self-funding” if at all possible. Almost all state- regulated, fully insured plans are deficient in protecting Catholic institutions. Currently 23 states have mandated contraception coverage. When provisions for abortion, sterilization, in vitro fertilization and same-sex couples are considered, more than half of the states have morally objectionable mandates. The remaining states are constantly moving in the same secular direction. Even in states that do not have these morally objectionable mandates, Catholic institutions are not likely to be safe for the long term in state-regulated insurance plans.

Federal regulation of medical insurance began in 1974 with the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which covers “self-funded” insurance. A section of ERISA specifically provides for “church plans” that generally do not have to pay for morally objectionable “benefits.”

To avoid state regulation, the real-world answer is to “self fund.” That means that instead of paying a fixed premium every month to an insurance company that accepts all the risk of claims, the employer agrees to share the risk. The employer financially “participates” in the cost of the employees’ medical claims. Does this mean that a self- funded plan is riskier than the alternative? Not necessarily. Any insurance plan can have zero risk or a large amount of risk—the latter can include a fully insured plan with a high deductible that the employer reimburses. But many Catholic institutions do not have the resources to gamble on high-risk plans.

In layman’s terms, here is how self-funding works. A plan document is written specifying what the plan pays for. The employee has a plastic card that looks and works just like a fully insured plan. A hired third-party administrator receives and pays claims from the doctors and other health care providers. In a “pure” self funded plan, the administrator would simply bill the employer for the cost of claims plus administrative costs, but few have a plan like that.

More commonly, an employer will purchase an insurance contract to limit the risk per insured on the plan. The employer is now responsible for only the first “X” dollars in claims per person, called the “stop loss” deductible. A large conglomerate might have a $100,000 stop loss deductible; but a smaller organization may have a risk as low as $25,000 a person. Even then, an institution of 100 employees cannot afford $2.5 million in risk, so they buy another type of stop loss insurance called “aggregate stop loss” to limit the maximum claims of the entire group. Aggregate allows the institution to budget, since it now has a firm cap and maximum risk if claims go out of control. If claims are less than the maximum, the employer keeps the funds instead of the insurer.

The bottom line is that self funded does not have to mean unlimited risk. With careful planning many if not most Catholic organizations should be able to find a way to do this.

Getting It Right

Even though I recommend getting out from under state regulation if possible, Catholic employers should not run out and self-fund unless they do it correctly. Many dioceses have had very bad experiences with self-funding, because their advisors were not sufficiently knowledgeable about “church plans,” how to use appropriate language and structure, and other practical details. Self-funding is not bad by itself, but every detail must be considered to avoid serious difficulties.

For instance, consider cash flow: many Catholic institutions are not wealthy, but most stop loss insurance requires them to pay the costs up front and get reimbursed at a later date. For institutions in this position, a third type of insurance, “cash flow protection,” is available to limit employer up-front costs to an annual cap divided by 12 months. It is added protection that many insurance advisors are not always aware of, because their experience with self-funded plans may have been primarily with larger corporations where cash flow is not a primary consideration.

In addition, a “church plan” under federal law must have some very specific language to avoid future challenges. The insurer most likely will not be an expert on Catholic-sensitive language and will offer a boilerplate contract. Do not assume that the Church’s definition of something is the same as the insurer ’s. For instance, the contract must define “family” and other things that may have very different meanings for a Catholic institution and a secular insurer. Every word of the contract must be read and understood, and every exclusion must be examined. You cannot trust that a contract is operating the way your agent, lawyer or other professional claims, unless you read and understand it yourself and consult with a true expert on the very unique needs of Catholic institutions.

The contract needs language controlling when an insurer can add benefits. Several dioceses were recently surprised when they learned the hard way that their insurer had the contractual right to add benefits without their approval. Although the dioceses’ lawyers believed they had a contract that could only be changed on renewal, the insurer had the unilateral right to impose changes—in this case covering contraception in response to a new state law. Thus in the middle of the year the dioceses have a major problem.

Eligibility is also an area where Catholic institutions may run into problems. In the U.S., health insurance is governed by an employer-employee relationship, and insurers expect to see a wage and tax statement showing earnings for each employee. Insurers do not want to cover volunteers who might only be volunteering to gain health insurance because they are ill. But how do we deal with Religious with a vow of poverty? Even if full-time employees, they are not paid; instead their order is often paid for their services. Thus, many Religious and even entire orders have been denied or removed from coverage because they receive no wages. Worse, insurers often do not ask for proof of wages until after the insured has an expensive claim—a terrible time to lose coverage. Again, this is a contractual issue that should be addressed up front.

There are also Catholic Church-specific laws, such as the Downey Amendment, that deal with Medicare for Catholic Religious. It is a very complex law, and most insurers are not even aware of its existence, let alone the application. There has been much confusion that required a ruling by the Center for Medicare Services three years ago, as many dioceses were interpreting the law incorrectly.

There are many more considerations involved in constructing a health plan for Catholic employers. This generally must be done with a custom product, not an off-the-shelf “normal” design. A custom plan often requires the cooperation of the insurer, filing with regulatory agencies and complex legal issues.

Split Off Drugs?

It is sometimes recommended that Catholic institutions should split off drugs—that is, have a fully insured health plan and self fund prescription drug claims—in order to avoid government mandates for contraceptives. It is suggested that such a scheme also produces cost savings, sometimes leading to rebates from the insurance companies that offer such standalone drug programs. My experience has shown this not to be the case, and I would advise against it.

Let us look how drugs are purchased by insurance plans. An insurance company will often subcontract portions of an employer ’s health plan including drugs, trans- plants and networks of doctors and hospitals. All these are normal subcontracted functions under the health plan. With regard to prescription drugs, most health plans use the same four pharmacy benefit managers.

Separating out drugs does not generate any cost savings by itself. There are actually several possible negative economic consequences. Many times drugs are not covered under the stop loss agreements if an employer self funds, but this is especially likely if drugs are covered through a separate plan. If the institution has a fully insured medical plan and then self funds the drugs, it could have unlimited drug cost liability. How would the institution budget? What if it has a terrible year? Will it have adequate reserves?

As for avoiding state mandates, self-funding a drug plan alone may not help. Regulators could simply decide that drugs are part of the major medical plan, regardless of the setup. For instance, when a patient is in the hospital, some drugs are covered under the medical plan; when he leaves the hospital and takes the same drugs, they may be covered by the self-funded pharmacy plan. How does the institution explain that inconsistency? The opportunity for misinterpretation by state regulators is great, and a legal fight to argue otherwise could be costly.

My best advice: do not do it. Leave the pharmacy plan to the insurer and take the huge discounts.

Pool Together?

It is also often recommended that Catholic institutions “pool” together for health insurance benefits, but there are many reasons why a pooled plan could be a disaster waiting to happen.

If the goal is to avoid mandates as a religious employer, the courts have indicated that the pooled entity itself must be “Catholic.” Would that new entity qualify for inclusion in the Official Catholic Directory?

And what about linking an institution’s finances with another entity? My firm has several clients that have struggled through the huge time, effort and cost of fighting sexual abuse lawsuits. One has filed for bankruptcy, and the lawyers aggressively sought to “find” money. Does another institution want to intertwine finances with such a troubled entity at this time? What kind of risk does that add? I know that this is a terrible question, but it is an honest, real-world question. Pools have set up separate corporations to try to limit the risk to individual employers, but the more that the pool or self-funded plan is walled off, the less likely that it will be considered “Catholic” by regulators or the courts. The two goals are somewhat at odds with each other.

Another argument for a pool is the opportunity for a volume discount, which in itself is a good idea. However, a good firm can help employers create groups that are financially separate, with different premium levels, yet receive a volume discount. Think about going to the car dealership and pooling with 10 entities for a fleet dis- count, but writing separate checks. It is the same concept, provides the same net result and risks much less liability, since you do not in fact pool assets together.

You may have heard that XYZ Diocese pools together and it works great. Pools do often work great, right up to the day they do not! Consider a real example:

A large Catholic pool run by a secular broker struggled with passing on necessary rate increases, and the trustees did not fund the plan to the level it needed. The plan nearly ran out of money. The dioceses participating in the plan were surprised by a mid-year assessment. Now how do you budget for that?

Ultimately, when an institution is in a pool, it owns all the risk of the whole pool. It is like owning a condo and having the pool leak. Every unit gets assessed money. It does not matter if a participating institution was excellent and had low claims. Pools generally must have the ability to assess or they run the risk of not having funds to pay unexpected or higher-than-expected costs.

Now here is the real mess: How should the pool assess, or make any similar decision? Should it divide the total amount of the assessment by the number of entities in the pool? The larger entities would favor that, but a smaller entity would want the assessment to be apportioned by the number of insureds for each participant.

So assume that everything is pro-rated according to each entity’s number of insureds—then turn the tables. What happens when the pool needs to pick a network of doctors? Back to my real example: The pool decided on a network that was not great for small rural dioceses but excellent for large dioceses. What could the little guys do? They only had 100 votes, while the big member had 50,000.

At some point the pool will not work for a member institution. Typically it is when the institution is very healthy and the pool is sick. The institution’s rates go up, and its trustees want to leave. It cannot afford the huge premiums, and it can go locally for much less. The institution leaves the pool, thus the remaining participants have fewer people to spread the risk of claims. Rates go up, and more participants leave. This drives the rates way up, and eventually the plan collapses. This is classic “adverse selection” as we call it in the insurance industry.

Now there are rare occasions when adverse selection is tempered. There is a state-specific Catholic pool where one health insurer virtually owns the state, due to restrictive laws; this seems to function well.

But that is the exception. The insurance industry tried for years to form pools through “associations.” They almost all lost money and blew up the pools with huge claims. Remember chamber of commerce pools?

Yet another problem with pools is how to get out. They tend to be thrown together for the sake of what often turns out to be short-term cost savings. Rarely do the pool members ask going in, “What are the rules to leave?” The example I have been using had two small entities leave. One had a surplus and its employees were very healthy; it was not allowed to take their surplus with them when they left. Another entity that left had a deficit of several hundred thousand dollars; it was forced to pay the debt to the pool. This institution had not budgeted for that, believing that the premiums they paid were the maximum required.

Let us say that one entity in a pool is knowingly incurring non-eligible expenses or is poor at controlling eligibility. How do other institutions control a pool participant? One bishop or entity cannot tell another what to do. What is the enforcement action? What if the problem participant is costing other institutions money that they really should not be paying? This is real and happens often. The other institutions cannot do much except maybe leave the pool, but under what terms?

Another example: Many dioceses and even some larger independent Catholic institutions do not have centralized payroll. Their sub-units hire and fire, and the master entity has difficulty controlling and keeping track of who should be on the health plan. In such cases there are often people not on the plan who should be, and others who are on the health plan but should not be.

Consider this also: what if the pool fails or too many groups suddenly pull out? A sick group could have a world of problems. Do groups that leave take pending claims with them? Let us say their insured receive one million dollars of health care on December 31, and the group leaves on January 1. Does the group that left “own” the claim legally, or are the remaining groups “stuck” with it? It is typical for many pools to not fully educate, disclose or address these issues, and so many of their member entities do not fully understand their liabilities.

Conclusion

For many institutions, employee health insurance is the second largest expense after payroll. Yet most will spend less time on their health plan than mundane purchases such as computers or telephone plans. Given the increasing dangers to Catholic institutions because of federal and state regulation of employee benefits, it is critical for Catholic institutions to take a fresh look at their health insurance decisions.

This applies especially to the choice of broker. Most institutions consult only with local general practitioner agents. These may be friends, donors or other honest, hard- working people. The problem is they are not experts in this unique and specialized field, lacking the skill sets, abilities and relationships of Catholic-only agencies. They do not devote all or even a substantial part of their time to Catholic institutions and their particular requirements.

Ultimately, to properly construct a “Catholic” health plan, Catholic institutions need an expert. Think of it this way: if your child becomes ill and needs brain surgery, you would never ask a pediatrician to be the surgeon. In situation after situation, problems could have been avoided if a Catholic institution had hired a Catholic-specific firm to stay on top of changes to the law and to the health plan, avoiding future lawsuits.

The bottom line is that today’s legal and policy environment makes it difficult for Catholic institutions to buy “off the shelf ” health insurance that is morally sound. The good news is that there are ways to craft Catholic health plans. To help navigate the complex issues, there are at least three major firms that work only with the Catholic Church and others with particular expertise in designing plans for Catholic institutions.

Contraceptive Mandates and Immoral Cooperation

As the largest provider of nongovernmental, nonprofit health care in the United States, Catholic health care is susceptible to being viewed as just another secular institution engaged in the welfare of the larger society, and at its behest. Those who wish to deny the ministerial nature of Catholic health care have capitalized on this misperception for their own political agendas. Advocates for abolishing sexual mores, for providing abortion on demand and for redefining the human being as a bearer of rights have engaged political structures in their pursuit of reshaping Catholic health care in their own image. They have made some subtle and some blatantly obvious attempts at changing the public perception of the purposes of Catholic health care. These have escalated into legislative initiatives that attempt to force Catholic health care to violate the tenets of the Catholic Church in the delivery of health care.

First, there is a need to correct the misperception that the delivery of health care is a secular endeavor. The Christian woman Fabiola, who established a hospital in Rome around the year 390, was the earliest forerunner of today’s nurse. Her decision to dedicate her wealth and her life to the care of the sick poor was grounded in her Christian faith. St. Benedict founded the Benedictine nursing order, based on the Christian ethic, around the year 500. The very names of the oldest foundations of health care, which continue to exist today—including the Hotel-Dieu in Paris, founded in 660—reflect the religious tradition of health care delivery. A structure for the delivery of nursing care was created by the Christian religious order the Hostpitallers of Saint John of Jerusalem in 1113. This historically is considered to be the first organized structure for the delivery of health care. The first identified nurse in the territory that was to become the United States was Catholic friar Juan de Mena, from Santo Domingo of Mexico. He arrived on the shores of the southern Texas coast in 1554. The friar was known for his humility and his charity toward the sick.

The second oldest public hospital in continuous existence in the United States, Charity Hospital in New Orleans (1736), despite being a public hospital, was under the administration of the Daughters of Charity from 1834 to 1970. The oldest hospital west of the Mississippi was established in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1828 by St. Elizabeth Seton’s Sisters of Charity. Today, through the centuries of initiatives to apply the Gospel imperatives in the service of neighbor, Catholic health care is the largest provider of nongovernmental, nonprofit health care in the United States. With this stunning history of health care in the ministry in the Catholic tradition, it is disingenuous to identify Catholic health care as a secular function of society. Yet, state by state, there have been legislative initiatives to define Catholic health care ministries as secular endeavors, not protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The Secular Redefinition of Catholic Health Care

The escalation of legislated health care mandates illustrates this trend to secularize Catholic health care. (See the regularly updated “Table of Legal Mandates State by State” at www.ncbcenter.org.) The majority of states mandate that contraceptive coverage, including prescription drugs and devices, be included in employee insurance plans that offer prescription coverage. Of these mandating states, few provide a true religious or conscience exemption. Increasingly states are mandating the administration of emergency contraception in emergency departments to victims of sexual assault, even when there is an indication that the medication would function as an abortifacient. Only in rare cases are states providing conscience exemptions for the health care agency. Pharmacists have been more successful in securing refusal provisions that protect them from having to violate their consciences in the dispensing of emergency contraception. Increasingly, however, they have had to seek court injunctions to protect their rights of conscience.

Of significant concern is the redefinition, in statutes or through the courts, of a religious employer. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, New York, North Carolina and Oregon are examples of states which have narrowly defined a religious employer to include only nonprofit agencies (which would include Church ministries) that serve or employ primarily members of their own faith (which would not include the majority of Church ministries). Here rests the example of a revisionist’s view of the role of religion in society and the protections that should be provided to religious entities.

To define a religious employer as primarily hiring or serving its own members is the antithesis of the historical role of a religious ministry. The classic example of this can be seen in the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 29-37). In defining who is one’s neighbor, who we are to love as we love ourselves, Jesus tells a young legal scholar the story of the compassionate Samaritan who, unlike a priest and Levite, stopped and ministered to a man who was beaten and robbed along the road to Jericho. The Samaritans were despised by the Jews. Jesus asks, “Which of these three, in your opinion, was neighbor to the robbers’ victim?” The scholar answers, “The one who treated him with mercy,” and Jesus tells him to “go and do likewise.” Church ministries answer this call. They are not created to be self-serving and self-employing, but to care mercifully for those in need, regardless of their religion, ethnicity, gender, social status, vocational or marital status, or ability to pay. History supports this purpose of Church ministry.

Furthermore, Church hiring practices are based on the ministry being provided. In a Catholic school, where beliefs are imparted to the next generation, teachers of certain disciplines may be required to be Catholic. For the majority of ministries, competence in and adherence to the mission of the ministry are the usual criteria for employment. Finally, there are no client eligibility conditions (such as conversion to the Catholic faith) applied to recipients of Church ministry. However, states such as New York and California require that to be considered a religious employer one must have as a purpose the inculcation of religious values. It would be very interesting to see the response of state legislatures if Church ministries attempted to apply the very criteria that these legislatures have stated define a religious ministry: that is, for a Catholic hospital to hire only Catholic workers and to treat only Catholic patients, or those willing to be evangelized in the faith.

Not only have state legislatures redefined Church ministries, but so have the courts. In 2006, the New York State Court of Appeals, by a unanimous vote, upheld two lower court decisions requiring the Church to include contraceptive drugs and devices (including abortifacients) in their employee prescription drug plans. Religious or faith-based ministries may be exempted only if they evangelize, and employ and provide services primarily to their own members. Thus, while employers of Catholic schools and chanceries may be exempted, most other ministries may not be. In the decision, it was evident that what was viewed as the need to remedy a bias against women took precedence over the rights of people of faith. In considering the constitutionality of the narrow legal definition of a “religious employer,” the justices acknowledged the reasoning of the New York legislature: “Those favoring a narrower exemption asserted that the broader one would deprive tens of thousands of women employed by church-affiliated organizations of contraceptive coverage. Their view prevailed.”142 In other words, the pro-contraception/pro-abortion agenda prevailed over religious freedom. This agenda was supported by the New York State Court of Appeals: “Finally, we must weigh against plaintiffs’ interest in adhering to the tenets of their faith the State’s substantial interest in fostering equality between the sexes, and in providing women with better health care.”144

A similar bias was demonstrated by the Supreme Court of California. This court concluded that the California legislature did not violate the “free exercise [of religion] clause” of the California Constitution when mandating that Catholic Charities of Sacramento include contraceptive drugs and devices in its employee prescription coverage plan. The justices found that it is within the legislature’s competence to identify subtle forms of gender discrimination, by which they referenced discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions: “Certainly the interest in eradicating gender discrimination is compelling. We long ago concluded that discrimination based on gender violates the equal protection clause of the California Constitution… and… triggers the highest level of scrutiny.”146 Again, the pro-contraception/pro-abortion agenda prevailed over religious freedom.

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress will make no law respecting a religious establishment. However, it immediately follows with a prohibition against violations of the free exercise of religion. These provisions have been described as the separation of church and state. However, no other concept of constitutional protections has been more misunderstood or misused by those with their own political agendas. The constitutional scholar Stephen Carter addresses this misperception: “For the most significant aspect of the separation of church and state is not, as some seem to think, the shielding of the secular world from too strong a religious influence; the principle task of the separation of church and state is to secure religious freedom.”156

Clearly, there has been a redefinition by the courts of the meaning of the First Amendment since its adoption in 1791. The mandate for demonstrating a prevailing state interest before passing a law that infringes on a religious freedom has been marginalized. When rights conflict (as in this case), the balance has tragically shifted from religious freedom to “reproductive rights.” In the Oregon v. Smith decision in 1990, public employees who smoked peyote as part of a religious ritual were held to not be protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.168 The impact of the decision is that the state has no obligation to demonstrate a prevailing state interest if a legal mandate or prohibition is applied to all persons. This negates the very purpose of the free exercise of religion clause. As Carter states, “If the state bears no special burden to justify its infringement on religious practice, as long as the challenged statute is a neutral one, then the only protection a religious group receives is against legislation directed at that group. But legislation directed at a particular religious group, even in the absence of the free exercise clause, presumably would be prohibited by the equal protection clause.”171

In response to the Oregon v. Smith decision, advocates of religious freedom succeeded in securing passage of the Federal Religious Freedom Act of 1993. This legislation prohibited the government from limiting religious freedom in the absence of a compelling government interest, and even then the limitation had to be the least restrictive. In 1997, however, in the decision Boerne v. Flores, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the law on the basis that it interfered with states’ rights.175

In his analysis of the changing perception of the First Amendment, Carter cites the legal scholar Harold Berman, who asserts that contemporary thinking on the First Amendment is sharply discontinuous with that of the Founding Fathers. Berman further asserts that the establishment clause of the First Amendment should be understood to allow “government support of theistic and deistic belief systems more nearly comparable to the government support which is permitted to be given to agnostic and atheist belief systems.”184 While Berman’s analysis addressees government support for faith-based endeavors, he identifies a phenomenon which some would consider to be a bias against religions by the very state(s) charged with protecting religious rights. Clearly, recent actions of legislatures and the courts have demonstrated this phenomenon. To fail in vigorously opposing such actions can have long-term and catastrophic implications for people of faith. Carter forecasts, “The potential transformation of the Establishment Clause from a guardian of religious freedom into a guarantor of public secularism raises prospects at once dismal and dreadful.”186 All one has to do is analyze the burgeoning list of mandates against religious freedom to understand the proportions of this very real threat. (See “Table of Legal Mandates” at www.ncbcenter.org.)

It will not end there. Ever-increasing threats exist, such as mandated assisted suicide and the recognition of same-sex unions, to name two examples. The question is, can the Church acquiesce under the misnomer of “the greater good?” Analyses of this conundrum have centered on proportionality of evil to good. There is a risk in refusing to comply with the legislative mandates (refusing to be complicit with evil) of losing one’s right to engage in the social and health care ministries of the Church. There is also the real concern that if the Church responds to the only morally tenable option – given the rulings in New York and California, for example – it would have to discontinue all prescription benefit coverage for employees. However, providing coverage for contraceptives and abortifacients may, in canonical terms, cause representatives of the Church to commit gravely imputable acts by cooperating with evil.

Grave Imputability

The concept of grave imputability relates to external violations of Church law. Canon 1321 §1 provides an insight into the nature of grave imputability: “No one is punished unless the external violation of a law or precept, committed by the person, is gravely imputable by reason of malice or negligence.” Thus, one is accountable for violations of the law through both intentional commissions (malice) and omissions of which they are culpable (negligence).195 The question is, could representatives of the Church be committing gravely imputable acts by allowing their employee benefit plans to pay for contraceptive drugs and devices, including abortifacients? Specifically, could they be considered in violation of canon 1282, which states, “All clerics or lay persons who take part in the administration of ecclesiastical goods by a legitimate title are bound to fulfill their functions in the name of the Church according to the norm of law?”

There is no question that the use of contraceptives, even by married couples, is gravely and intrinsically evil. Pope Paul VI states, “It is a serious error to think that a whole married life of otherwise normal relations can justify sexual intercourse which is deliberately contraceptive and so intrinsically wrong.”205 The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that contraception, even to regulate births, is morally unacceptable: “The regulation of births represents one of the aspects of responsible fatherhood and motherhood. Legitimate intentions on the part of the spouses do not justify recourse to morally unacceptable means (for example, direct sterilization or contraception).”207

What accountability, then, is borne by those who facilitate such use of morally unacceptable means? Pope Paul VI states that to make it easy for another to commit this intrinsic evil also is “an evil thing”: “Not much experience is needed to be fully aware of human weakness and to understand that human beings—and especially the young, who are so exposed to temptation—need incentives to keep the moral law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for them to break that law.”211 Causing another to break the law is, in and of itself, scandal, which is morally illicit.212 Furthermore, the scandal is grave when it is caused by a representative of the Church, “who by nature or office [is] obliged to teach and educate others.”215

This grave nature of the matter is compounded by the fact that almost all state contraceptive mandates include insurance coverage for “devices” such as intrauterine abortifacient devices. Abortion is one of the most serious violations of the law. “A person who procures a completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication” (can. 1398). A latae sententiae penalty is one that is incurred ipso facto when the specific external violation of the law is committed (can. 1314). Abortion includes the destruction of the embryo or fetus any time after conception (fertilization).216 The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services are consistent with this interpretation of the meaning of abortion. Directive 36 states, in part, “It is not permissible, however, to initiate or to recommend treatments that have as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction or interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum.”217 Therefore, initiating or recommending the use of abortifacient drugs or devices is also prohibited.

Canon 1329 addresses the imputability as it pertains to accomplices without whose assistance the delict (external violation of the law) would not have been committed:

  • 1. If ferendae sententiae [imposed, not latae sententiae] penalties are established for the principal perpetrator, those who conspire together to commit a delict and are not expressly named in a law or precept are subject to the same penalties or to others of the same or lesser gravity.
  • 2. Accomplices who are not named in a law or precept incur a latae sententiae penalty attached to a delict if without their assistance the delict would not have been committed, and the penalty is of such a nature that it can affect them; otherwise, they can be punished by ferendae sententiae penalties.

Given these laws, are representatives of the Church accomplices when, under legal mandate, they allow their employees to receive contraceptive coverage, including coverage for abortifacient devices, through the Church’s employee benefit plans? A relevant factor that exempts one from a penalty for a delict is coercion. However, there are provisions to this exemption. One relevant exemption pertains to “a person who acted coerced by grave fear, even if only relatively grave, or due to necessity or grave inconvenience unless the act is intrinsically evil or tends to the harm of souls” (can. 1323, 4º). The presence of legal coercion is a fact in contraceptive mandate laws, but the act of facilitating contraception and the use of abortifacients is “intrinsically evil” and “tends to harms souls.” The bishops of the United States have issued a statement addressing the harm done to couples, in Married Love and the Gift of Life: “Suppressing fertility by using contraception denies part of the inherent meaning of married sexuality and does harm to the couple’s unity.”224 Thus, this exemption from imputability does not apply.

One also can look at the meaning of “malice” in canon 1321 §1: the Latin text uses the word dolo, meaning “deliberate intent to violate the law.”238 One can also examine factors in cooperation with evil: “The term ‘cooperation’ refers to any specific assistance knowingly and freely given, either as a means or an end, to a morally evil act principally performed by another individual or institution.”274 In formal cooperation in evil, the cooperators in the evil act have the same intent as the principal agents of the act. For the representatives of the Church to engage in explicit formal cooperation in providing contraceptives and abortifacient devices to their employees, they must have the same intent as the medical professionals who provide these prescriptions or services. The intent could also be implicit, in giving assistance for a specific portion of the immoral act or in providing prerequisite assistance to enable the immoral act to occur.

There is much evidence to support the fact that bishops and other representatives of the Church have opposed contraceptive mandates as a violation of the moral teachings of the Church. Thus, there is no malice or deliberate attempt to violate Church law by complying with contraceptive mandates.

Ethicists have examined the other levels of cooperation pursuant to adhering to contraceptive mandates. Peter Cataldo differentiates these levels as follows:

Cooperation is material if the act of the principal agent is not intended. The act of the cooperator in material cooperation is itself good or morally indifferent. Material cooperation can be either immediate or mediate. Immediate material cooperation contributes to the essential circumstances, and mediate material to the nonessential circumstances, of the principal agent’s act. Mediate material cooperation can be either proximate through a direct causal influence, or remote through an indirect causal influence, upon the act of the principal agent. Immediate material cooperation by an institution in an intrinsically evil act such as contraception is never morally permissible. Mediate material cooperation can be morally tolerated if there is a great good to be preserved or a grave evil to be avoided.275

The question is whether enabling payment for the prescription constitutes an essential circumstance, making the immoral act possible.

There are numerous permutations of employee benefit plans used by Church corporations. Employee benefit plans are funded in part by the employer and in part by all of the employees participating in the plan. There is nothing more essential to the completion of an act than the payment for the act, which would not be completed without such payment, thus making the material cooperation immediate. Even if one did not agree with this premise, and held that cooperation with contraceptive mandates constitutes mediate material cooperation, one would have to analyze the good being preserved and the grave evil to be avoided in determining whether the cooperation is licit. As stated earlier, there are goods to be preserved: the continuance of the health care and social ministries of the Church, and the continued employment of thousands of persons provided with prescription coverage. However, to preserve these goods requires cooperation in the intrinsically evil acts of contraception and abortion (through abortifacient devices). While canon 1324 §1,5o provides for a tempering of a penalty is a violation is perpetrated under coercion, and 1324 §3 precludes a latae sententiae penalty under such circumstance, canon 1323, 4o states that one is still subject to a penalty for violating a law, even if coerced, if the act is intrinsically evil or tends to harm souls.

The evil of cooperating in contraception and abortion is not the only evil to be averted. By cooperating with contraceptive laws, Church employers are forcing their employees to contribute to the insurance pools that pay for the immoral prescriptions and services. There is a third evil to be averted, and it is that which was predicted by Paul VI in Humane vitae. He predicted that government would impose its will in the area of contraception:

Who will prevent public authorities from favoring those contraceptive methods which they consider more effective? Should they regard this as necessary, they may even impose their use on everyone. It could well happen, therefore, that when people, either individually or in family or social life, experience the inherent difficulties of the divine law and are determined to avoid them, they may give into the hands of public authorities the power to intervene in the most personal and intimate responsibility of husband and wife.276

By collaborating, even under protest, with contraceptive and abortifacient mandates, the Church is paving the way for further government intrusions. This is a grave evil to be avoided. The Church has made every legal attempt to overturn the contraceptive mandate laws. To date, all efforts to secure judicial recourse have failed. To continue to comply with such mandates can only lead to a further erosion of religious freedom. Furthermore, to acquiesce to a redefinition of our ministries as secular entities not only is historically inaccurate but also has significant implications for the future of religion in the United States. To comply now would appear to be akin to negligence.

The second criterion of grave imputability for a violation of the law, culpable negligence, is also addressed in canon 1321 §1: “No one is punished unless the external violation of a law or precept, committed by the person, is gravely imputable by reason of malice or negligence [culpa].” To comply with contraceptive and abortifacient mandates could constitute ecclesiastical negligence pursuant to canon 1389 §2: “A person who through culpable negligence illegitimately places or omits an act of ecclesiastical power, ministry or function with harm to another is to be punished with a just penalty.” Canon 1321 §2 states that ordinary negligence due to the omission of necessary diligence is not punishable by law: “A penalty established by a law or precept binds the person who has deliberately violated the law or precept; however, a person who violated a law or precept by omitting necessary diligence is not punished unless the law or precept provides otherwise.” However, canon 1321 continues, “when an external violation has occurred, imputability is presumed unless it is otherwise apparent” (can. 1321 §3).

Need for Decisive Action

Concerning culpable negligence, no one could accuse the Church of not performing due diligence on the matter. Extensive legal resources have been expended in the pursuit of religious freedom. Now that legal remedies are being exhausted, the issue is how will the Church act in accord with its due diligence? Now is the time to act: to refuse to comply, so that no further harm can be done to the ministries of the Church, her employees and the future of religious freedom. The history of Catholic health care is being rewritten by legislatures and the courts, who are denying the ministerial nature that is its foundation. The essential meaning of religion is being redefined to deny its very essence. Furthermore, for the Church not to act will fulfill the prophesies of Paul VI, as well as those of Carter: “The potential transformation of the Establishment Clause from a guardian of religious freedom into a guarantor of public secularism raises prospects at once dismal and dreadful.”277

Since the U.S. Supreme Court declared the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 unconstitutional, efforts to remedy this in Congress have stalled. In 2000, Congress passed a limited version of an RFRA, the Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act. This legislation restricts government intrusion into the use of religious land, and protects religious freedom of institutionalized persons. The final recourse to redress the contraceptive mandate laws and rulings of New York and California is the U.S. Supreme Court. However, in October 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the challenge to the decision of the Supreme Court of California; and in October 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear a challenge to the New York Court of Appeals decision. Now what should be done?

Eventually the Church will have to say, “Enough. We will not be complicit in the violation of moral law.” This will require significant employee relations and public relations campaigns to demonstrate the source of the problem: violation by the government of religious freedom that the drafters of the U.S. Constitution intended to protect. Sufficient notice of the intent to no longer comply, perhaps by no longer offering prescription coverage to employees, will be needed. Then the very secular society that depends on the services of the Church, which is the largest provider of nongovernmental, nonprofit health care, social services, human services and education in the United States, will be responsible for the outcome.

 

 

 

Implications of Mandatory Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives for Catholic Colleges and Universities

You have asked us to describe some of the current issues surrounding conscientious objections to the funding of contraceptives through employee and student health insurance benefit plans. In particular, you have asked us to describe the general considerations confronting Catholic institutions that seek to comply with their understanding of their obligations under Ex corde Ecclesiae and Roman Catholicism generally.

We emphasize at the outset that this is not legal advice, and no one should treat it as such. Nor are we presuming to give religious or theological advice.

We also note that it is not only those Catholic institutions that conform in all respects to the most obvious reading of Ex corde Ecclesiae, canon law, or any other source of church authority that enjoy religious liberty under the law. At least since Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), it has been clear that it is the specific religious beliefs of the person or institution before the Court that determine the extent of conscience protection afforded by civil courts. The legal analysis that follows is therefore belief-neutral.

Introduction

The issue of contraceptive mandates is a new one for most Catholic institutions. The trend toward state-mandated contraceptive coverage in employee health insurance plans began in the mid-1990s276 and was accelerated by the decision of Congress in 1998 to guarantee contraceptive coverage to employees of the federal government through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).277 After FEHBP—the largest employer-insurance benefits program in the country—set this precedent, the private sector followed suit, and state legislatures began to make such coverage mandatory.278

The trajectory of state law and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) recent interpretations of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) pose serious threats to the conscience rights of Catholic employers who believe that they cannot fund employee prescription contraceptives without contradicting fundamental tenets of their faith. Should this trend continue, many Catholic institutions will not be able to comply with state law and the PDA while remaining true to their religious convictions. As a result, Catholic institutions might be compelled to suspend, or significantly restrict, the prescription health care benefits available to their employees.

Failure to exclude objecting Catholic entities from the requirement to provide contraception constitutes an abandonment of the government’s responsibility to protect against threats to the moral integrity of a large class of its citizens.279  What is at stake is therefore the right of an objecting Catholic college to remain “authentically Catholic” by its own lights.280

Overview of Governing Law

Catholic employers are no doubt familiar with Title VII, the primary federal law addressing employment discrimination. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin….”281  Title VII exempts religious organizations and institutions from its provision on religious discrimination, but does not exempt them from its provisions on gender discrimination.282

Title VII defines discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;” and specifies that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work….”283

This part of Title VII, commonly known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)284, was added by Congress in 1978 in response to a Supreme Court decision holding that an employer ’s selective refusal to cover pregnancy-related disability was not sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.285  The PDA specifies that it “shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion.”286  The PDA does not define abortion, and makes no mention of contraception.287

In 2000, the EEOC issued an opinion stating that the refusal to cover contraceptives in an employee prescription health plan constituted gender discrimination in violation of the PDA.288  Although this opinion is not binding on federal courts, it is influential, since the EEOC is the government body charged with enforcing Title VII.289  This opinion led to many lawsuits against non-religious employers who refused to cover prescription contraceptives.290  The first federal court decision in one of these cases—Ericksov. Bartell Drug Co.—came less than a year after the EEOC opinion, and agreed that employers with prescription drug plans have “a legal obligation to make sure that the resulting plan does not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics and that it provides equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes.”291 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of contraceptive coverage. But, since Erickson, new Title VII claims have been brought against Catholic institutions that did not provide contraceptive coverage.292

Current State Laws Concerning Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives

While virtually all insurance plans include coverage of prescription drugs, employers can opt to exclude coverage of the range of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)- approved prescription contraceptive drugs and devices.293  To counteract this policy, in the past two decades, 27 states have enacted laws to require insurers that cover any prescription drugs at all to cover all FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices.294 Furthermore, 16 of these states have mandated coverage of related outpatient services.295 Such state laws regulate college and university health plans for students as well as employees.

Catholic institutions are afforded limited protection in 15 of the 27 states.  These states have enacted conscience protections that allow institutional employers or insurers to exclude contraceptive coverage on religious or moral grounds.296  Under such provisions, a Catholic college or university may be able to exclude contraceptive coverage from its employee health plan. (However, the conscience protections do not extend to health plans offered by a college or university to its students.)297

The state exemptions ordinarily allow entities to opt out if covering contraception would interfere with the employer ’s “religious tenets” (e.g., Hawaii and North Carolina), “bona fide religious tenets” (e.g., Connecticut), or “bona fide religious beliefs and practices” (e.g., Maine and Maryland).298 Among the states that have enacted these mandates, Missouri is the most protective of conscience, allowing any employer to refuse coverage, regardless whether the motivation is based on religion or other ethical principle.299  The objections of Catholic institutions to covering contraception should meet any of these state standards, since Catholic institutions that object to contraception, sterilization, and abortion as “intrinsic evils” can invoke a number of doctrinal statements expressing the value and dignity of human life from conception and the sacredness of the marital act open to procreation.300

More complicated, however, is how the state laws define the religious employers to be exempted under their conscience provision. Some states do not define the term “religious employer ” at all, which could permit any institution that self-identifies as religious to claim the exemption.301  In North Carolina, for example, a religious employer is a non- profit organization whose purpose is to advance the “inculcation of religious values” and whose employees primarily “share the [employer ’s] religious tenets.”302  Thus, in North Carolina and states employing similar language, Catholic colleges would ordinarily be exempted. Hawaii’s statute is similar to North Carolina’s, although it also affords protection to nonprofit organizations that are owned or controlled by a religious employer, as long as the organization “primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity.”303 In New York and California, among others, the term “religious employer ” is interpreted so as to exempt Catholic churches themselves, but not the various organs of the Catholic Church such as Catholic Charities, or Catholic hospitals, colleges, universities or nursing homes.304

Catholic colleges are subject to the overlapping jurisdictions of the state and federal governments; a fact that complicates approaches to benefits decisions. For example, fully-insured health plans, such as those extended to employees and students of most colleges and universities, are governed by both federal and state law. Self-insured employee health plans, by contrast, are governed exclusively by federal law under ERISA.305  However, this federal preemption of state mandates under ERISA affects employee health plans only; student health plans remain subject to state regulations despite an institution’s decision to self insure.306

Since the PDA is federal law, a religious exemption to the PDA would be ineffectual in protecting religious employers in the 27 states that require contraceptive coverage. An exemption to the PDA would only affect those religious institutions that are able to provide self-insurance programs (that are subject to Federal ERISA) or in the minority of states that have not mandated contraceptive coverage.

Trends in the Law

The law governing contraceptive mandates has seen much change in recent years. One of the most far-reaching state contraceptive mandates was enacted earlier this year in Wisconsin. As of January 2010, Wisconsin will require all providers of health insurance to include contraceptive services, irrespective of religious affiliation, moral objection, or category of “religious employer.” The Roman Catholic bishops of Wisconsin issued a statement in response, decrying “this blatant insensitivity to our moral values and legal rights.”307  The new mandate will have direct impact on all objecting Catholic institutions and dioceses, except for the few that have the size and wherewithal to self-insure for their employees.308

The Wisconsin law is the latest iteration of a growing body of state law that rejects conscientious objections to contraceptive mandates. For instance, in 2004 the California Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities was required to cover contraceptives under their fully-insured employee health plan in order to comply with California’s Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act (WCEA). See generally Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).309

The reasoning in Catholic Charities of Sacramento was followed in New York, where the state’s highest court affirmed a decision that Catholic Charities was not a “religious employer ” for the purposes of a religious exemption to the state mandate on contraceptive coverage.310  Part of the intermediate appellate court’s explanation for overriding Catholic Charities’ Free Exercise claims was that “the paramount right of personal health…of many employees who do not share plaintiffs’ views on contraceptives would be subordinated to plaintiffs’ right to freely exercise their beliefs.”311  This reasoning manifests the courts’ and legislatures’ recent tendency to treat government as the guarantor of a limited set of state-defined benefits—even at the expense freedom of conscience—rather than as the protector of the liberty and integrity of persons.312

If other state courts follow the reasoning of the California and New York courts, then state contraceptive mandates will affect Catholic institutions in every state where state law does not provide conscience protections.

There is similar uncertainty with respect to the EEOC’s claim that the PDA provides for a contraceptive mandate for employers. Lower courts have split over whether Title VII, as amended by the PDA, compels insurance coverage for contraceptives. Compare Cummins v. Illinois, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LeXIS 42634 (S. D. Ill. 2005) (employee health plan does not violate Title VII if both men and women are denied contraceptive coverage); Alexander v. American Airlines, Inc., 2002 WL 731815 (N.D.Tex. 2002) (“[b[y no stretch of the imagination does the prohibition against discrimination based on ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition[s]’ require the provision of contra- ceptives.”) with Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (failure to provide contraceptive coverage violated the PDA); Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Mo.2006) (same); Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F.Supp.2d 979, 984-85 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (same); Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2002 WL 2022334 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (same).

Although the federal district courts have split over the issue of whether the PDA requires employers to provide contraception, the only federal court of appeals to reach the issue held that the PDA did not include a contraceptive mandate. In 2007, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that contraception was not sufficiently “related to” pregnancy to fit under the umbrella of the PDA. See In re Union Pacific Railroad, 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the court grounded its opinion on the fact that contraception itself is “gender-neutral” and the plain language of the PDA statute did not refer to contraception.313  An employee health insurance plan, therefore, did not violate the PDA by failing to include contraception coverage. Since the court ruled the employer ’s decision not to cover contraceptives did not involve a “sex classification,” it could not be categorized as a sex-based violation of Title VII.314

Given the relatively recent vintage of the EEOC’s interpretation (2000) and the mixed court rulings so far, it remains an open question whether federal law, like some state laws, will impose a contraceptive mandate on objecting Catholic colleges and institutions.

Legal Defenses for Catholic Colleges and Universities

Catholic institutions with objections to contraceptive mandates are not wholly without legal options, even in the face of federal or state law. There are two main kinds of legal defenses that Catholic colleges can raise in response to federal- or state-imposed contraceptive mandates.

First, there are various defenses arising from the federal Constitution or state constitutions that objecting Catholic institutions may be able to employ to defend against contraceptive mandates. Colleges may have recourse to state constitutional language and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which preserve free exercise of religion. Colleges may also raise defenses rooted in the constitutional doctrine of “church autonomy,” which protects internal church affairs on matters of theology and ecclesiastical governance from government interference.

Despite these constitutional guarantees, Catholic institutions will have to be prepared for arguments stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith.315  In Smith, the Supreme Court announced that the First Amendment’s free exercise clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability,’” simply because “the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”316  In other words, the fact that an act infringes on the religious beliefs or regulates the religiously motivated policies of a Catholic institution does not necessarily make the law unconstitutional.317 This is because, as the New York and California courts have asserted, their state contraceptive insurance mandates “apply neutrally and generally to all employers, regardless of religious affiliation, except to those few who satisfy the statute’s strict requirements for exemption on religious grounds.”318

In New York and California, “those few” may not include Catholic colleges. Nonetheless, objecting Catholic institutions can argue that the definition of a “religious employer ” for purposes of a statutory exemption should comprehend Catholic colleges with a strong Catholic identity, since there is a very strong argument that the mission of a Catholic college is “to inculcate religious values.”

That said, any constitutional defense will necessarily vary with both the location and the circumstances of the particular Catholic institution affected. Therefore experienced constitutional counsel should be consulted at the earliest opportunity.

Second, Catholic institutions can raise various statutory defenses to contraceptive man- dates. These include federal and state “Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,” as well as various anti-discrimination statutes.319  These laws typically protect against (a) religious discrimination and (b) “substantial burdens” on religious exercise, without regard to whether the government intended to discriminate. However, in the context of an EEOC action, the EEOC is likely to argue that statutory religious discrimination defenses do not trump gender discrimination claims made under the PDA.320 Moreover, since state religious freedom laws (including state constitutions) do not protect against action by the federal government, PDA claims brought by the EEOC would be relatively difficult to defend against on that basis.

Catholic institutions should be aware that all of these protections—constitutional and statutory—are subject to the requirement that the religious institutions’ claims be sincere, or “bona fide.” Although the courts will not delve into the reasonableness of a religious belief, they are competent to judge whether a belief is “sincerely held.”321  Insincere religious beliefs enjoy neither constitutional nor statutory protection.322 For example, a prison inmate who requests to be served a vegetarian diet for religious reasons but who nonetheless buys hot dogs from the commissary cannot invoke free exercise protections because his behavior appears to be insincere. In the context of Catholic colleges and universities, first acting inconsistently with the school’s religious identity and then later claiming a religious exemption (after a lawsuit has been filed) is unlikely to succeed.

As with the constitutional defenses, there is no one-size-fits-all legal strategy to law- suits attempting to impose contraceptive mandates on Catholic institutions. Therefore the key to raising a successful defense will be to involve competent counsel at an early juncture.

Areas of Consideration for Catholic Colleges and Universities

Depending on the state legislative developments and the outcome of future litigation over the scope of the PDA, objecting Catholic institutions may have to resort to creative arrangements to balance treating their employees and students justly and remaining faithful to their principles. Some possible courses of action and recommendations are outlined below:

Eliminating Prescription Drug Benefits Altogether. This option was proposed by the New York Court of Appeals in Catholic Charities of Albany, but has obvious drawbacks, including burdens on students, employees and their families who require prescription drugs.323  It would also likely present objecting Catholic institutions with the dilemma of reconciling Catholic teaching on living wages for workers with their beliefs about facilitating contraception, sterilization, and abortion.

Eliminating prescription drug benefits altogether may be a more appealing option for student health insurance plans (rather than employee plans).  Already, student plans tend to be less comprehensive than employee plans; students are typically offered a choice among different plans with varying levels of benefits.  Because basic student plans, or “catastrophic plans,” usually exclude prescription drugs or “out- patient treatment” altogether, these plans would not be obligated to provide “family planning services” under state mandates.  Moreover, unlike a university employee, a student pays an additional fee for health coverage offered by the university.  Thus, a student who desires prescription health benefits can simply opt for a private health plan instead of the university plan. Although the student might have to sacrifice convenience, a Catholic college might decide this is an acceptable compromise.

Attempting to “Out-source” Contraceptive Coverage. Another way that some Catholic institutions, principally health care systems, have dealt with mandated contraception coverage is by attempting to distance themselves from the actual provision of benefits.324 According to a 2000 report of “Catholics for a Free Choice,” more than half of managed care plans adopted by Catholic health systems have found “creative approaches” to contract at arm’s length to meet the state requirements and joint federal-state Medicaid mandate that entitles Medicaid recipients to family planning services and supplies.325  Some of these Catholic employers have attempted to distance them- selves from providing this coverage by separating out the amount of the premium that would be used to cover contraception and contracting with a third-party administrator to handle payment. Others contract with an independent insurance company to handle coverage of those services.

This approach would have the disadvantage of putting many religious institutions and individuals into a quandary of conscience.326 Such arrangements would also make it much more difficult for Catholic institutions to invoke religious freedom protections against facilitating access to morally objectionable services in other contexts, because plaintiffs would likely argue that the outsourcing arrangements contradict the institution’s claimed beliefs.

Form self-insurance pools. Another option may be for Catholic institutions to pool their benefits and liabilities in such a way as to self-insure. This strategy would allow Catholic employers to escape restrictive state laws styled after Wisconsin’s recent mandate, but would not protect against federal laws or EEOC action. However, converting from insured to self-insured has larger consequences than protecting against state law prescription contraceptive mandates. For instance, self-insuring would ex- pose the religious employer to financial risk whenever high-cost claims are filed.327

Be consistent in policy decisions and in media communications. A Catholic institution must be careful to ensure that all of its members’ actions are consistent with the values it espouses. Recent history amply demonstrates that religious institutions will be charged with hypocrisy, and incur civil liability, if they do not act consistent with their beliefs. Similarly, all media communications need to be consistent with the actual values of the institution. A civil court will be much less inclined to believe assertions of sincere conscientious objection if the institution has not been consistently acting and communicating in accordance with its claimed beliefs.

Make clear—externally and internally—what one’s institutional values are. It is crucially important that the administration of a Catholic institution state publicly and privately what moral precepts it intends to follow and why. Many religious institutions have seen religious freedom defenses fail because the institutions failed to assert their values openly, vigorously, and consistently. Catholic institutions also run the risk of liability if they fail to explain in detail why they believe what they do. Rooting benefits policies in specific Church doctrines makes clear where the institution stands, and that it is sincere. Sound theology can be a sound defense, even in civil court.

Dont carelessly discuss finances and costs of health insurance. Colleges and universities often take a business-like approach to certain decisions, even when there are underlying religious principles at stake. Make sure that the written record of any decision regarding benefits reflects the religious principles motivating the decision. Plaintiffs seeking to defeat a religious freedom defense often argue that denying certain benefits is “just about the money.” Don’t give a civil court reason to believe them.

Seek legal advice at the earliest opportunity. Every legal situation is different, and religious freedom issues can be particularly tricky in any state. Catholic institutions should get expert legal advice as soon they find out about a challenge to their benefits practices. Waiting to get legal advice until later often leads to mistakes that can be difficult to unwind.

Responding firmly. As the analysis above shows, objecting Catholic institutions have legal options. Immediately accommodating a potential plaintiff once he or she com- plains often results in only temporary appeasement and additional requests later. It is frequently better to respond firmly at the outset than to accommodate and merely delay the inevitable conflict until later.

Conclusion

The next few years may present difficult times for Catholic colleges and universities that have conscientious objections to contraceptive mandates. However, there are a number of ways Catholic institutions can continue to carry out their missions while minimizing the threat of government penalty. They should not be afraid to do so.

 

 

 

Ex corde Ecclesiae: Echoes of Newman’s The Idea of a University

Having taught courses in the philosophy of education in two of the largest Catholic universities of the country for twenty years, I have more than a passing interest in the field. When the invitation came to consider presenting a paper to a conference sponsored by The Cardinal Newman Society to commemorate the bicentennial of Cardinal Newman’s birth,286 I immediately thought of his magisterial work, The Idea of a University, written exactly 150 years ago, referred to by Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua as “a work of great subtlety.”289 Fresh in my mind also was that United States episcopal conference had just completed a decade-long effort to bring Pope John Paul II’s Ex corde Ecclesiae to life in our nation. Could there be a connection between the visions of Newman and Wojtyla?

Both men spent considerable portions of their lives as university professors and chaplains. Both wrote only one major work on the nature of a Catholic university: Newman to prepare for the opening of the Catholic University of Ireland; John Paul II to prevent the collapse of Catholic higher education worldwide. Both struggled to see their vision implemented: Newman failed; the jury is still out on Wojtyla.

Many have noted that Cardinal Newman was the “unseen father” at Vatican II, and I don’t think that is much of an exaggeration. The late Holy Father, like every single one of his predecessors from the nineteenth century forward, and now also his successor, Pope Benedict XVI, made no secret of his esteem for the Venerable convert on numerous occasions. One could highlight the fact, for instance, that aside from popes, councils, and the beatified or canonized, Newman is the only person cited in the Catechism of the Catholic Church—and on three occasions, no less. Of course, the Pope also concluded his homily at the latest consistory by evoking the memory of Cardinal Newman and by presenting him as a model for cardinals of the third millennium; interestingly, that was also the consistory at which the recently late Father Avery Dulles, S.J. entered the College of Cardinals—another theologian-cardinal and convert.

So, I don’t think it far-fetched to suppose a Newmanian influence on the composition of Ex corde; in fact, a glance at the footnotes surfaces three direct quotes. I submit, however, that closer examination of the document reveals distinct and loud echoes of Newman’s voice, as well as a tone which is unmistakably suffused with the thought and spirit of John Henry Newman. Permit me to serve as your guide through this investigation by moving back and forth between the Cardinal and Pope John Paul II, asking not too irreverently, “Was Newman the ghostwriter for Ex corde Ecclesiae?”

1. What Is a Catholic University?

Newman launches into this matter with all deliberateness: “. . . when the Church founds a University,” he says, “she is not cherishing talent, genius or knowledge, for their own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and of making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society.”290

The title of Pope John Paul II’s apostolic exhortation is carefully chosen; in fact, he has been referring to Catholic schools as “the very heart of the Church” at least since 1981, if my tracking has been accurate.301 The Holy Father sets the stage by locating the university as having been “born from the heart of the Church.” Indeed, he makes a point which most commentators, Catholic and secular alike, fail to recall: that it was the Catholic Church which created not Catholic universities but the entire concept and system of university education. So much for George Bernard Shaw’s snide remark that speaking of “a Catholic university is a contradiction in terms.”

“It is the honor and responsibility of a Catholic university to consecrate itself without reserve to the cause of truth,” teaches the Pope.326 And then, directly quoting Cardinal Newman, he speaks of the Church’s “intimate conviction that truth is its real ally . . . and that knowledge and reason are sure ministers to faith.”328

One cannot gainsay the centrality of truth in the educational process, and here the Pope’s admiration for Newman knows no bounds, having referred to him as an “ardent disciple of truth.”329 Indeed, Newman made the battle for truth the cause célèbre of his life, fighting against “liberalism” in religion, which he defined as the belief that “there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another.” 330 Quite movingly does Cardinal Bevilacqua describe Newman’s commitment to this cause:

Cardinal Newman’s life is a testimony to the liberating power of the truth and a warning about the slavery awaiting those who exalt freedom above all. Unless our freedom is built on the rock of truth, our poor wills will be, as the Apostle says, “tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the cunning of men, by their craftiness in deceitful wiles” [Eph 4:14]. Without the kindly light of truth, human freedom gets lost amid the encircling gloom.331

The Holy Father goes on to identify four “essential characteristics,” to use his terminology, qualities that must be present in any university which wishes to be known as Catholic; they are worth citing in full:

  1. A Christian inspiration not only of individuals but of the university community as such;
  2. A continuing reflection in the light of the Catholic Faith upon the growing treasury of human knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research;
  3. Fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the Church;
  4. An institutional commitment to the service of the People of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent goal which gives meaning to life.332

Then follows counsel for all who make up the university community, which community must be, he says, “animated by the Spirit of Christ.” The Pope further argues that no true community can exist without “a common dedication to the truth, a common vision of the dignity of the human person and, ultimately, the person and message of Christ.” This last element, he maintains, is precisely what “gives the institution its distinctive character” (no. 21). University teachers are thus not merely providers of academic formation; they are called to be “witnesses and educators of authentic Christian life.” Most importantly, the Holy Father says, it should be evident that these men and women have achieved an “integration between faith and life and between professional competence and Christian wisdom” (no. 22). Nor should one expect that because many of them are members of the laity that this dimension would be less apparent or even totally lacking (no. 25).

Students, having been introduced to the meaning of Christian wisdom and having seen clear, consistent, and living examples of it in their professors, will logically be able to assume their roles as “the trained ‘leaders’ of tomorrow, of being witnesses to Christ in whatever place they may exercise their profession” (no. 24).

2. Why a Catholic University?

Cardinal Newman explains it thus: “. . . it is a matter of deep solicitude to Catholic prelates that their people should be taught a wisdom, safe from the excesses and vagaries of individuals, embodied in institutions which have stood the trial and received the sanction of ages. . . .” 333

Ex corde puts it this way: “In the world today, characterized by such rapid developments in science and technology, the tasks of a Catholic university assume an ever greater importance and urgency. . . . Its Christian inspiration enables it to include the moral, spiritual and religious dimension in its research and to evaluate the attainments of science and technology in the perspective of the totality of the human person” (no. 7). John Paul II continues:

. . . I turn to the whole Church, convinced that Catholic universities are essential to her growth and to the development of Christian culture and human progress. For this reason, the entire ecclesial community is invited to give its support to [them] and to assist them in their process of development and renewal. It is invited in a special way to guard the rights and freedoms of these institutions in civil society . . . (no. 11).

Along similar lines, it has been noted that Newman “urges the priority of literature over science in education,” lest the Church’s educational institutions produce little more than a generation of “technocrats”.334 That does not mean that Newman was opposed to science; by no means. In fact, following in the mentality of his fellow-Oratorian of the sixteenth century, Cardinal Baronius, Newman—like Wojtyla today—had a profound respect for science and its autonomy and even contended that “many scientists have been hostile to religion because theologians have often overstepped their mark.”335

The Pope goes on with very practical applications of these general principles, talking about the “integration of knowledge” (no. 16) and the need to promote “dialogue between faith and reason” (no. 17). He underscores the critical necessity for all research to be grounded in ethical and moral standards, both in “its methods and discoveries” (no. 18) because of the requirement to safeguard the dignity of the human person in all circumstances.

3. Does a Catholic University Have a Distinctive Curriculum?

John Paul II would seem to think so, and it is what we might call “the humanum.” Sounding an awful lot like the old pagan Roman poet Terence, with his “nihil humanum mihi alienum est,” the Holy Father argues that “there is only one culture: that of man, by man and for man.” He goes on: “And thanks to her Catholic universities and their humanistic and scientific inheritance, the Church, expert in humanity, . . . explores the mysteries of humanity and of the world, clarifying them in the light of Revelation” (no. 3). Even more boldly, he declares: “By means of a kind of universal humanism, a Catholic university is completely dedicated to the research of all aspects of truth in their essential connection with the supreme Truth, Who is God” (no. 4), with the result that Catholic institutions of higher learning “are called to explore courageously the riches of Revelation and of nature, so that the united endeavor of intelligence and faith will enable people to come to the full measure of their humanity” (no. 5). And here the Pope sounds a great deal like Irenæus, with his “gloria Dei vivens homo.”

Having mentioned Irenæus, one is immediately led to consider Newman. What does he envision for a Catholic university curriculum? The Cardinal observes that, although Pope St. Gregory the Great was not particularly fond of the literature of the pagan Greeks and Romans (although he knew it all very well), he was said by his biographer “to have supported the hall of the Apostolic See upon the columns of the Seven Liberal Arts.”336

As Newman presented his ideas for the founding of the Catholic University of Ireland, he applied this generic concept to a model for a curriculum:

. . . Civilization too has its common principles, and views, and teaching, and especially its books, which have more or less been given from the earliest of times. . . . In a word, the classics, and the subjects of thought and the studies to which they give rise, or, to use the term most dear to our present purpose, the Arts, have ever, on the whole, been the instruments of education which the civilized orbis terrarum has adopted; just as inspired works, and the lives of the saints, and the articles of faith, and the catechism, have ever been the instrument of education in the case of Christianity. And this consideration, you see, . . . invests [our project] with a solemnity and moment of a peculiar kind, for we are but reiterating an old tradition, and carrying on those august methods of enlarging the mind, and cultivating the intellect, and refining the feelings, in which the process of civilization has ever consisted.337

The venerable Cardinal also spoke specifically about “Catholic literature,” for which he offers a definition: “. . . by ‘Catholic literature’ is not to be understood a literature which treats exclusively or even primarily of Catholic matters, of Catholic doctrine, controversy, history, persons, or politics; but it includes all subjects of literature whatever, treated as a Catholic would treat them, and as he only can treat them.”338

Newman is advocating an approach to education grounded in the classics. How does one determine whether an author fits the bill? “A great author,” he says, “is not one who merely has a copia verborum, whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling sentences; but he is one who has something to say and knows how to say it.”339 He gets even more specific and even lyrical in expounding his vision:

. . . if by means of words the secrets of the heart are brought to light, pain of soul is relieved, hidden grief is carried off, sympathy conveyed, counsel imparted, experience recorded, and wisdom perpetuated,—if by great authors the many are drawn up into unity, national character is fixed, a people speaks, the past and the future, the East and the West are brought into communication with each other,—if such men are, in a word, the spokesmen and prophets of the human family,—it will not answer to make light of literature or to neglect its study; rather we may be sure that, in proportion as we master in whatever language, and imbibe its spirit, we shall ourselves become in our own measure ministers of like benefits to others, be they many or few, be they in the obscurer or the more distinguished walks of life,—who are united to us by social ties, and are within the sphere of our personal influence.340

Few commentators have missed how Newman was most impressed by the role “personal influence” played in the lives of people, as is the Pope, who stresses the critical importance of having faculty and administrators provide appropriate role models for the student population. John Paul II also underscores the “irreplaceable lay vocation” in the university apostolate (no. 25). Yet again, the Holy Father relies on Newman’s apprehension here: “Cardinal Newman describes the ideal to be sought in this way: ‘A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom.’ ”341 “The humanum” comes across loud and clear again.

4. What Is the Place of Theology Within the Curriculum?

Is there a place? Cardinal Newman framed it as a syllogism:

A university, I should lay down, by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge. Theology is surely a branch of knowledge: how then is it possible to profess all branches of knowledge, and yet to exclude from the subjects of its teaching one which, to say the least, is as important and as large as any of them? I do not see that either premiss of this argument is open to exception.342

He presses the point the point even further: “Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton’s doctrine is knowledge. University teaching without theology is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as astronomy.”343

When Newman tries to understand and explain why theology found itself being slowly but surely driven to the margins of academia, he offers a fascinating insight. He suggests the reason was rather simple, namely, that theology had become classified as little more than “taste and sentiment,”344 with everything reduced to subjectivity. In other words, the great irony is that theology’s Enlightenment-influenced movement away from objective truth has been its own undoing.

Cardinal Newman also realized the possibility for excessive claims on the part of theology, and so he warned theologians and other scholars as well: “ . . . according as we are only physiologists, or only politicians, or only moralists, so is our idea of man more or less unreal.”345 Tunnel vision is bad for everyone, which is why he went on to say that what would make him a poor academic would be if “I carried out my science irrespectively of other sciences.”346 Why? Because “all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject-matter is one.”347 Without fear of contradiction, Newman maintains “that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether.”348 And were we to make such an omission, we should see without a doubt how theology is “the soul of the university.” Here he waxes eloquent:

In a word, religious truth is not only a portion, but a condition of general knowledge. To blot it out is nothing short, if I may so speak, of unravelling the web of university teaching. It is, according to the Greek proverb, to take the Spring from out of the year; it is to imitate the preposterous proceeding of those tragedians who represented a drama with the omission of its principal part.349

Ex corde notes the central place for theology in a Catholic institution of higher learning and the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to the various subjects, such that the unity of all truth is acknowledged and becomes apparent. Therefore, we read that theology “serves all other disciplines in their search for meaning, not only by helping them to investigate how their discoveries will affect individuals and society but also by bringing a perspective and an orientation not contained within their own methodologies.” However, this is not a one-way street, for the “interaction with these other disciplines and their discoveries enriches theology, offering it a better understanding of the world today, and making theological research more relevant to current needs” (no. 19). Hence, the need for every Catholic university to “have a faculty, or at least a chair, of theology.” Needless to say, the Pope observes that Catholic theology must be “taught in a manner faithful to Scripture, Tradition and the Church’s Magisterium” (no. 20).

5. What Is the Relationship Between the Catholic University and the Church?

The Pope tackles this core problem of the past few decades, begun with the Land o’ Lakes Statement in 1967.350 In the most unequivocal terms possible, he asserts that such a relationship “is essential to [the university’s] institutional identity.” Furthermore, he declares that non-Catholic members of the university community “are required to respect the Catholic character” of the institution, even as the university “respects their religious liberty” (no. 27). Bishops have an indispensable role to play in Catholic colleges, engaging in “close and consistent cooperation and continuing dialogue” with the university authorities. Because of the nature of this relationship, bishops cannot under any circumstances be regarded “as external agents” to the life of a university which wishes to be Catholic; in truth, they are active “participants in [its] life” (no. 28). John Paul II also reminds us that Catholic theologians have a right to academic freedom, like all other professors. A critical part of that right, however, is also concerned with being faithful to the principles and methods proper to the discipline of theology, which is to say, fidelity to the Church’s Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterium (no. 29).

Rightly, then, does the Code of Canon Law stipulate: “In Catholic universities it is the duty of the competent statutory authority to ensure that there be appointed teachers who are not only qualified in scientific and pedagogical expertise, but are also outstanding in their integrity of doctrine and uprightness of life” (can. 810). The Code goes on to require of presidents and those entrusted with teaching in areas related to faith and morals a profession of faith, which has been drawn up by the Apostolic See (see can. 833).

But more than a century before the present Holy Father, Cardinal Newman—that great advocate of academic freedom—was capable of stating in the strongest language: “Hence a direct and active jurisdiction of the Church over [a Catholic university] and in it is necessary, lest it should become the rival of the Church with the community at large in those theological matters which to the Church are exclusively committed.”351 And there is more: “It is no sufficient security for the Catholicity of a university, even that the whole of Catholic theology should be professed in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and unearthly spirit into it, and fashions and molds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action.”352 Interestingly, Newman brings forth as an example of an institution which ran amok, precisely because of the lack of a direct link to the institutional Church, the Spanish Inquisition.353

A theology of communio354 underlies Ex corde’s notions of how everything fits together in a Catholic university. In this regard, the Pope once more cites Newman directly as he writes: “Cardinal Newman observes that a university ‘professes to assign to each study which it receives its proper place and its just boundaries; to define the rights, to establish the mutual relations and to effect the intercommunion of one and all.’ ”355 Was it Cardinal George of Chicago who suggested that the issue was not the place of the Church in the university but the place of the university in the Church?

6. Some Concluding Considerations

The Holy Father has much more to say on other significant issues, but time does not permit adequate attention to be given to such things as how the Catholic university serves both the Church and society; what kind of pastoral ministry should be exercised on campus; the unique contribution which should be made to contemporary culture by Catholic colleges; and the central place of evangelization in university priorities, goals, and objectives. In this context, it is worth looking to Newman’s thoughts on university preaching, for they are reflective of his overall approach to pastoral ministry for university students.

Allow me now to highlight a few of the more salient points of Ex corde Ecclesiae and The Idea of a University.

  1. Notice that Pope John Paul II, like Newman a century earlier, stresses the existence of the Catholic university for the advancement of truth. That should be the case for any institution of higher learning, but in this post-Enlightenment period in which we find ourselves, academia has lost its moorings in its abandonment of belief in truth. Truth has been replaced by opinion and/or ideology—at least as far as religious matters are concerned, although we note with fascination that in math class two plus two still equals four, regardless of personal opinion or fancy and regardless of anyone’s suggestion that such a position might be “authoritarian.”
  2. I hope you did not miss the Pope’s appeal to an interdisciplinary approach to learning—another “Newmanian” echo. Indeed, the Catholic philosophy of education is rooted in our belief that all truth is one, causing us to operate from a unified vision of reality. No unhealthy compartmentalization for us! For we recall that the word “university” itself means that the various disciplines are presented and studied in such a manner as to “turn toward the one,” converging in what the Pope calls “a single reality,”356 that is, bringing all the little truths of the several sciences into unity in the one great Truth, Who is the Inspiration and Source of all academic inquiry. Therefore, what is learned in one department of a university should eventually mesh in a holistic way with what is gained in another. And while there is no such thing as a Catholic brand of math or a Catholic take on science, our ethical and moral reflection must necessarily undergird it all. Therefore, we should be able to say with confidence that in a truly Catholic university the truths of the Catholic Faith will never be contradicted in any forum, if for no other reason than the simple fact that all truth is one and mutually reinforcing. Way back in the third century, Tertullian asked what he thought was a rhetorical question: “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” By which he meant to imply that theology and humanistic sciences had little or nothing to do with each other. The Church disagreed in a definitive fashion, and, in the midst of the Age of Faith, she began the university system.
  3. Both Newman and Wojtyla place in clear relief the fact that in a Catholic university the local bishop and the teaching authority of the Church can never be perceived as extrinsic, let alone oppressive, realities. Since the Catholic educational institution comes into existence because of faith, is sustained because of faith, and has its only valid rationale because of faith, it is patently absurd to regard matters of faith as foreign or alien to its life.
  4. The Pope obviously expects great things from Catholic colleges, something besides mere cosmetic changes, in many instances. More than crucifixes on classroom walls and collars on the clergy is being sought—although these two are certainly steps in the right direction. What the Pontiff has in mind is an educational establishment which breathes Catholic air, and that can come from nothing less than a total permeation of the curriculum and every other program with a fully Catholic spirit. And this philosophy of education jumps off every page of Cardinal Newman’s The Idea of a University.

In sum, could we argue, basing ourselves on Newman and Wojtyla, that the only true university is a Catholic university, pace George Bernard Shaw?

If we take our time-machine up to the present, we might ask what the current Pope has to offer on this topic. It is interesting to note that in the massive corpus of Joseph Ratzinger, one finds very little on Catholic education. Since he changed his name to Benedict XVI, however, he has dealt with the topic extensively. Not surprisingly, all eyes and ears were focused on him as he was to meet with Catholic educators in Washington, D.C. on April 17, 2008. The encounter was originally billed as an address to the presidents of America’s Catholic colleges and universities. Word has it that the interest-level of most of the intended audience was so low that the event was re-fashioned into a more generic grouping.

I am going to offer a decidedly minority opinion about the papal talk. First, it cannot be ignored that Ex corde was not mentioned even once—not even as a footnote. Secondly, of a four-page discourse, less than a quarter of the document could be considered as directed specifically to institutions of higher learning and actually, only one paragraph was uniquely suited to colleges and universities. Why did this turn of events occur?

I want to suggest that Pope Benedict has come to the conclusion that the vast majority of Catholic colleges and universities in the United States are beyond repair and sees no reason to expend time and energy on a lost cause. I think Pope John Paul had come to a similar judgment on American religious life and so just dropped the entire project, turning his attention to encouraging new religious communities, rather than focusing on the reform of existing ones. I suspect the present Holy Father has determined to adopt a like course in regard to American colleges and universities that once were rooted in a strong ecclesial identity and no longer are. Simply put: Don’t waste effort on institutions that will die; support new ones that have a truly Catholic ethos and sensibility. Time will tell whether that is the precise course he is charting and, if so, how wise such a course might be.

Pope John Paul II issued Ex corde on the Solemnity of the Assumption in 1990. Throughout his pontificate, he consistently presented the Sedes Sapientiæ as the model for Catholic scholars. Once more, we find a connection to Cardinal Newman here, for it was Newman who headed each of his University essays with the invocation “Sedes Sapientiæ, Ora pro nobis,” and actually dedicated the University to Our Lady under this very title.357 But why? Because, Newman asserted, the Seat of Wisdom was a model for simple believers and for theologians alike because she operates from faith and reason at one and the same time. The great convert wrote:

Thus, St. Mary is our pattern of faith, both in the reception and the study of Divine Truth. She does not think it enough to accept, she dwells upon it; not enough to submit to the Reason, she reasons upon it; and not indeed reasoning first, and believing afterwards, with Zacharias, yet first believing without reasoning, next from love and reverence, reasoning after believing. And thus she symbolizes to us, not only the faith of the unlearned, but of the doctors of the Church also, who have to investigate, and weigh, and define, as well as to profess the Gospel; to draw the line between truth and heresy; to anticipate or remedy the various aberrations of wrong reason; to combat pride and recklessness with their own arms; and thus to triumph over the sophist and the innovator.358

May the Virgin who guided the steps of Cardinal Newman to the fullness of truth, as she guided Pope John Paul II and now guides Pope Benedict XVI, ensure for us a Catholic Academy of the third millennium which is wholly directed toward her Son, Who is Truth Incarnate.